- (1.) This Rule was obtained by the petitioners landlords.in a suit for ejectment, being Title Suit No. 375 of 1973. The Rule is directed against the order of the learned Court below dated 28th November, 1974 on an application by the landlord under section 17 (3) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The facts are given in a narrow compass. The monthly rent of the tenant was Rs. 23/-. There had been default in payment of the rent. On an application under section 17 (2 A) of the Act the Court directed the tenant to deposit Rs. 23/- as current rent and Rs. 30/- towards arrears of rent, that is, Rs. 53/- per month under the order dated 14th March, 1974. Admittedly, there had been due deposits in accordance with the order of the Court but in the month of May, 1974. the tenant deposited Rs. 50/- only in place of the monthly instalment of Rs. 53/-. The deposit was short by Rs. 3/-. On this the landlords complained to the Court that there had been non-compliance with the order in view of default in payment of the instalment and thus preferred a petition under section 17 (3) of the Act. The Court by its order dated 28th November, 1974 gave effect to the contentions of the tenant that the short deposit of Rs. 3/- was owing to mistake and this should be condoned by the Court. It has been so condoned and the petition of the landlords under section 17 (3) of the Act was dismissed. Hence this application in revision.
(2.) Mr. Banerjee, learned Advocate appearing in support of the Rule contends that owing to the short deposit as referred to above there had been default in payment of instalment and as such the defence against the delivery of possession should be struck out under section 17 (3) of the Act. Mr. Chatterjee, learned Advocate appearing for the opposite party while contesting the Rule relies upon the principle of Deminimis non curat lex and contends that the law does not concern itself with trifles in applying a statutory provision. The amount of Rs. 3/- by which the deposit was short is a negligible amount and this was apparently owing to some mistake and this mistake appears on the face of the deposit and can be concluded without reference to any fact. The learned Court below was of the view that it was a mistake which resulted in the short deposit for the month of May, 1974 and this was condoned and the belated deposit of Rs. 3/- had been accepted by the Court in dismissing the landlord's application under section 17 (3) of the Act. Mr. Banerjee strenuously argued that the learned Court wrongly invoked his powers under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure as there was no petition to that effect and relies upon some decisions of this Court in support of his contention. I will first of all refer to the maxim to which I have referred. This maxim was relied upon by Sen, J. in the case of Subhas Chandra Bhattacharjee & Ors. v. Panchu Rani Dutt reported in 64 CWN 438. His Lordship had considered the question of failure to deposit an interest of 3 Np and the question whether the slight deviation from strict compliance with section 17(1) did really mattered. His Lordship, invoked the principle of Deminimis non curat lex as referred to above. This principle was also discussed in a Division Bench decision of this Court referred to by Mr. Banerjee in the case of Rempher Jaiswal v. Ram Subhag Shaw reported in 64 CWN 880. At pages 892 and 893 of the reported decision the principle has been discussed and the application of the principle had been doubted in the case of one month's non-compliance with the statutory provision. In the aforesaid decision reference had been made to an unreported decision in CR Case Nos. 884-886 of 1957 Apurba Kumar Sinha v. Surendra Narayan Sinha where Sen. J. had invoked the said principle to the case of a wrong deposit in the Rent Controllers Office for one month's rent. Reference had been made to the aforesaid decision at pages 892 and 893 of the judgment referred to above. The Division Bench decision can be distinguished on the facts of the present case. It was a case of non-deposit of one month's rent in terms of Court's order. In the instant case there had been deposit of Rs. 50/- out of Rs. 53/- and it cannot be said to be a case of non-deposit but the deposit is short by Rs. 3/-. I am, therefore, unable to apply the principle as referred to above to the facts of the present case. Mr. Banerjee has drawn my attention to Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statute (12th Edition) where the principle has been discussed. It refers to a case reported in Coleshite and Dist. Investment Co. Ltd. v. Minister of Housing, 1968 (1) All ER 62. Widgery, J. speaking for the Division Court observed that "this little job of shifting a few cubic yards of soiled with a digger and lorry is not, in my judgment, an operation of a kind which could ever be dignified with the title of an engineering operation" so as to constitute 'development' within the meaning of section 12 (1) of the Town and Country Planning Act, 1962. The Court of Appeal reversed the decision. Lord Denning observed that Widgery, J. was wrong in applying the principle to the facts of the case. Mr. Banerjee strongly relies upon the aforesaid observation of Lord Denning. I am unable to accept that the said observation of Lord Denning would in any way influence the decision on the facts of the present case regarding the applicability of the principle in question. The principle has been accepted but the observation is to the effect that the principle has been wrongly applied by the Division Court to the facts of the case. The deposit of Rs.50/- by the tenant in the face of the required amount of Rs. 53/- is an obvious error and no facts are required to be investigated for such a view. The amount of shortness is insignificant 'having regard to the amount required to be deposited monthly. The principle can very well be invoked to the facts of this case. It is not a case where there is absence of deposit in respect of the particular month.
(3.) Mr. Banerjee has relied upon the decision in the case of Mrs. Gouri Bose v. Sukumar Ghosh reported in 75 CWN 342 by Salil Kumar Datta J, and refers to paragraph 7 in particular for the principle that the time limits provided in section 17 of the Act cannot be enlarged by invoking section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. That principle is well established that the time limits are mandatory provisions of the statute and they cannot be relaxed. In the instant case the facts are such that there is no question of relaxation of the time limit raised therein. It is really a case of condonation of the short deposit of Rs. 3/- in the circumstances stated above. Such condonation can always be made in exercise of Court's inherent power under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure because in such a case it does not constitute default at all. As a matter of fact there was an- application under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Court has referred to the said application but rejected it as the copy of the same was not served upon the plaintiff-landlord. He however, had held that the short deposit was a mistake and he accepted the deposit as a valid one. I am not in a position to say that the view taken by the Court below is in any way perverse or contrary to the provision of the Statute. On application of the principles as referred to above it was only proper for the Court to condone the trifle insufficiency or deficit in the deposit and accept it as a valid one in due compliance of law.;