- (1.) N.Paul, the writ petitioner (the petitioner in short) initiated this writ proceeding way back in the year 1994, to be precise on September 7, 1994, primarily challenging an order of punishment dated July 2, 1994 passed by the Disciplinary Authority of the United Commercial Bank, the first respondent herein. apart from challenging the said order of punishment the petitioner also challenged the validity of two showcause notices November 5, 1990 and November 27, 1991, the charge sheet dated November 20, 1992 issued against the petitioner, the enquiry report of the Enquiry Officer dated January 27 as well. At this stage, for the sake of convenience, only the concluding portion of the said order of punishment of the Disciplinary Authority is mentioned below: "Considering the above aspects and in exercise of the powers conferred upon me by UCO Bank Officer Employees' (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1976, as amended, I hereby pass the following order in terms of Regulation 4 of the said regulation/s. Charge No. 1. - approved - removal from service which shall not be a disqualification for future employment. Charge No. 2. - approved - removal from service which shall not be a disqualification for future employment. Charge No. 3 - approved - removal from service which shall not be a disqualification for future employment. The above punishment will be effective from the date of service of this order upon N. Paul." Assistant General Manager (Disciplinary Authority)
(2.) As I proceed to deal with the merits of the case of the petitioner or rather the merits of the respective cases of both the petitioner and the respondents herein, namely the United Commercial Bank, I would refer to the said showcause notices, the charge sheet including the statement of allegations and of course the said order of the Disciplinary Authority dated July 2, 1994 in a little detail if necessary.
(3.) Although, as aforesaid, this writ proceeding was initiated way back in the month of September 1994 and though the direction for affidavits, it appears, was first given on September 8, 1994, yet direction for affidavits had to be given again by the Court after expiry of about nine years from the date of initiation of this proceeding again on July 17, 2003 and during these nine years the writ petition itself was dismissed for default on January 16, 2001. However, the said order of dismissal was recalled and the writ petition was restored by an order of this Court dated April 28, 2003. However, parties on the basis of the said direction dated July 17, 2003 eventually exchanged or used their respective affidavits and only thereafter the writ petition was heard on merits.;