- (1.) The Court: In this writ proceeding the petitioner (hereinafter referred to as the workman) has challenged Memo. dated 6.6.97 issued by the Dy. Secretary, Government of West Bengal, Labour Department intimating the workman that in the terms of section 12(5) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 the Government do not consider the matter to be a fit case for making reference to any adjudicating forum.
(2.) It appears that the workman was an employee of respondent No. 3 (hereinafter referred to as the company). The company initiated a disciplinary proceeding against the workman and dismissed the workman from the services of the company. Since an industrial dispute between the company and their workmen was pending before the 7th Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal, the company preferred an application under section 33(2) (b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 before the Tribunal for approval of the action in dismissing the workman.
(3.) It appears that by an order No. 36 dated 13th March, 1992 the Tribunal passed an order refusing to approve the action of the company. It further appears that being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the aforesaid order No. 36 dated 13th March, 1992 passed by the Tribunal company instituted a writ proceeding being Matter No. 2918 of 1992. It appears that on July 8, 1993 Susanta Chatterji, J. (as his Lordship then was) by an order quashed the said order No. 36 dated 13th March, 1992 passed by the Tribunal and the matter was sent back on remand before the Tribunal. The relevant portion of the judgment and order passed by Susanta Chatterji, J., on July 8, 1993 in Matter No. 2918 of 1992 is quoted hereinbelow :- "Upon perusal of the materials on record this court is of the view that the Tribunal has to approach the matter impartially independently and impassionately : The findings and the reasons of the Tribunal in refusing the approval do not appear to be fair and justified inasmuch as there is no proper appreciation of the enquiry report. Instead the Tribunal has considered the merit of the evidences adduced on behalf of the Company before the Enquiry officer. This is certainly beyond the scope of the scope of section 33(2) (b) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The Tribunal sat for a limited purpose as to whether proper procedure was followed and whether there was any misconduct within the ambit of Clause 21 (a) of the Certified Standing Orders. Anything beyond the same will be unwarranted and uncalled for. The Tribunal, as this court finds, has gone beyond the scope of section 33(2) (b) in assessing the merit of the evidence in the manner as done in the instant case. This judgment suffers from certain in inherent defects and the same cannot be sustained in law. The Tribunal has to consider in the proper perspective and to see whether there can be approval strictly within the spirit of section 33(2) (b) of the Industrial Disputes Act. For the fitness of things, this court is of the view that the Tribunal should consider afresh the application of the company whether an approval should be granted by giving an opportunity to both sides and pass a fresh reasoned order in the manner as desired under section 33(2) (b) of the Act. The matter is sent back on remand before the Tribunal and the impugned order is quashed accordingly. It is expected that the Tribunal will dispose the matter within a period of 4 months from the date of communication of the order.";