Sabyasachi Mukharji, J. - (1.) In this application under section 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, the petitioner Shalimar Rope Works Limited wants the existence, validity and effect of the arbitration agreement contained in the contract dated the 26th February, 1976 be determined and declared void.
(2.) The controversy lies within a short compass. The petitioner entered into a contract in writing with the Jute Corporation of India Ltd. on the 26th February, 1976. The said contract contained an arbitration clause, which is clause 11. It is not necessary for my purpose in view of the points urged, to set out the said arbitration clause. The case of the petitioner is that the contract in question comes within the mischief of the Forward Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1952. There is no dispute that this is a forward contract. There is also no dispute that the respondent, viz., the Jute Corporation of India Ltd., was not a member of any recognised association which membership would have taken out the contract in question, out of the mischief of the Act. It is also not necessary for me to deal in detail with the provisions of the said Act. The said Act makes all contracts except, those mentioned in certain conditions and in certain manner void. Sections 15 and 18 are relevant for this purpose.
(3.) If the said contract is void, the arbitration clause being a part of the same contract would also fall. But section 27 of the said Act empowers the Central Government by notification in the official gazette to exempt subject to such conditions and in such circumstances and in such areas as may be specified in the notification, any contract or class of contracts from the operation of all or any of the provisions of the Act. It is the case of the respondent that pursuant to the said power granted to the Central Government under section 27 of the Act as aforesaid, a notification was issued on the 18th July, 1973. As the only argument centers round the effect and on the construction of the said notification, it would be material to set out the said notification in extenso. The said notification reads as follows : "3. 0.2211: In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 27 of the Forward Contracts (Regulation). Act, 1952 (74 of 1952) the Central Government hereby exempts all forward contracts entered into by the Jute Corporation of India Limited or by any per.,on or agent duly appointed in that behalf by the said Corporation for the sale or purchase of raw jute (including Mesta) from the operation of (i) section 15 of the said Act in the States of West Bengal, Bihar, Assam. Meghalaya, Orissa and Tripura and the Union Territories of Arunachal Pradesh and Mizoram and (ii) section 17 of the said Act in any place in India, other than the States or Union Territories mentioned above, subject to the condition that the said Corporation shall furnish to the Forward Markets Commission, Bombay, such returns in respect of the forward contracts entered into by the said Corporation, as are specified by the Commission from time to time." As I have indicated above, the notification in question was issued on the 18th July, 1973. The contract with which I am concerned, was entered into in February, 1976. On behalf of the petitioner it was urged that the notification in question read literally and grammatically would only cover contracts which had been, ''entered into" prior to the coming into operation of the notification. As this contract, with which I am concerned, is a contract subsequent to the date of the notification, the exemption does not apply or cover the contract in question, that is the argument made on behalf of the petitioner. In support of the proposition that a document be it a notification or a statute should be construed literally according to its ordinary meaning, counsel for the petitioner drew my attention to certain observations in Cranes on Statute Law, Seventh Edition, page 84 where the learned Editor has noted that where the grammatical construction is clear and manifest and without doubt, that construction ought to prevail, unless there be some strong or obvious reason to the contrary. Similar views arc echoed in Maxwell, Eleventh Edition, at page 221 where the learned Editors of the book reiterate that the Courts are reluctant to substitute words in a statute or add words to it unless there is a repugnancy grammatical or literal meaning used in the expression. It has been held by the Supreme Court in the case of Indramani v. W.R. Natu, AIR 1963 SC 274 that section 27 empowers the appropriate government to issue both prospective and retrospective notifications. I am not concerned so much with the question of the power of issuing prospective or retrospective notification. Counsel for the respondent, however, emphasised that normally a document or a statute should be construed in a prospective manner. He drew my attention to the observations appearing in Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, Twelfth Edition, where the learned editor has reiterated the view that if the enactment is express ed in language which is fairly capable of either interpretation it ought to be construed as prospective only. As I have mentioned before am not so much concerned with the power of the government to issue prospective or retrospective notification. With what I am concerned here is the question whether the notification' in question covers the contract which has been entered into subsequent to the date of the notification. It is true that a notification should be read fairly and in its entirety and normal literal meaning should be given preference. The expression, "entered into" in its strict grammatical sense might convey or cover only past transactions, but that kind of construction in my opinion is confined mainly to literary documents. Where legal notifications of this nature have to be construed then it is appropriate to take into considers t on the entire Notification along with the power under which the Notification is issued. As has been said very often, in India every act of communication either in a statute or in a Notification is an act of translation, therefore, the abstract theory of adherence to strict literal or grammatical meaning may not be quite appropriate in a case of a Notification of this nature. Read in its entirety and in the background of the power given under section 27, in my opinion, the Notification covers both the types of transaction, that is, contracts entered into or to be entered into subsequent to the Notification. If that is the position, then in view of the power given under section 27, the Contract in question does not come within the mischief of the Act and cannot be said to be void. In that view of the matter the arbitration clause cannot be said to be illegal or bad.;