Arun K.Mukherjea, J. - (1.) This is an application for a certificate under Article 133fl)(a) of the Constitution. The petitioner seeks to appeal to the Supreme Court against the judgment and order dated 2nd December, 1966 passed by a Division Bench by which an earlier judgment and order passed by Ray, J. on July 30, 1963 had been confirmed. The judgment from which the petitioner now seeks to appeal to the Supreme Court was delivered bv mvself.
(2.) The petitioner in his petition before Ray, J. asked for setting aside of an arbitration award made by the Bengal Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Ray. J. refused to do that whereupon the petitioner preferred an appeal to the Court of Appeal - which was also dismissed by G. K. Mitter. J. and myself. The judgment is therefore, a judgment of affirmance. There is no dispute between the parties that the amount or value of the subject matter of the dispute in the Court of first instance and still in dispute on appeal was and still is not less than Rs. 20,000. The only question on which we have to be satisfied before we can issue a certificate is whether there is a substantial question of law
(3.) In Raghunath Prosad Singh v. Deputy Commissioner of Partabgarh. AIR 1927 PC 110 the Judicial Committee had held that the words "substantial question of law" mean a substantial question of law as between the parties in the case involved. In Chunilal Mehta and Sons Ltd. v. Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd., the Supreme Court discussed the effect not only of the judgment of the Privy Council in RaShunath Prosad's case but also several other judgments of different High Courts of India and supported the view taken by the Madras High Court in R. Subba Rao v. N. Veeraju, (FB). The proposition that was laid down in that case was this that "when a question of law is fairly arguable, where there is room for difference of opinion on it or where the Court thought it necessary to deal with that question at some length and discuss alternative views, then the question would be a substantial question of law" After expressing general agreement with this view Mudholkar, J. who delivered the judgment of the Supreme Court observed: "The proper test for determining whether a question of law raised in the case is substantial would, in our opinion, be whether it in of general public importance or whether it directly and substantially affects the rights of the parties and if so whether it is either an open question in the sense that it is not finally settled by this Court or by the Privy Council or by the Federal Court or is not free from difficulty or calls for discussion of alternative views. If the question is settled by the highest court or the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well-settled and there is a mere question of applying those principles or that the plea raised is palpably absurd the question would not be a substantial question of law";