(1.)IN this application under Article 226 of the Constitution the petitioner Messrs. Sri durga Transport Service, a proprietary concern of one Jagabandhu Ghatak, is challenging the orders dated 28th July, 1967 and 21st July, 1973 passed by the Appellate Sub-Committee of the State Transport Authority, West Bengal. In order to appreciate the question involved in this application it will be necessary to refer to certain, facts. On the 17th April, 1964 permanent stage carriage permit on route Durgapur- Ajayghat via Shibpore was sanctioned by the Regional Transport Authority, Burdwan. The 17th April, 1965 was fixed as the date for receiving objections and no objection was received. 13 valid applications, however, were received. On the 7th February, 1966 out of the 13 applicants only six appeared on the date fixed for verification and the absentees were left out of consideration and six applicants present were heard. On the 7th February, 1966 details of applicants and Sri Durga Transport were found out on verification by the Regional Transport Authorities and it was found that the petitioner was financially solvent and had sufficient experience in transport and operating passenger service and owned a ready available bus which was produced for verification. So far as respondent No. 4 Messrs. Mukherjee Brothers Transport Service was concerned it was found that the said firm was not financially solvent and did not have a ready bus. In consideration of the relevant merits, the Regional Transport Authority came to the unanimous decision that in view of experience in passenger service, financial solvency and availability of ready bus the petitioner was most suitable candidate and was granted the permit on route Durgapur-Ajay-ghat via Shibpore for five years, inter-alia, on terms and conditions mentioned in the permit. Messrs. Mukherjee brothers Transport Service preferred an appeal to the State Transport Authority against the order dated 7th February, 1966 granting the permit to the petitioner. The appeal was marked as Appeal No. B-31 of 1966. On 3rd October, 1966 when the State Transport authority took up the said appeal it was found that the petitioner was absent. Again on the 28th July, 1967 that appeal was taken for the second time, it was found that the petitioner was absent. In the premises, on 28th July, 1067 the appeal was allowed by the Appellate Sub-Committee ex-parte. No reasons, however, were indicated in the said order. On, the 5th October. 1967 the petitioner wrote to the State Transport Authority informing them that it had not received any notice for hearing of the appeal and prayed that it might be given a hearing. On the 26th October, 1967 by an order of the same date the Appellate Sub-Committee of the State Transport Authority recalled the order dated 28th July, 1967 and thereafter issued a registered notice nixing 27th May, 1968 being the date of hearing of the appeal. On that date the appeal preferred by Messrs. Mukherjee Brothers Transport Service was heard and dismissed and it was held that the decision of the Regional Transport Authority was correct as public interest could be served by giving the permit to one who had a ready vehicle. Thereafter, sometime in 1969 the said Messrs. Mukherjee Brothers Transport Service being the respondent no. 4 herein moved this High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution and obtained the Civil Rule Mo. 189 (W) of 1969 challenging the aforesaid order dated 27th May 1968 passed by the State Transport Authority. On 3rd May, 1973 the learned judge made the said rule absolute and set aside the order dated 27th May, 1968 as the same was passed without notice to Messrs. Mukherjee Brothers Transport Service and as such was violative of natural justice. The learned Judge directed that the State Transport authority should decide whether it could revise the order dated 28th July, 1967. Leave was also given to decide the question whether the State Transport Authorities had jurisdiction to revise its previous order. On the 21st July, 1973 the Appellate Sub-Committee heard the appeal and resolved that it had no power to revise or review the earlier order and as such it had no power to go into the merits. They further held that the petitioner had notice of the hearing prior to 28th July, 1967 and the said order did not violate the principles of natural justice. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the petitioner has moved this court challenging the two orders dated 28th July, 1967 and the order dated 21st July, 1973.
(2.)IN the last impugned order dated the 21st July, 1973 the Appellate Sub-Committee first considered whether the petitioner had notice of the hearing on the 28th July 1967. The Appellate sub-Committee found that the petitioner had notice and the order on that date was not passed without notice to it fit appears that the State Transport Authority has recorded that the petitioner had received intimation about the first date of hearing of the appeal on the 30th October, 1966 sent to it by registered post and received by it on 27. 9. 66. Subsequent intimation of the order of adjournment on 3rd October, 1966 was received by the petitioner on the 8th May, 1967. These were verified as correct from the information received from the Post Master General, West Bengal It is true that the actual notice of further hearing on 28th July, 1971 had not been sent by registered post but it was sent by express delivery post. It further appears that the petitioner was absent in spite of notice being given to it by registered post on 3rd October, 1966. In the above background the State Transport Authorities came to the conclusion that the petitioner was duly served and the order dated 28th July, 1967 was passed upon notice to the petitioner. In my opinion, it cannot be said that the said finding of the State Transport Authorities was perverse or based on no evidence at all. Whether in a particular case notice had been given to a party concerned or whether a particular order is in violation of the principles of natural justice is mainly and essentially a question of fact dependent upon the facts and circumstances of each particular case. On the facts enumerated in this case, it cannot be said that the State Transport Authority has acted perversely or without material. Section 64 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1989, does not as such enjoin that notice should be served by registered post but the hearing before the authorities must be in consonance with the principles of natural justice. Reliance was placed by counsel for the petitioner on the observations of Rajasthan High Court in the case of Messrs. Motilal Ram Kalyan and Ors. Vs. Appellate Authority, Rajasthan, A. I. R. 1960 Rajasthan 201 in aid of the proposition that the party affected by the decision must be given notice. There is no dispute about that proposition. But here in the instant case it is the finding of the appropriate authority on proper materials that the party affected had been given notice. In the case of Narain Singh Kohli Vs. Transport Appellate Tribunal, Jaipur A. I. R. 1968 Rajasthan 213 more or less a similar view was reiterated. Therefore, in so far as the State Transport Authority held that by the order dated 21st July, 1973 that the petitioner had notice prior to the passing of the order dated 28th, July, 1967, in my opinion, it cannot be said that the petitioner has any cause for grievance.
(3.)THE next contention is whether the State Transport Authority was right in its finding that the State Transport Authority had no power to revise the order passed by the Appellate Sub-Committee on the 28th July, 1967. Quasi-judicial authority must be deemed to have such incidental or ancillary power which are necessary for the proper exercise of the jurisdiction vested in them. This proposition is well settled. Reliance may be placed on the observations in the case of Pulin Behari Das vs. King Emperor 16 C. W. N. 1105. Murlidhar Sardar vs. Income Tax Appellate Tribunal 92 I. T. R. 189 and in the case of Income-tax Officer F. Ward vs. Murlidhar sardar 99 I. T. R. 485. But the question is, whether the power to review or revise an order previously passed by it is such a power which an authority should possess by virtue of incidental or ancillary power. In my opinion, there is no warrant to come to the conclusion that the power to revise a previous order not on the ground of clerical mistake, not on the ground that the previous order was passed without notice but on the ground that the previous order was passed erroneously, can be attributed to an authority unless specific provision is made in the statute for that purpose, Otherwise, the authority would be sitting on appeal over its previous decision. Such power the quasi judicial authorities do not possess, in the absence of statutory provision to that effect. If it was intended by the legislature to vest the State Transport Authority with such revisional power then specific provision had to be made for the same. Therefore, in my opinion it cannot be said that the State Transport Authority, in so far as it held that it had no power to revise the previous order passed on the 28th July, 1967, acted erroneously.