- (1.) IN view of the judgment rendered by a learned Single Judge of this Court on 15th December, 1995 in the case of UCO Bank vs. Concast products Ltd. (now in liquidation) reported in 1996 (1) CLJ 380, the appellant bank chose to file the suit in this Court on 28th August, 1996. The suit was filed after obtaining specific leave from this Court to institute the suit under section 446 of the Companies Act, 1956. Leave was granted by Hon'ble Mr. Justice Shyamal Kumar Sen by order dated 20th August, 1996. Soon after institution of the suit the plaintiff filed an application for amendment of the plaint, to make a minor correction in the amount claimed. The second application was an interlocutory motion seeking injunction and attachment before judgment against respondent Nos. 2 and 3. Thereafter, the original respondent No. 3 (substituted respondent Nos. 3a to 3d) moved an application for rejection of the plaint and/or dismissal of the suit. All these applications were filed in the year 1996-97. It is not disputed that prior to the filing of the aforesaid suit The Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions act, 1993 (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1993) had already come into operation and the Debts Recovery Tribunal was functioning. The suit was filed in this Court only on the apprehension that in view of the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court, in the UCO Bank's case (supra), the debts, Recovery Tribunal would not entertain the application under section 19 of the Act of 1993. This judgment, however, has been held to be "not correct" by the Supreme Court in the case of Allahabad Bank vs. Canara bank and Anr. , reported in AIR 2000 SC 1535. Therefore, as soon as the judgment in Allahabad Bank (supra) was pronounced by the Supreme Court, the appellant herein made an application before the Registrar for transfer of the suit to the Debts Recovery Tribunal under Section 31 of the Act. The request of the appellant was accepted and the suit was transferred to the debts Recovery Tribunal. Thereafter, notices were issued by the Debts recovery Tribunal to the respondent Nos. 2 and 3. Being aggrieved against the notice the respondent No. 3 in the suit filed a writ petition being Writ petition No. 1932 of 2001. The aforesaid writ petition was allowed on 9th january, 2002 and it was held that the Registrar, Original Side of this Court had no jurisdiction to transfer the suit as section 31 of the Act of 1993 would not be applicable in this case. Therefore, the proceedings pending before the Debts Recovery Tribunal were declared to be without jurisdiction. The registrar of the Debts Recovery Tribunal was directed to transfer the records of the suit to this Court. However, it was observed as follows : "therefore, there is a distinction between transfer of a suit by operation of law under section 31 of the Act and a case where the Court in a pending suit has lost jurisdiction as a result of interpretation given to an act of parliament by the Apex Court. Insofar as the second question is concerned, that is to be dealt with judicially by the Court and this aspect cannot be dealt with by the Registrar, Original Side of this Court in administrative capacity. Therefore, in the facts of the case, since section 31 does not apply the suit cannot be transferred by operation of law to the Tribunal and the Tribunal has not acquired any jurisdiction as a result of unauthorized act of transfer of suit by the Registrar, Original Side of this court. This Court, therefore, quashes the order which is Anncxure P-4 to the writ petition and directs the Registrar, Debts Recovery Tribunal, respondent No. 3 herein to transmit the records of the said suit to this court as early as possible preferably within a period of one month from the date of service of this Order upon the said Registrar. This Court, however, makes it clear that after the records of the suit are transferred before this Court and are placed before the appropriate Bench it may be open to the respondent Bank to make an application before the appropriate court and ask for proper orders and if such an application is made it will be open to the respondent Bank to raise all questions and nothing said in this judgment will be considered as an expression of opinion on the Bank's application for seeking further orders from this Court including an order of transfer. This writ petition, therefore, succeeds to the extent indicated above and the impugned order being Annexure P-4 to the writ petition is quashed with the above observations. "
(2.) RELYING on the aforesaid observations, the appellant moved an application (GA No. 1387 of 2002) in the Company Court for transfer of the suit to the Debts Recovery Tribunal. The Trial Court noticed that the three applications filed in the suit are still pending. Thereafter, by order dated 07. 10. 2005 the application for transfer has been dismissed with the observations that "the present petition is not maintainable, and the prayer for transfer of the suit in the present petition cannot be granted. "
(3.) THIS appeal has been filed by the plaintiff Bank/ against the aforesaid order.;