D.K.Seth, J. - (1.) These three writ petitions were heard analogously since all these three writ petitions involve certain common principles of law. Though the facts are different, though the questions that arise out of these common principles are different, yet there are certain communions of identity within the question to be answered. Therefore, though we have heard the common principles together in respect of the three writ petitions, but in effect we have heard the three writ petitions simultaneously one after the other. 1]. The learned Counsel for the respective parties had also addressed the Court accordingly. We, therefore, propose to dispose of these three matters by a common judgment dealing with the common principles in the judgment in Falakata Industries Ltd. & Anr. (W.P.L.R.T. No. 348 of 2005). But we have dealt with the three cases on the basis of the respective facts involving different questions of law applicable to such respective facts, emanating from the common principles of law, separately one after the other with reference to the common principles dealt with in Falakata Industries Ltd. as hereafter.
(2.) Very interesting points have been raised in course of hearing of this writ petition arising out of a decision by the West Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal dismissing the application made before it on the ground of limitation in a judgment consisting of 56 pages. The question of limitation was not addressed by Mr. Mukherjee on the ground that on the face of the record, it appears that there was no limitation at all that the order which was challenged before the Land Tribunal was not within the jurisdiction of the Land Tribunal and the application made before it was due to wrong advice and on account of a decision of this Court where initially the matter was sought to be moved through a writ petition, but the points could not be raised before the learned Single Judge to impress upon him that this case was outside the jurisdiction of the learned Tribunal and could have been decided by this Court. In any event the same question which was involved in the said writ petition having been directed by an order passed in the said writ petition to be agitated before the Land Tribunal and the same having been taken to the Land Tribunal, even assuming that the Land Tribunal had jurisdiction, then also the writ petitioner was entitled to the benefit of section 14 of the Limitation Act, since the application whereof had not been excluded in a proceeding initiated before it. Mr. Mukherjee contended that the writ petition stands on its own strength and the action under challenge pertains to an action under the Transfer of Property Act (TP Act) and not under any of the provisions of the specified Acts within the meaning of section 2(r) of the West Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal Act, 1997 (1997 Act). 1]. Mr. Soumen Dasgupta, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Panchayat, to whom the land was sought to be handed over for the purpose of construction of a Bus Terminus, took a preliminary objection as to the hearing of this writ petition before this Bench comprising of one of us (Hon'ble D.K. Seth, J.) having occasion to deal with the matter at one stage, namely in disposing of the second writ petition. Admittedly, the second writ petition was dealt with by one of us (Hon'ble D.K. Seth, J.) sitting singly, holding that the dispute could not be entertained in the writ petition before this Court without being routed through the Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal in view of sections 6 and 7 of the 1997 Act due to which the jurisdiction of this Court ceased and that too before a Division Bench by reason of the decision in L. Chandra Kumar vs. Union of India, AIR 1997 SC 1125.
(3.) This preliminary objection does not seem to be of any substance in view of the provisions contained in section 38 of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887 (1887 Act). Section 38(2) of the 1887 Act prohibits the Presiding Officer of an Appellate Civil Court from dealing with an appeal against an order passed by himself in another capacity. Mr. Dasgupta confined his objection only on this point with regard to hearing of the matter by "this Bench". 1]. The order against which the present writ petition has been filed was not an order dealt with by one of us (Hon'ble D. K. Seth, J.). This writ petition is not arising out of an order passed in the second writ petition by one of us (Hon'ble D. K. Seth, J.) sitting singly. The said order passed by one of us sitting singly is not the subject-matter to be decided by this Court as an appellate authority. On the other hand, this Court is exercising original jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, though in the Division Bench as was exercised by (Hon'ble D. K. Seth, J.) sitting singly. That apart in the second writ petition, this Court held that the said writ petition was not maintainable under Article 226 before this Court in view of cessation of jurisdiction by reason of sections 6 and 7 of the 1997 Act and did not deal with the merits of the said writ petition. After the said decision, the matter was dealt with by the learned Land Tribunal. Now, the order passed in that matter by the learned Land Tribunal is under challenge before this Court in its original jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and that too in respect of a different cause of action that arose on 29th August, 2000, i.e. during the pendency of the second writ petition, disclosed only on 7th October, 2002. Therefore, the prohibition prescribed under section 38(2) of the 1887 Act can, by no stretch of imagination, be invoked in the present case.;