JUDGEMENT
PROTIK PRAKASH BANERJEE,J. -
(1.) A very tragic case has come before this Court today. A model was allegedly being driven at 2.00 in the morning from a nightclub by an actor friend and due to an accident, which involved the car and both the persons in it were injured and as a result of the said injuries, it is claimed, that the said model died. It became a cause c? ((THELAW))lèbre. Had the model been alive perhaps they would have tried to hush up the matter and had another late-night party to celebrate, their safe return after a night of revelry. Because the model died her father is interested in being heard in a proceeding where the prosecution has alleged that the accused was guilty of culpable homicide not amounting to murder. The Court understands the desperation and helplessness of a father whose daughter has died.
(2.) This is not a case where the Court can ride a moral high-horse and lecture parents who have not taught their offspring about the perils of such a lifestyle. This is a not a case where the Court will ask itself the question where a so-called cultured society is going when it does not ask its members what their unmarried adult children are doing by driving at high-speed from night clubs in the shallows of the morning, instead of burning the midnight oil, working for a livelihood or studying or even sleeping. The Court shall not even try to ask Mr. Ghosh to remind his client that all actors do not lead a charmed life regardless of suicidal black bucks and compliant drivers. Rather the Court shall consider the point of law raised.
(3.) Mr. Ghosh has submitted that this case shows that the complainant himself is the investigating officer and it has been held in the case of Mohanlal v. State of Punjab, reported in (2018) SCC online SC 974 (Bench Strength - 3) as follows:-
14. A fair trial to an accused, a constitutional guarantee under Article 21 of the Constitution, would be a hollow promise if the investigation in a NDPS case were to be fair or raises serious questions about its fairness apparent on the face of the investigation. In the nature of the reverse burden of proof, the onus will lie on the prosecution to demonstrate on the face of it that the investigation was fair, judicious with no circumstances that may raise doubts about its veracity. The obligation of proof beyond reasonable doubt will take within its ambit a fair investigation, in absence of which there can be no fair trial. If the investigation itself is unfair, to require the accused to demonstrate prejudice will be fraught with danger vesting arbitrary powers in the police which may well lead to false implication also. Investigation in such a case would then become an empty formality and a farce. Such an interpretation therefore naturally has to be avoided.
18. In a criminal prosecution, there is an obligation cast on the investigator only to be fair, judicious and just during investigation, but also that the investigation on the very face of it must appear to be so, eschewing any conduct or impression which may give rise to a real and genuine apprehension in the mind of an accused and mere fanciful, that the investigation was fair. In the circumstances, if an informant police official in a criminal prosecution, especially when carrying a reverse burden proof, makes the allegations, is himself asked to investigate, serious doubts will naturally arise with regard to his fairness and impartiality. It is necessary that bias must actually be proved. It would be illogical to presume and contrary to normal human conduct, that he would himself at the end of the investigation submit a closure report to conclude false implication with all its attendant consequences for the complainant himself. The result of the investigation would therefore be a foregone conclusion.
18. The discussion in the present case may be understood as confined to the requirements of a fair investigation under the NDPS Act only carrying a reverse burden of proof. Baldev Singh (supra) related to a prosecution under Section 165A of the IPC. Nonetheless, it observed that if the informant were to be made the investigating officer, it was bound to reflect on the credibility of the prosecution case. Megha Singh (supra) prosecution under the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1985. It was held that the Head Constable being the complainant himself could have proceeded with the investigation and it was a practise, to say the least, which should be resorted to so that there may be any occasion to suspect fair and impartial investigation. Rajangam (supra) was a prosecution under the NDPS Act, an objection was taken that PW-6 who apprehended the accused could have investigated the case. Upholding the objection, relying on Megha Singh(supra) the accused was acquitted. The view taken by the Madras High Court in Balasundaran v. State, 1999 (113) ELT 785 (Mad.) , was also noticed as follows : '16. Learned Counsel for the appellants also stated that P.W.5 being the Inspector of Police who was present the time of search and he was the Investigating officer and as such it is fatal to the case of the prosecution. P.W.5, according to the prosecution, was present with P.W.s 3 and 4 at the time of search. In fact, P.W. 5 alone took up investigation in the case and he had examined the witnesses. No doubt the successor to P.W.5 alone had filed the charge sheet. But there is no material to show that he had examined any other witness. It therefore follows that P.W.5 was the person who really investigated the case. P.W.5 was the person who had searched the appellants in question and he being the investigation officer, certainly it is proper and correct. The investigation ought to have been done by any other investigating agency. On this score also, the investigation is bound to suffer and as such the entire proceedings will be vitiated'.";
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