- (1.) I will ask Jenkins L. J. to deliver the first judgment.
(2.) having stated the facts substantially as set out above, continued : It will have been observed that the trust declared during the life of the settlor comprised a discretionary power given to the trustees to apply the income of the fund to an extremely wide and varied range of objects not confined to charitable purposes nor even to benevolent purposes, for the first proviso to paragraph 2 expressly provided "that the objects of the above trust are not confined to purposes which according to law may be held to be charitable purpose but shall include purposes of a benevolent and/or public character," and so on. I will not read the words again but the potential objects cover a very wide field.
(3.) It is common ground that the discretionary trust declared to take effect during the life of the settlor in these extremely wide terms was and is void for uncertainty so that no effective disposition was made of the income of the fund during the settlors lief. In that state of affairs it is contended by Mr. Cross for the appellants that on the principle recognised in a long line of cases the result of the invalidity of the trusts declared during the settlors lifetime was to bring about an acceleration of the interests of the persons taking in remainder. The effect of that, as I understand it would be that for with upon the execution of the settlement Dame Florence Flower, the widow became taint for life in possession of the fund with remainder to the three children in equal shares. If that were so it is common ground that no estate duty could be exigible on the death of Sir archibald under the provisions of section 1 of the Finance Act, 1894 or otherwise. (1) (1876) 3 Ch. D. 703. (2) (1886) 34 Ch. D. 357; 3 T. L. R. 204. (3) (1938) A. C. 575; sub nom In re Blake, 54 T. L. R. 703; (1938) 2 All E. R. 362.;