Sabyasachi Mukharji, J. - (1.) THIS is an application under Section14 (2) of the Arbitration Act, 1940 for directing the arbitrator to file the interim award made and published by him on the 6th January, 1977, in this Court.
(2.) IN order to appreciate the controversy in this case, it is necessary to briefly refer to certain facts. Pramode Kumar Mittal, the petitioner herein, and the respondents all belong to the same family, hereinafter referred to as Mittal family. They are all descendants of the first respondent Bhuramal Chiranjilal Mittal. It is not necessary to refer to the actual relationship between the parties. There are several companies and firms which belong to the different parties to which also it is not necessary to refer in detail. The family was also interested in several trusts. Diverse disputes and/or differences arose in the Mittal family relating to and concerning the business of the said firms, trusts and companies and regarding the control and management thereof and also regarding the properties belonging to the parties. With a view to settle the said disputes the same were referred to the sole arbitration of Shri B. P. Khaitan, Solicitor and Advocate, by an arbitration agreement dated the 21st June, 1976. Thereafter, there were several meetings but on the 8th January, 1977 the petitioner received by registered post an interim award and/or directions signed by the arbitrator. The petitioner is asking that the said interim award and/or directions be filed in Court. One of the contentions raised in this application was that the directions sent by the arbitrator was not an interim award and as such was not capable of being filed in Court. Having regard to the nature of the directions given and having regard to the definition of 'Award' under Section2 (b) of the Arbitration Act, 1940. I am unable to uphold this objection. This objection was also not very seriously pressed on behalf of the respondents, who are opposing this application.
(3.) THE next question that requires consideration in this case is whether this Court has jurisdiction to entertain this application for filing of the award, in other words, whether this is the appropriate Court for filing of the award. Under Section2 (c) of the Act Court means a Civil Court having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject-matter of the reference if the same had been the subject-matter of the suit. In para 21 (1) of the award the Arbitrator has directed as follows: "21. (1) Andhra Steel Corporation Ltd. has a tenancy right in respect of premises No. 24 Alipore Road, Calcutta which is being used as residential house of members of Mittal family as also in respect of office space at No. 2, Brabourne Road, Calcutta. It has been agreed between the parties that Shri M. L. Mittal and members of his family will be entitled to the tenancy rights in respect of premises No. 24 Alipore Road, Calcutta as also the office space at No. 2, Brabourne Road, Calcutta 1, therefore direct the parties to cause Andhra Steel Corporation Ltd. to surrender its tenancy rights in respect of premises No. 24 Alipore, Calcutta as also office space at No. 2 Brabourne Road, Calcutta in favour of Shri M. L. Mittal or his nominee. Shri M. L. Mittal will be entitled to obtain the tenancy rights in respect of premises No. 24. Alipore Road, Calcutta as also office space at No. 2, Brabourne Road, Calcutta from the respective landlords either in his name or in the name of his nominee on such terms and conditions as he may think fit. I direct that the resolutions be passed in the meeting of the Board of Directors of Andhra Steel Corporation Ltd. surrendering the tenancy rights in consultation with Shri M. L. Mittal. THE implementation of these directions will also reduce expenses of Andhra Steel Corporation Ltd." Admittedly there was direction regarding the immoveable property within the jurisdiction of this Court, namely No. 2, Brabourne Road, Calcutta. THErefore, by virtue of the aforesaid direction this Court would have jurisdiction to entertain this application. On behalf of the opposing respondents it was contended that No. 2, Brabourne Road premises belonged to Andhra Steel Corporation Ltd. and was not the subject-matter of properties agreed to be referred to the arbitration of Shri Khaitan. It was contended that what were agreed to be referred to arbitration were the disputes regarding the properties of the parties in their own name or in the names of the members of their families but disputes regarding properties standing in the name of separate corporate entities had not been agreed to be referred to arbitration. THE arbitrator merely by giving direction in respect of the properties which had not been referred to his arbitration could not enlarge the scope of the arbitration, it was submitted. It, however, appears from the award of the arbitrator that all disputes had been agreed to be referred to his arbitration. THE opposing respondents dispute this assumption. THE question whether the No. 2 Brabourne Road property or other properties which are not standing in the name of the parties themselves and their families were the subject-matter of arbitration is a disputed question of fact which cannot and, in my opinion, should not be resolved in an application for filing of the award. It is clear, however, that there is a dispute whether the dispute in respect of the property which is within the jurisdiction of this Court and in respect of which directions have been given by the arbitrator had been referred to arbitration. That, in my opinion, would be sufficient part of the cause of action arising within the jurisdiction of this Court which will entitle this Court to entertain this application. In that view of the matter, I am unable to sustain this abjection raised on behalf of the opposing respondents. THE view which I am taking, in my opinion, is in consonance with the observations of the learned single Judge of this Court in the case of Anandi Lall Poddar v. Keshavdeo Poddar (AIR 1949 Cal 549) wherein the definition under Section2 of the Arbitration Act 1899 was slightly different. This view is also in consonance with the view of another learned single Judge of this Court in the case of Union of India v. Khem Chand Rajkumar (ILR (1973) 1 Cal 529). I, however, make it clear that the question whether the arbitration agreement had included disputes regarding properties other than those standing in the names of the parties to the dispute or of the members of their family, will have to be decided later on if this contention is raised in appropriate proceeding and directions, if any, given for filing of the award will not preclude raising such contention.;