Dara Sheko, J. - (1.) The application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is filed by the plaintiff/respondent/petitioner (who will be called on hereafter as the petitioner) assailing order No.30 dated March 22, 2016 passed by learned Additional District Judge, 2nd Court, Purba Medinipur at Contain allowing the application under Order 41, Rule 3A read with Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and thereby admitting Title Appeal No.1 of 2014 condoning the delay of 2 years 7 months, as is preferred by opposite party Nos.1, 2, 3, 4 who were defendant Nos. 2, 3, 4 and 7 respectively in original Titile Suit No.45 of 1988. Said Title Suit No.45 of 1988 (renumbered from Title Suit 75 of 1986) for partition, was decreed in preliminary form on March 21, 2011. The operative part of said preliminary decree is set out hereunder:- In the result the suit succeeds in part. Court fees paid a sufficient. Hence, it is ORDERED That the suit is parly decreed in preliminary form on contest against defendant Nos. 13, 14, 16 & 17 and ex parte against the rest without any cost. It is hereby declared that the plaintiff has 7/72 shares in the 'Ka' schedule property. It is further declared that the defendant No.13 & 14 jointly have 3/4 shares only in plot Nos. 87 & 88 and ⅜ shares only in plot Nos.90 & 92 of Mouja Monoharchak. It is also declared that the defendant Nos. 16 & 17 have 55/72 shares only in plot Nos. 88, 89 & 90 of Mouza Subdi.
(2.) Since learned Additional District Judge upon hearing both sides condoned the delay by order No.30 (Supra), the penultimate portion of the impugned order is also set out hereunder:- Here, I find a prima facie case on the part of the appellants, so I rely on the observation held in 2014 (iv) Indian Civil Cases 733 wherein it has been observed that the delay may be condoned if there is a prima facie merit for adjudication of the issues and a litigant should not be ousted from the Court of Law on technical ground of limitation but if there is prima facie merit for adjudication, delay should be condoned. I also relied on the observation held in (2005) 3 Supreme Court Cases 752 wherein it has held that expression sufficient cause should be considered with pragmatism in a justice-oriented approach rather than the technical cause for explaining every day's delay. I also rely on the observation held in A.I.R. 1989 Gujarat 227 wherein it has been observed that the ultimate object of the procedural law is to see that substantial justice is done to the parties. Hence, it should be endeavour of the Court to see that the disputes are resolved as far as possible on merits in just, fair and reasonable manner. Victory or defeat on technical grounds should ordinarily be avoided and discouraged. The case laws cited by the respondents do not attract the facts and circumstances of this appeal.
(3.) Mr. Roy Chowdhury, learned senior Advocate for the petitioner inviting attention to this Court's order dated 04.10.2016 submitted that the causes as were shown by the opposite parties in their initial application for condonation of delay of 2 years 7 months i.e. 940 days in preferring the Title Appeal No.1 of 2014 were neither sufficient nor satisfactory, this Court has given opportunity to the opposite parties to disclose the better particulars, which occasioned the delay in filing the said appeal before the Court of Appeal below. But the particulars though filed by the opposite party Nos.1 to 4 on 7th of November, 2016 it did not develop the merit of their case. Mr. Roy Chowdhury further inviting attention to copies of different documents annexed with the counter affidavit dated 29.11.2016 submitted that the causes of delay as alleged were false, malafide and based on untruthful statements, which are liable to be rejected.;