Sinha, C.J. - (1.) In this case the farts are shortly as follows :
(2.) The petitioner appellant entered the Police service in 1940. Since 1952, he has been stationed in the district of Hooghly. On or about 30th November, 1956 a charge-sheet was served upon the appellant, a copy of which is Annexure "B" to the petition. The charges were somewhat serious and involved moral turpitude. The respondent No. S, namely, the Inspector, District Enforcement Branch (1), was entrusted with the conduct of the enquiry. The Enquiring Officer held an enquiry which was conducted in the presence of the appellant, and on the 8th July, 1957 submitted his report, finding him guilty but recommending a lenient punishment. The Additional Superintendent of Police issued the usual show-cause notice asking the appellant to show cause why he should not be dismissed from service. The appellant was asked whether he wanted a personal hearing. The appellant showed cause and asked for personal hearing and was duly heard. Thereafter an order of dismissal was made dismissing the appellant from service. Against this order, the appellant filed an appeal before the respondent No. 3, the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Hooghly, on or about the 20th August, 1957. Thereafter, the appellant by his letter dated the 19th September, 1957 prayed for a personal hearing. But this prayer was not granted, and on the 8th November, 1957, the appeal was dismissed by the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Hooghly. Thereafter, the appellant filed several memorial petitions which failed, and with which we are not concerned in this appeal. The only ground on which the Rule was issued is as to whether this rejection of prayer for a personal hearing in the appeal, was in accordance with law or not. So far as this point is concerned, the facts are not disputed. The appellant did ask for a personal hearing, but this prayer was refused. The question is whether in the facts and circumstances of this case the Deputy Inspector General of Police was bound to give a personal hearing to the appellant. The matter has been placed before us from two points of view. Firstly, as a violation of the rules of natural justice, and secondly, as an infringement of the provisions of the Bengal Police Regulations. So far as rules of natural justice are concerned, this has been the subject-matter of various decisions of the Supreme Court and so far as the circumstances of this case are concerned, the position may be said to be covered by the law as enunciated in the Supreme Court decision in Nagendra Nath Bora v. Commr. of Hills Division and Appeals, Assam. Sinha, J. (as he then was) stated as follows: "The next ground of attack against the order of the High Court, under appeal, was that the High Court had erred in coming to the conclusion that there had been a failure of natural justice. In this connection, the High Court has made reference to the several affidavits filed on either side, and the order in which they had been filed, and the use made of those affidavits or counter-affidavits. As already indicated, the rules make no provisions for the reception of evidence oral or documentary, or the hearing of oral arguments, or even for the issue of notice of the hearing to the parties concerned. The entire proceedings are marked by a complete look of formality. The several authorities nave been left to their own resources to make the best selection. In this connection, reference may be made to the observations of this Court in the case of New Prakash Transport Co. Ltd. v. New Suwama Transport Co. Ltd.. In that case, this Court has laid down that the rules of natural justice vary with the varying constitution of statutory bodies and the rules prescribed by the Act under which they function; and the question whether or not any rules of natural justice had been contravened, should be decided not under any pre-conceived notions, but in the light of the statutory rules and provisions, In the instant case, no such rules have been brought to our notice, which could be said to have been contravened by the Appellate authority. Simply because it viewed a case in a particular light which may not be acceptable to another independent tribunal, is no ground for interference either under Article 226 or Article 227 of the Constitution."
(3.) It is, therefore, necessary to look into the rules and regulations which are applicable in the present case, so far as the proceedings are concerned culminating in the dismissal, of the appellant. The rules which are applicable are the Police Regulations Bengal of 1943 as amended from time to time. These rules were made under Section 241 of the Government of India Act, 1935 read with the relevant provisions of the Police Act (V of 1861). The authority of these regulations are not challenged before us. The appellate authorities are enumerated in Regulation 882. It has not been disputed before us that the appeal lay to the Deputy Inspector General of Police. Regulation 883 lays down the procedure for filing an appeal and the time limit for doing so. It lays down as to what the application or petition of appeal should consist of and provides that such appeal should be preferred within 37 days of the date of receipt of the order by the appellant. The Regulation also provides that when the petition of appeal is transmitted, the service-book or roll and confidential report book should also be forwarded. Regulation 884 is in the following terms : "884. The Inspector-General or the Deputy Inspector-General may call for the proceedings of any case, even where no appeal lies, and pass such orders as may seem fit provided that no order under this regulation shall be made to the prejudice of any person unless he has had an opportunity of showing cause against the proposed order. If he so desires he shall be g ranted a personal hearing and this fact should e recorded in the proceedings." There are then provisions for memorials etc. but we are not concerned with that.;