- (1.) The petitioner is the same in all revisions and he invokes jurisdiction of this Court for quashing the proceedings before the trial Magistrate urging that he has been subjected to unfair trial in violation of the provisions of Article 21 of the Constitution of India, considering the scope and extent of that provision as pronounced by the Supreme Court of India in its various judgements.
(2.) Article 21 of the Constitution of India lays down that no persons shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to the procedure established by law. The reliance placed by the petitioner's counsel is on the following judgements.1. Biswanath Pratap Singh v. State of Bihar, 1994 Cri LJ 242 : 1993 AIR SCW 3631 (SC).2. Santosh Dey v. Archana Guha, 1994 Cri LJ 1975 : AIR 1994 SC 1229 : 1994 AIR SCW 1480. 3.S. G. Nain v. Union of India, 1992 Cri LJ 560 : AIR 1992 SC 603 : 1992 AIR SCW 2201 (SC). The first two judgements are in cases arising from Bihar and were delivered by Hon'ble Justice B. P. Jeevan Reddy and Hon'ble Justice S. P. Bharucha. The 3rd judgement is a case arising from Bihar and was delivered by Hon'ble Justice Kuldip Singh and Hon'ble Justice M. M. Punchhi of the Supreme Court of India. In these judgements, it was held, on the authority of Article 21 of the Constitution of India, that the right of speedy trial is vested in favour of the accused and violation of that right entails prejudice to the accused in trial and such delayed prosecution is liable to be quashed. Each of these cases was decided on its facts and circumstances for finding out if there was such delay on the part of prosecution as to cause prejudice to the accused and violation of his right to speedy trial. With these findings, the prosecutions were quashed.
(3.) In the first case, referred above, their Lordships noticed that the F.I.R. was lodged on 10th December, 1977, charge-sheet was filed by police on 9th February, 1983 i.e. after more than five years. It was a case of misappropriation of funds worth Rs. 1,15,000/- belong to State Co-operative Marketing Unit where the accused was a Depot Manager. There was no explanation of the delay in filing charge-sheet by the police. Thereafter, there had been no progress in trial. The accused had been arrested on January, 1978 and released on bail. The Court framed the formal charges on the accused on 25th April, 1989, i.e. six years after the formal charge-sheet filed by the police, The charges were under Sections 408 and 468, I.P.C. and Section 7 of E. C. Act. After the framing of formal charges by the Court, the accused approached the High Court for quashing the proceedings. The Patna High Court dismissed the writ petition on 25-7-89. The accused approached the Apex Court by Special Leave Petition in October, 1989, there was no stay of further proceedings by the Apex Court. So the trial continued and when the matter came up for hearing before the Supreme Court, the prosecution had completed its evidence and the accused had been called upon to enter the defence. In these facts and circumstances, their Lordships considered certain other special circumstances of this case that the accused had been suspended and then dismissed from service and his Provident Fund and Gratuity had been forfeited and he had crossed age of superannuation. It was held that in calling upon the accused now to enter his defence after 16 years, in the facts and circumstances of this case, was bound to cause prejudice to him. Their Lordships said that but for these circumstances, their Lordships would have taken stricter view as indicated in the Constitution Bench Decision in Abdul Rahman Antule v. R. S. Nayak, AIR 1992 SC 1701 : 1992 Cri LJ 271 : 1992 AIR SCW 1872 (SC).;