- (1.) THIS appeal is directed against a judgment and decree of M. M. Dutta, J. By his judgment the learned Judge reversed a decree passed by the City Civil Court dismissing a suit brought by certain landlords against their tenants for possession on the ground that the premises are reasonably required for their own occupation. By a registered deed of partition the premises in suit were allotted to the plaintiff No. 1 and her daughter the plaintiff No. 2. Plaintiff No. 1, considerably advanced in years, has lost her husband and the plaintiff No. 2, a married woman, is her only child. The daughter deposed before the trial court that except for her, her mother has no one to look after her in her old age and that she requires the premises so that she can move in and be near her. There is evidence that at the time when the suit was heard the plaintiff No. 1 was living in her father's house at Pingla, a village in the district of Midnapore. In cross-examination it was suggested that the house belongs to the plaintiff no. 1 and she was residing there with out any inconvenience to herself.
(2.) THE learned trial Judge dismissed the suit on the ground that the plaintiff No. 1 had not proved by evidence that she was not in possession of reasonably suitable accommodation. He held that she had failed to establish that the house belonged to her father and not to her. In that view of the matter, he came to the conclusion that it had not been proved that the accommodation at Pingla of which the plaintiff No. 1 was in possession, was not reasonably suitable for her and that in those circumstances, it could not be said that she reasonably required the premises for her own occupation. At the hearing of the appeal, it was stated by the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the plaintiff no. 2 that she did not require the premises in suit for her own occupation. The learned appellate Judge found that the plaintiff No. 1, an old lady, had no one to look after her except her daughter. He also found that when residing in Calcutta, she used to put up in the premises which were allotted to a co-sharer of her husband on partition and she neither intended to live there any more nor was it desirable for her to do1 so. He also held that it was inconvenient for the plaintiff no. 1 to live at Pingla as there is no one there to see to her needs. In those circumstances, the learned Judge held that it was reasonable for her to require the premises in suit for her own occupation. In that view of the matter, the learned Judge disagreed with the trial Judge and held that the plaintiff No. 1 had established the case of reasonable requirement. In our opinion, 'requirement' spoken of in Section 13 (1) (ff) should not be understood as requirement of accommodation anywhere. A palace in a wilderness may provide plenty of accommodation but such accommodation may not be reasonably suitable. 'requirement' includes requirement of accommodation in a particular place or in a specific neighbor hood. The reasonableness of the requirement has to be judged in the facts and circumstances of each case on its merits.
(3.) MR. P. N. Mitter, appearing on behalf of the appellant, contended before us that as the requirement is of the plaintiff No. 1 alone and not of both the plaintiffs no decree could be passed, having regard to the provisions of clause (ff) of sub-section (1) of section 13 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. In other words, the argument is that in the contemplation of the statute, the requirement must be of all the owners of the premises. On that basis, Mr. Mitter submitted that the daughter. that is to say, the plaintiff No. 2 having conceded that she does not require the premises for her own occupation the requirement of her mother, the plaintiff No. 1, is not by itself sufficient to lift the bar imposed by section 13 mr. Mitter relied on a recent judgment of S. K. Datta J. in (3) Sriram Pasrisha v. Jagannath Sen and others 11 C. W. N 613. There it was held by the learned judge that in order to entitle a landlord to a decree for eviction under section 13 (1) (ff) of the Act he must be the sole owner of the demised premises. A part-owner is not entitled to a decree for eviction on the ground stated in the said clause. At page 616 of the report his Lordship observed: "it will not be sufficient if the reasonable requirement is of all members of the family of the co-owners but such co-owners must again be the landlords who only are made entitled to a decree for recovery of possession under section 13 (1 ). " In the appeal with which we are concerned all the owners have joined as plaintiffs. Their ownership of the premises is not in dispute. Therefore, it is not necessary for us to go into the question whether only one of the owners can successfully institute a suit against a Tenant for eviction. The question with which we are concerned is whether in order to pass a decree under section 13 (l) (ff) of the Act, the Court has to be satisfied that- the requirement is of all the co-owners. That was not the question with which the learned Judge was concerned in the case reported 5n 77 C. W. N. 613. Mr. Mitter sought to draw sustenance from the observation of the learned Judge at page 616 to which reference has been made. In our opinion, it will be reading too much in that observation to assume that the learned Judge held as a matter of law that unless the reasonable requirement is of all the landlords, section 13 (l) (ff) is of no avail. The learned Judge merely decided that all the owners must join not that the requirement must be of all the owners. ";