- (1.) THIS writ application was moved by the petitioner company challenging an order of Requisition No. 21682 dated 17r. h July 1985 which is annexure 'b' to the writ petition under the provision of Sub-section 1 of section 3 of the West Bengal Land (Requisition 8 Acquisition) "act 1948. The Additional District Magistrate, Howrah requisitioned the property in question which was already in the occupation of Mesrs. Remington Rand of India Ltd. , the Respondent No. 5 herein, for the purpose of providing proper facilities for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community and for creating employment opportunities to the people.
(2.) THE facts relevant for the purpose of this case in short are as follows : By a registered Deed of lease dated 16th of September 1959, the petitioner company who was the owner of' the Jute Mill in Shibpur, Howrah granted a lease of a portion of its Mill promises in favour of the Respondent No. 5, Remington Rand of India Ltd. for a term of 20 years begining from let of September 1959 which expired with effect from 1st of September 1979 at a monthly rent of Rs. 17,250/ -. Before the expiry of the said lease period of 20 years the petitioner company by the notice dated 7th of February 1979 required the respondent no. 5, Remington Rand of India Ltd. to deliver peaceful and vacant possession of the said premises to the petitioner company on the expiry of the period stipulated in the Deed of Lease dated 16th September, 1959. After the lease period-expired with effect from 1st September 1979, the Respondent company did not deliver possession of the said premises. Thereafter, on 21st of April, 1980 the petitioner company filed a suit for eviction of the respondent company in Title Suit No. 46 of 1980 in the Court of Subordinate Judge, Howrah. Upon the petitioners' application made before this High Court under Clause 13 of the Letters Patent for transfer of the said suit to this Hon'ble court, the said suit was transferred before this Court for expeditious hearing on the basis of the allegation that the Respondents were delaying the final hearing of the said suit on some plea or other. On 29th May, 1985, the said suit appeared for final hearing and on that day the Respondent Company moved an application for amendment of the written statement. The said amendment was allowed by His Lordship Hon'ble Mr. Justice B. C. Basak of this Court and the matter was directed to be listed on 4th june, 1985. On that date in course of hearing of the said amendment application, His Lordship Hon'ble Mr. Justice B. C. Basak of this Court enquired from the parties whether the suit could be settled by the parties agreeing upon the grant of fresh demise in favour of the Respondent company at an enhanced rate of rent fixed having regard to the market rate. The matter was adjourned for effecting a settlement between the parties. Thereafter, the respondent company offered the terms of settlement to the petitioner company, but the petitioner company could not agree and according to the petitioner company, the Respondents have no intention to pay the market rate of rent for the said premises and the Respondent company wanted to continue in occupation of the premises at the old rate of rent fixed in the year 1959. It is stated by the petitioner company that the Respondent company is a flourishing concern and the available profit before taxation for the year ending 31st March 1984 was Rs. 240. 01 lakhs and the net profit was rs. 86. 01 lakhs. It is stated that the Respondent company offered dividend during that period at the rate of 20%. When the suit was adjourned for effecting a compromise between the parties, this order of requisition was served upon the petitioner company for continuing in occupation of the premises in question of the respondent company. This order of requisition is under challenge.
(3.) THE petitioner company challenged the validity of the order of requisition on the ground that an order of requisition could only be passed under the provision of the impugned Act if the purpose which was specifically mentioned by the legislature is fulfilled or in other words, it is only for the purpose of fulfillment of any if the purposes specified in the Act, the property could be requisitioned. It is stated that the order of requisition was passed on the basis of formation of an opinion that it was necessary for the purpose of providing proper facilities for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community and for creating employment opportunities to the people. It is alleged and not in dispute that the Respondent Company for whose benefit the order of requisition was issued, it engaged in the manufacturing of typewriter machines,, It is contended that Typewriter machine cannot be said to be a thing which is necessary for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community. The words supplies and services essential to the life of the community have got its own meaning and the meaning of this expression could not be enlarged to bring within its fold all matters and things which are not strictly supplies and services essential to the life of the community. It is; stated that under the provision of the said Act, requisition could not be made for a private company and in this connection, reference was made to the provision of land Acquisition Act particularly Part VI thereof which provides the mode of acquisition of property under the provision of land acquisition Act for the purpose of a company and one of the pre-requisite for acquiring property for a company is that the company must bona-fide attempt to purchase the said property and secondly, such acquisition could only be made for a public purpose. It is stated that the order of requisition could only be passed under the impugned Act which is made for speedy requisition of the property to meet with the urgent situation connected with supplies and services essential to the life of the community or for increasing employment opportunities for the people by establishing commercial estates and industrial estates and/or for proper facilities for transport, communication, irrigation or drainage etc. It is next submitted on behalf of the petitioner company that the order of requisition was issued in colourable exercise of power under the law inasmuch as, it stated that in the instant case, admittedly the lease period had expired and after the expiry of the lease period, the Respondent company failed and neglected to deliver possession and thereafter for recovery of possession, a suit was filed and that during the pendency of the said suit, when the attempt for effecting compromise failed, the summary power of requisition under the impugned Act was invoked solely for the purpose or protecting a company who was in occupation of the premises in question as a lessee and after the lease expired it failed to deliver possession for which a suit was filed and also refused to pay the market rate of rent on the contrary by invoking the summary power of requisition the property was requisitioned. It is submitted by the petitioner company that tine State Government by the exercise of an emergency intended the Respondent company to continue in possession at the old rate at the cost of the petitioner company who is facing a great financial crises and it is stated that the existence of the petitioner company is at stake. It is further submitted that there could not be any public interest and/or public purpose behind the order of requisition, particularly, in view of the fact that the suit was pending in the matter, which was adjourned for settlement and during this interregnum period this action was taken. Further by the impugned order of requisition, it is provided that the possession of the property in question would be taken over and delivered to the Respondent Company which is a private company. It is stated that within the scope of the said Act, the same is on the face of it without jurisdiction and without the authority of law. It is further stated that though in the said order of requisition that the land described in the schedule thereto would be delivered to the respondent company on 17th July, 1985 after taking possession at 1 p. m. on 17th July 1985, the order of requisition was delivered and served the petitioner company long after 1 p. m. on 17th of July 1985. It is further submitted that the said order of requisition would not fulfill any of its purposes mentioned in the Act as such it must be held that malafide was the foundation of the said order of requisition and that the same is nothing but a malice in law.;