Aniruddha Bose, J. - (1.) In this application the applicant seeks review of an order passed by this Court on 18th April, 2017 in a proceeding taken out by the applicant under Section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. I had chosen to pass an order for hearing the persons against whom the applicant wants to initiate the proceeding before I formed my opinion as to whether it was expedient in the interest of justice that an enquiry should be made into an offence which may come within Clause (b) of sub-section 1 of Section 195 of the 1973 Code.
(2.) Argument of Mr. Khosla, learned Counsel for the applicant, in substance was that there was a bar on hearing the proposed accused persons at that stage. He relied on the four authorities in support of this proposition. "i) Pritish Vs. State of Maharashtra, 2002 AIR(SC) 236 ii) Godrej & Boyce Manufacturing Co (P) Ltd. Vs. Union of India,1192 CrLJ 3752 iii) Madan Lal Sharma Vs. Punjab & Haryana High Court, 2000 CrLJ 1512 iv) Devinder Mohan Zakhmi Vs. Amritsar Improvement Trust, 2002 CrLJ 4485 ."
(3.) The context in which the aforesaid application under Section 340 was taken out would appear in the following passages of my order passed on 18th April, 2017: "1. This application, supported by Judge's summons has been taken out by Hungerford Investment Trust, (the applicant) seeking an enquiry under Section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Prayers have also been made for initiation of contempt proceeding in relation to making of false statements in four different pleadings in proceedings registered as C.A. No. 493 of 2006, counter-affidavit to C.A. No. 106 of 2015, counter-affidavit to C.A. No. 109 of 2015 and supplementary counter-affidavit to C.A. No. 360 of 2015. The applicant further seeks an inquiry into offences alleged to have been committed under Section 195(1)(b) of the 1973 Code, against the persons whose names have been disclosed in paragraphs 81 and 82 of the application and recordal of finding thereof and also direction upon an officer to be appointed by this Court for making complaint into the offences under Sections 191, 192, 193, 199, 200, 202, 209 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and for sending such complaint to the Magistrate having jurisdiction in relation to such complaint. There are other directions which the applicant has made prayer for in this application, which include referring the matter for criminal contempt of the Court to a Division Bench of this Court in exercise of power under Section 15(2) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. Direction has also been sought for providing the applicant with a sum of Rs.2,50,000/- being legal costs and expenses in connection with this application, in exercise of power of this Court under Section 382 of the 1973 Code. 2. The substance of the allegations of the applicant in relation making false statements in the aforesaid four pleadings is in connection with an application registered as C.P. No. 33 of 1988. That application, instituted under Sections 397 and 399 of the Companies Act, 1956 was dismissed by a learned Single Judge of this Court on 21st June 2007, and the order of dismissal was sustained by an Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court. Subsequently, Hungerford Investment Trust (H.I.T.) had taken out an application on 2nd July 2006, registered as C.A. No. 491 of 2012 seeking to substantiate control over Turner Morrison & Co. Ltd. and its subsidiaries, and various directions were prayed for in that regard. The main ground for dismissal of the petition under Sections 397 and 399 of the Companies Act, 1956 was lack of locus on the part of the applicant and it was found by the Court that the applicant had lost the eligibility criteria. A petition seeking to review the dismissal order of the Appellate Bench was also dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court on 7th April, 2015. 3. The specific plea of the applicant is making of false statements have been outlined in paragraph 2(a) of the subject application. The facts narrated in the aforesaid pleadings, which according to the applicant constitutes false statements, are:- i. "That the applicant company's entire shareholding in Turner Morrison of 2295 shares have been sold by auction in 1994. ii. That the 12 shares registered in the names of 4 individuals do not belong to the applicant company, iii. That Turner Morrison Ltd has never recognised the right of the applicant Company over these 12 shares. iv. That by sale of shares by auction in 1994, the applicant is now left with no shares in Turner Morrison Ltd." The allegations made by the applicant of making false statements appear to have a bearing on the reasoning based on which the applicant's petition for mismanagement and oppression was dismissed. The judgments and orders of dismissal of the applicant's appeal (APOT No. 440 of 2007) and the Review Petition were, however, not appealed against before any superior forum. 4. The applicant has named nine individuals and a firm of Advocates & Solicitors against whom it seeks to initiate criminal prosecution for perjury. In my order of 17th June 2016, I had directed service of copy of this application upon learned counsel for Turner Morrison & Co. Ltd. No service, however, has been effected upon the other persons whom the applicant seeks to prosecute. At this stage, Mr. Khosla, learned counsel for the applicant has submitted that no notice ought to be issued against those persons. His submission on such service is that there is bar on this Court in issuing such notice while examining an application under Section 340 of the 1973 Code at the initial stage. He has relied on four judgments in this regard being (i) Pritish Vs. State of Maharashtra, 2002 AIR(SC) 236, (ii) Godrej & Boyce Manufacturing Co (P) Ltd. Vs. Union of India, 1992 CrLJ 3752, (iii) Madan Lal Sharma Vs. Punjab & Haryana High Court, 2000 CrLJ 1512 and (iv) Devinder Mohan Zakhmi Vs. Amritsar Improvement Trust, 2002 CrLJ 4485 . 5. The Judge's summons in the present application was taken out on 18th February 2016. In my order passed on 4th February 2016, I had adjourned hearing of applications in connection with C.P. 33 of 1988, and the following order, inter alia, was passed in respect of two applications, being C.A. No. 714 of 2015 and C.A. No. 708 of 2015, both taken out in connection with C.P. No. 33 of 1988:- "In the event, however, any affidavit or application is there in support of the aforesaid two applications, such affidavits or applications will be heard together. I also want to make it clear that it is not possible for this Court to fix a specific date for hearing of applications in connection of CP No. 33 of 1988, as I am in the midst of hearing of another application in which, there are some contesting sides who are common to the both sets of litigants, the said proceeding being CP No. 90 of 1983. The applications involving CP No.33 of 1988 would be posted for hearing after conclusion of the proceedings taken out in connection with CP No. 90 of 1983 and for that purpose liberty is given to the learned Counsel for the parties to mention the same before this Court for listing after the proceedings arising out of CP 90 of 1983 are concluded." Subsequently, this application was called on for hearing at the instance of Mr. Khosla. 6. The Companies Act 2013 has become operational in the meantime. By a notification dated 1st June 2016 bearing no. S.O. 1933 (E), issued by the Central Government, the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal has become functional. A further notification has been issued by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs on 7th December 2016 in exercise of powers under Sections 434 (1 & 2) of the Companies Act, 2013 read with Section 239 (1) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. Clause 3 of this notification stipulates :- "3. Transfer of pending proceedings relating to cases other than Winding up.-All proceedings under the Act, including proceedings relating to arbitration, compromise, arrangements and reconstruction, other than proceedings relating to winding up on the date of coming into force of these rules shall stand transferred to the Benches of the Tribunal exercising respective territorial jurisdiction: Provided that all those proceedings which are reserved for orders for allowing or otherwise of such proceedings shall not be transferred." So far as different applications instituted in connection with C.P. 33 of 1988 is concerned, my prima facie view is that those applications ought to be treated as part or extension of C.P. 33 of 1988, and those applications ought to be transferred to the Tribunal. In an unreported judgment of a Coordinate Bench, delivered on 22nd March 2017 (in C.A. 563 of 2013 with C.P. 611 of 1988, CC 43 of 2014 Prasanta Kumar Mitra & Ors. Vs. India Steam Laundry (P) Ltd. & Ors.), similar view has been expressed in relation to a pending petition pertaining to allegations of oppression and mismanagement. Operation of that judgment had been stayed by the Coordinate Bench initially for a period of three weeks, and in course of hearing today, Mr. Bose, learned Senior counsel has apprised this Court that the order of stay has been directed to continue by the Coordinate Bench for two more weeks, and that an appeal has been preferred against that judgment. The opinion I am expressing in this order, I must re-iterate, is my prima facie view. Mr. Khosla's submission is that a petition under Section 340 of the 1973 Code stands independently and cannot be affected by transfer of other applications for the reason that the false statements alleged by him to have been made were in pleadings filed before this Court only. He has also submitted that under the law, the recall petition also ought not to be transferred, and question of transfer would not arise until the order is recalled. But having regard to the nature and scope of the present application, no elaborate argument has been advanced on that count.";