B.Panigrahi, J. - (1.) The Writ petitioner has claimed that his father was the owner of a number of mines in the State of Bihar. But after the death of his father, the petitioner looked after his business. During the life time of his father all the coal mines which the petitioner's father enjoyed as lessee were nationalised. Notwithstanding such order the petitioner as well as his father claimed to have subsisting interest over those Collieries. It is, inter alia, claimed that since the petitioner's father's time petitioner was granted lease on composite mines having alternative layers of fire-clay and coal. The petitionner claimed the validity of the Amendment Act before this court. But anyway, since the matter was disposed of by the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in AIR 1988 SSC page 1682 in the case of Tara Prasad Singh v. Union of India, the apex court disposed of the matter with a direction that the orders of stay in the matters of composite mines stood vacated. The petitioner has now claimed against the Union of India particularly, against the Coal Controller that appropriate direction be made for granting lease in favour of State of Bihar Mineral Development Corporation who could sub-let it in favour of the petitioner.
(2.) Mr. V.K. Gupta, the learned advocate appearing for the State of Bihar has raised an initial objection relating to exercise of territorial jurisdiction of this court. It has been contended that since the petitioner has not prayed any specific prayer against State of West Bengal nor any part of cause of action has arisen within the jurisdiction of this court, therefore, this court could not exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. It has been claimed under the Colliery Control Order, 1945 that Coal Controller means and includes the Joint Controller and the 'Deputy Controller'. Therefore since al the collieries over which reliefs having sought for by the petitioner are situated within the State of Bihar. It is the Deputy Controller who is having jurisdiction to decide such matters. Thus, the petitioner without taking recourse to filing of such writ in the Patna High Court could not have challenged it by invoking Article 226 of the Constitutional jurisdiction of this court.
(3.) The identical questioned come for consideration in the case of Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu and Ors. reported in (1994) 4 Supreme Court cases 711. It has been held in the aforementioned judgment as follows :- "From the facts pleaded in the writ petitioner, it is the clear that NICCO invoked the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court on the plea that a part of the cause of cause of action had arisen within its territorial jurisdiction. According to NICCO, it became aware of the contract proposed to be given by ONGC on reading the advertisement which appeared in the Times of India at Calcutta. In response thereto, it submitted its bid or tender from its Calcutta office and revised the rates subsequently. When it learnt that it was considered ineligible it sent representations, including fax messages to EIL, ONGC etc., at New Delhi, demanding justice. As stated earlier, the Steering Committee finally rejeted the offer of NICCO and awarded the contract to CIMMCO at New Delhi on 27.1.1993. Therefore, broadly speaking, NICCO claims that a part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court because it became aware of the advertisement in Calcutta, it submitted its bid or tender from Calcutta and made representations demanding justice from Calcutta on learning about the rejection of its offer. The advertisement itself mentioned that the tenders should be submitted to EIL at New Delhi; that those would be scrutinised at New Delhi and that a final decision whether or not to award the contract to the tenderer would be taken at New Delhi. Of course, the execution of the contract work was to be carried out at Hazira in Gujarat. Therefore, merely because it read the advertisement at Calcutta and submitted the offer from Calcutta and made representations from Calcutta would not, in our opinion constitute facts forming an integral part of the cause of action. So also the mere fact that it sent fax messages from Calcutta and received a reply thereto at Calcutta would not constitute an integral part of the cause of action. Besides the fax message of 15.1.1993, cannot be construed as conveying rejection of the offer as that fact occurred on 27.1.1993. We are, therefore, of the opinion that even if the averments in the writ petition are taken as true, it cannot be said that a part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court.";