P.B.Mukharji, J. - (1.) THIS is an application by Nanalal M. Varma and Co. (Gunnies) Private Limited for setting aside award No. 166 of 1956 of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce dated 3-2-1956 in case No. 861 of 1955.
(2.) THE award is challenged on five grounds. THE first ground is that the arbitration clause and the rules of arbitration of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Calcutta are ultra vires the Constitution of India. THE second ground is that the award is bad for erroneous exercise of discretion by the Arbitrators in refusing to state a case for the opinion of the Court. THE third ground is that there was an erroneous exercise of discretion by the Arbitrators in refusing to permit Lawyers to represent the case of the applicant before the Arbitrators. THEse last two grounds are put forward as legal misconduct. THE fourth ground is that the Arbitrators have no jurisdiction because the contract under which they were acting had been rescinded by one of the parties. THE fifth ground is that the Arbitrators were not appointed in writing under the hands of the Registrar. I shall first take up the constitutional objection. The objection is that the present arbitration agreement and the arbitration rules of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce are contrary to the Constitution of India, Nothing in the Indian Constitution is an express bar to arbitration in the form specified in the present arbitration agreement or under the rules of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce. The question therefore must be answered by interpretation of the Constitution. Arbitration is a matter of contract between the parties. The parties in this case agreed to settle their disputes by the method and procedure of arbitration according to the arbitration rules of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce. Such an arbitration agreement is a well-known standard arbitration clause familiar to the commercial community of Calcutta. The curse of the Constitution cannot be visited on such a private contract between citizens. The argument that such a contract is unconstitutional is advanced on two grounds. One is the specific ground that denial of representation by lawyer to a party who claims such representation is a breach of a constitutional right. The other is the more general ground that arbitration is a kind of unconstitutional discrimination in the procedure of justice. I find it difficult to accept the soundness of either of these two contentions, although I must confess to a sense of novelty when these contentions are put forward.
(3.) RIGHT to be represented by a lawyer is not expressly recognised by the Indian Constitution with perhaps one exception. It is not a fundamental right under the Constitution of India except under Article 22 of the Constitution in the case of preventive detention where personal liberty is involved. As the Constitution does not recognise the right of a citizen to be represented by a lawyer, except in that particular ease, refusal to permit lawyers representing parties in a civil dispute over a contract before the Arbitrators cannot, therefore, be regarded as an infraction of any constitutional provision. It was then argued that the arbitration infringed Article 19 (1) (g), Constitution of India. The right there recognised, however, is confined to the right of a citizen to practise a profession which in this case is profession of law. It is not necessarily the same thing for an applicant to claim a right to be defended by a lawyer in a civil dispute over a contract. It is not the applicant's right but the lawyer's right. This arbitration agreement expressly incorporating the rules of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce specifically recognising the right to exclude lawyers except with the permission of the Arbitrators, is not in my opinion a denial of the citizen's right to practise the profession of law. It is left to the Arbitrator to judge each individual case on its merit and to consider whether it is a fit and proper case to permit lawyers to appear. Even were it a denial, I would justify it as a reasonable restriction imposed by the existing law under Sub-clause 6 of Article 19 of the Constitution. Ordinarily in India a person certainly has a right to engage any qualified lawyer to represent his case. But that is a contractual right and not a Constitutional right. It is a matter of contract between the litigant and his lawyer and not a subject of Constitutional provision. It is normally a permissible contract but it is always subject to rules, of those particular Courts and Tribunals before whom the lawyers are licensed to appear and those restrictions are justifiable restrictions on the ground of reasonableness under Sub-clause 6 of Article 19, Constitution of India.;