A.M.BHATTACHARJEE, J. - (1.) This writ proceeding has been referred to us by the learned Chief Justice as our learned brother Mukul Gopal Mukherji, J., who was initially hearing the matter, was of opinion that the proceeding involves a substantial question of law of general importance relating to the interpretation of some of the provisions of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 and should be heard and decided by a Division Bench. After hearing the learned Counsel for the parties, we have, however, found that the disposal of this writ petition involves a question slightly larger than what was formulated by our learned brother and since the entire writ petition has been referred to us for disposal, we have disposed of that question in the larger form.
(2.) The avowed objects of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 inter alia are to impose a ceiling on vacant lands in urban agglomeration and to acquire vacant lands in excess of the ceiling limit. Under Section 2(q) of the said Act, the expression vacant land shall not include "land mainly used for the purpose of agriculture". The only question involved in this writ proceeding is whether or not the Competent Authority can initiate proceeding under the Act even in respect of land recorded in the revenue or land records as agricultural land in order to be satisfied as to whether such record still represents the true character of the land on the appointed day under the Act in 1976 to warrant its exclusion from the operation of the Act. An affirmative answer would result in discharge of the Rule while a negative answer would require the Rule to be made absolute. We record an affirmative answer.
(3.) It is not disputed that the plots of land in question have been recorded in the Record of Rights as agricultural and Mr. Mukherjee, the learned Counsel for the petitioners, has very seriously urged that agricultural land being a prohibited area for the Urban Land Ceiling Act, 1976, once a land is recorded as agricultural in the relevant Record-of-Rights, the operation of the Act to such land shall at once stand excluded. And, therefore, Mr. Mukherjee has contended that the lands in question being so recorded, the Competent Authority could have no jurisdiction to initiate proceeding under the Act in respect of those lands. Strongest possible reliance has been placed by Mr. Mukherjee on the provisions of the Explanation (B) to S.2(0) of the Act which reads that - "land shall not be deemed to be used mainly for the purpose of agriculture, if such land is not entered in the revenue or land records before the appointed day as for the purpose of agriculture." And Mr. Mukherjee has contended that if land shall not be deemed to be used mainly for the purpose of agriculture unless so recorded in the relevant records, then, conversely, land shall be deemed to be used mainly for the purpose of agriculture if it is so recorded in the concerned records and would accordingly cease to be vacant land under S.2(q) and would thus go out of the purview of the Act. We are afraid that we would be misreading the provisions of Explanation (B) if we read them in the manner in which Mr. Mukherjee has wanted us to do. To our mind, the said provisions only mean that even though a land is in fact used mainly for the purpose of agriculture, it would still not be deemed to be so used for the purpose of this Act, unless it is also recorded as such in the relevant records. In other words, in order to justify exclusion from the operation of the Act, a land must satisfy two tests - (1) it must in fact be used mainly for the purpose of agriculture and (2) it must also be entered as such in the relevant records. Both the tests must be satisfied and both the user and the entry as agricultural land must concur. The provisions, therefore, unmistakably demonstrate that mere entry in the records as agricultural is not, by itself, at all decisive as to the land being used mainly for the purpose of agriculture within the meaning of the Urban Land Ceiling Act to justify its exclusion from its operation. And, therefore, if the mere entry in the records does not determine the character of the land, such an entry, by itself, cannot stand in the way of initiation of proceeding under the Act in order to determine as to whether the land is in fact mainly used for agriculture to go outside the ambit of the Act. As neither mere user without corresponding record, nor mere record without actual user, is decisive of the matter, it should be, and it really is, obvious that a mere record as agricultural can not prevent the Competent Authority from initiating proceeding in order to ascertain as to whether the land in question is really one which is mainly used for agricultural purpose within the meaning of the Act.;