Tarun Chatterjee, J. - (1.) This revisional application has been moved against an order being order No. 20 dated 17th of February, 1993 passed by Sri N. C. Sil, Judge, Claims Tribunal, 4th Court at Midnapore in Misc. case No. 153 of 1989. The petitioner took out an application under Section 110A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as 'the Claims Tribunal'). In the said application, it was alleged by the petitioner that the mother of the petitioner, Smt. Rothi Tudu (since deceased) along with the petitioner and many others were returning home after collecting fire woods from Purna Pani Jungles in the left side of the National High Ways No. 6. Suddenly, a truck barring No. ABK-9898 dashed the mother of the petitioner by ease a whose she was run over by the said truck and succumbed to her injuries on the spot. According to the petitioner, the accident took place due to the rash and negligent driving of the said offending truck. By an order being order No. 13 dated 30th June, 1990, the Claims Tribunal allowed a petition; filed by the petitioner under Section 92A of the Acton contest and awarded a compensation of Rs. 50,000/- to be paid by the Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as 'the Insurance Company') who was to indemnify the opposite party No. 2 viz. Sri G. Bose, the owner of the offending vehicle The aforesaid order also indicated that it would carry on interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of passing of the said order. It is true that from a reading of the said order, it appears that the petitioner was found to be the sole heir and legal representative of the deceased though she was married There is no dispute that the Insurance Company did not comply with the before-said award passed by the Claims Tribunal. It is above not in dispute that ultimately by an order dated 31st of August, 1993 the original application filed under Section 110A of the Act was dismissed by the learned Judge on contest holding inter alia that the petitioner being married and not being dependent on her deceased mother was not a legal representative of her deceased mother and as such was not entitled to any amount by way of compensation following the death of her mother, although it was found by the learned Judge of the Claims Tribunal that the death was caused due to the rash and negligent driving of the driver of the offending truck. As a result of non-payment of the compensation amount and the interest to be paid thereon in terms of the earlier order being order No. 13 dated 30th June, 1990, the petitioner levied an execution case before the said Claims Tribunal which was registered as Money Execution Case No. 1 of 1992. in the said execution case, the opposite party No. 1 filed an objection under Section 47 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure in which the executibility of aforesaid order passed under Section 92A of the Act was questioned in vice of the final disposal of the original petition under Section 110A of the Act By the impugned order, the Claims Tribunal allowed the objection raised by the Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. and held that the execution case must be dismissed. It appears from the order impugned in this revislonal application that since in the application under Section 110A of the Act, the petitioner was neither found to be dependent, nor was she found to be legal representative of the deceased, the order No. 13 dated 30th June, 1990 which was interlocutory in nature could not have any existence after the disposal of the original application filed under Section 110A of the Act. It was also found by the Executing Court that the order passed under Section 92A of the Act was always subject to the order passed made Section 110A of the Act as it was interlocutory in nature. Accordingly, the Executing Court found that since it was found in the order passed under Section 110A of the Act that the petitioner was neither a dependent nor a legal representative of the deceased which had not been challenged by the petitioner and in view of the fact that the order passed under Section 92A of the Act was found to be interim in nature, the order passed by the Claims Tribunal being No. 13 dated 30th June, 1990 cannot be executed and, therefore, the objection raised by the opposite party No. 1 as to the executibility of the said order must be sustained. Feeling aggrieved by this order, the petitioner has come up to this Court in revision.
(2.) On behalf of the petitioner, Mr. Chakraborty urged before me that the Executing Court had failed to appreciate that in a situation where interpretation of any provision of a benevolent legislation like Motor Vehicles Act is capable of having two different interpretation, which furthers the policy of the Act and is more beneficial to the class in whose interest the law has been promulgated should be preferred and, therefore, the Executing Court had acted illegally and with material irregularity in the exercise of its jurisdiction by not holding that under the provision of the Motor Vehicles Act which is a benevolent legislation, the claimant petitioner should be entitled to execute the order passed under Section 92(A) of the Act. It was further argued by Mr. Chakraborty that the Executing Court has failed to exercise its jurisdiction vested in it by law by failing to appreciate that Rule 2(i) of the West Bengal Motor Vehicles Rules lays down that "Legal Representative" has the meaning assigned to ii under Sec. 2(11) of the Code of Civil Procedure which is applicable to the petitioner as the deceased mother of the petitioner had left the petitioner surviving as her only heir and legal representative within the meaning and scope of Section 2(ii) of the Code of Civil Procedure.
(3.) The submissions of Mr. Chakraborty were hotly contested by the learned Counsel, appearing for the insurance Company. According to the learned Counsel for the insurance Company, no fault liability was la fact, in the nature of an interim award and, therefore, on the dismissal of the application under Section 110A of the Act, the order passed as an interim award got merged with the final order passed under Sec. 110A of the Act. Therefore, the Executing Court was justified in holding that the interim award passed on 30th June, 1990 was no longer executable. In support of this contention, that no fault liability was of an interim nature, the learned Counsel for the opposite party No. 1 relied on a decision of K.C. Agarwal, C.J. while holding the post of as Chief Justice of the Rajasthan High Court in the case of Dhapa Kanwar v. Ktihenlal & Anr., 1992 Accident Claims Journal 163. the learned Counsel for the opposite party No. 1 also contended that since the order passed by the Claims Tribunal dated 30th June, 1990 was a nullity, the same can be challenged at the execution stage. In support of that contention, the learned Counsel for the opposite party No 1 relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Joypur Development Authority v. Radheshyom, 1994(4) SCC 370 the learned Counsel for the opposite party No. 1 also submitted that since the petitioner was a married daughter, she was rightly found to be not a legal representative within the meaning of Section 110A of the Act by the Claims Tribunal and, therefore, the petitioner not being a legal representative of the deceased was not at all entitled to execute the order passed by the Tribunal on 30th June, 1990. In support of this contention, the learned Counsel for the opposite party No.1 relied on a Division Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Padma Devi & Anr. v. U.P. State Road Transport and Corporation & Ors., 1988 Accident Claims Journal 667. The learned Counsel for the opposite party No. 1 further submitted that even assuming that the married daughter may be considered to be a legal representative of her deceased mother, even then the petitioner cannot be permitted to raise the question in execution in view of the fact that in the order passed under Section 110A of the Act, it was found that the petitioner was not a legal representative of her deceased mother and that the above order which was not challenged by the petitioner, had now attained finality and, therefore, this question cannot be permitted to be raised in the execution stage.;