Umesh Chandra Banerjee , J. - (1.) The doctrine of uberrima fides is one of the essential requirements in a contract of insurance, and this doctrine has been so since the advent of the concept of insurance. The issue arises as to whether there is any corresponding obligation on the part of the insurers. The answer in my view ought to be in the affirmative without any exception. There is a bounden obligation on the part of the insurer to act fairly without any motive; and this ought to be the most accepted methodology of workings of an insurer. Harassive attitude ought not to be the guiding factor of an insurer, as the same would otherwise negate the very purpose of the concept of insurance. The socio-economic condition of our country is such that there ought to be proper reciprocity insofar as the concept of fairness is concerned between the insured and the insurer. Contra action in fair dealing by the insurer may lead to social catastrophe on the one, hand and violate the purpose for which the Insurance Act was engrafted in the statute book. The petitioner herein obtained a policy of insurance covering the risks of fire, RSD malicious damage, flood and inundation, RPS, on stock of potatoes stored in the insured's cold storage premises situated at Harinkhola, Amgaon, Arambagh, District Hooghly upon completion of the required formalities for a period of twelve months from 23rd March, 1978 to 23rd March, 1979. The contract of insurance inter alia contain the following: " * * * * 11(a) A claim in writing for the loss and damage containing as particular an account as may be reasonably practicable of all the several articles or items of property damaged or destroyed, and of the amount of the loss or damage thereto respectively, having regard to their value at the time of the loss or damage not including profit of any kind. (b) Particulars of all other insurances, if any. 12. The insured shall also at all times, at his own expense produce, procure and give to the company all such further particulars, plants, specifications, books, voucher, invoices, duplicates or copies thereof, documents, proofs and information with respect to the claim and the origin and cause of the fire and the circumstances under which the loss or damage occurred, and any matter touching the liability or the amount of the liability of the company as may be reasonably required by or on behalf of the company together with a declaration on oath or in other legal form of the truth of the claim and of any merits connected therewith. No claim under this policy shall be payable unless the terms of this condition have been complied with. 13. If the claim be in any respect fraudulent, or if any false declaration be made or used in support thereof, or if any fraudulent means or devices are used by the insured or any one acting on his behalf, to obtain any benefit under this policy; or if the loss or damage be occasioned by the wilful act, or with the connivance of the insured; or if the claim be made and rejected and an action or suit be not commenced within three months after such rejection, or (in case of an arbitration taking place in pursuance of the 18th condition of this policy), within three months after the arbitrator or arbitrators or umpire shall have made their Award, all benefits under this policy shall be forfeited. 16. If at the time of any loss or damage happening to any property thereby insured, there may be any other subsisting insurance or insurances, whether effected by the insured or by any other person or persons, covering the same property, this company shall not be liable to pay or contribute more than rateable proportion of such loss or damage. * * * 17. If any difference arises as to the amount of any loss or damage, such difference shall independently of all other questions, be referred to the decision of an arbitrator, to be appointed in writing by the party in difference; or if they cannot agree upon a single arbitrator, to the decision of two disinterested persons as arbitrators, of whom one shall be appointed in writing by each of the parties within two calendar months after having been required so to do in writing by the other party. In case, either party shall refuse or fail to appoint an arbitrator within two calendar months after receipt of notice in writing requiring an appointment, the other party shall be at liberty to appoint a sole arbitrator; and in case of disagreement between the arbitrators, the difference shall be referred to the decision of an umpire who shall have been appointed by them in writing before entering on the reference, and who shall sit with the arbitrators, and preside at their meetings. The death of any party shall not revoke or affect the authority or powers of the arbitrator, arbitrators or umpire respectively; and in the event of the death of an arbitrator or umpire, another shall, in each case, be appointed in his stead by the party or arbitrators (as the case may be) by whom the arbitrators or umpire so dying was appointed. The costs of the reference and of the award shall be in the discretion of the arbitrator, arbitrators or umpire making the award. And it is hereby expressly stipulated and declared that it shall be a condition precedent to any right of action or sit upon the policy that the award by such arbitrator or umpire of the amount of the loss or damage, if disputed, shall be first obtained. 18. In no case whatever shall the insurers be liable for any loss or damage after the expiration of twelve months from the happening of the loss or damage unless the claim is the subject of pending action or arbitration." Incidentally, it is to be noted that the petitioners obtained a bifurcated policy with the Oriental Fire and General Insurance Company, as well as with the National Insurance Company at specified ratio. It appears from the records that the petitioners had lodged a claim with the insurers immediately after the deluge in West Bengal in September, 1978. As against the policy of insurance with the National Insurance Company, the petitioner lodged its claim with the insurer; and the latter duly communicated its decision within a reasonable period of time in pursuance whereof the petitioner referred the matter to arbitration, which is pending adjudication. But it is the inaction on the part of the Oriental Fire and General Insurance Company in communicating its decision, either by way of acceptance or rejection, which is the subject matter of the present writ petition. The petitioners contended that as an authority within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution, there exists a duty, in so far as the respondent insurance company, in this case, the Oriental Fire and General Insurance Company, to act with utmost promptitude. The learned counsel, Mr. Bhaskar Gupta appearing for the petitioners contended that lack of promptness in communicating the decision either way has resulted in serious loss to the petitioners. In the event of a refusal to admit the claim, the petitioner would be entitled in law to refer the matter to arbitration, or to take such other step or steps so as to vindicate its rights under the contract of insurance. But by reason of deliberate silence on the part of the insurer, the petitioner's rights were being affected. It was further contended that being a creature of the statute, the respondent authority ought to act in a manner so as not to affect otherwise or defeat the rights of the petitioners. Mr Gupta contended that the Writ Court ought to direct the statutory creatures to discharge their functions in accordance with law. This writ petition was moved on 6th June, 1985, and the learned advocate, Sri Alok Kumar Ghose appearing for the respondent insurer contended that by reason of the expiry of the 12 months period from the date of lodgment of the claim by the insured with the insurer, the matter cannot be agitated any longer before any Court of law in terms of clause 19 of the contract of insurance. It was further contended that the Writ Court ought not to embark upon an enquiry into commercial contracts. Not being satisfied, however, with the submission made, this Court directed the Divisional Managers either by themselves or through authorised representatives to appear before this Court so that the learned advocate may have proper instructions in the matter. The presence of the officers was required as noted above, to satisfy the judicial conscience that justice must be done with utmost expedition, more so in the facts of the case. Incidentally, no prayer was made for filing of affidavits in the matter; and this Court neither felt the necessity of having a counter affidavit on record as there exists no dispute in regard to the factual aspect of the matter. It is to be noted in this context also that this Court is not concerned with the admissibility of the claim, neither the same was canvassed. The direction for appearance of the officer was given so that the matter could be expeditiously dealt with. On the next date of hearing, Sri H. N. Choubey and Sri R. N. Sen duly appeared before the Court, being the two senior Divisional Managers of Division IV and Division II respectively, and instructed the learned lawyer appearing for the respondent insurer that the claim, being barred by the laws of limitation under clause 19 of the Contract of Insurance, the authorities felt it to be of no necessity to communicate its decision to the insured, though generally, the obligation to communicate its decision to the insured, has not been disputed. Strenuous submissions have been made in regard to the jurisdiction of the Writ Court by Mr. Monoj Kumar Chowdhury, learned counsel appearing for the insurer, on the next date of hearing in the same line as was done on the day before. Relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State Bank of Haryana v. Jageram and Ors, reported in (1980) 3 SCC 599 , Mr Chowdhury submitted that writ jurisdiction ought not to be invoked to avoid contractual relationship. Question of avoidance of contractual relationship does not, and cannot arise in the facts of this case, and as such, the aforesaid decision has no manner of application in the present contest. Further reliance was placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Divisional Forest Officer v. Bishwanath Tea Co. Ltd. reported in AIR (1981) SC 1368 . In that decision, the Supreme Court observed: "It is undoubtedly true that High Court can entertain in its extraordinary jurisdiction a petition to issue any of the prerogative writs for any other purpose. But such writ can be issued where there is executive action unsupported by law or even in respect of a Corporation, there is a denial of equality before law or equal protection of law. The Corporation can also file a writ petition for enforcement of a writ under a statute. As pointed out earlier, the respondents (company) was merely trying to enforce a contractual obligation. To clear the ground, let it be stated that obligation to pay royalty for timber cut and felled and removed, is prescribed by the relevant regulation. The validity of regulations is not challenged. Therefore, the damand for royalty is supported by law. What the respondent claims is an exception that in view of a certain term in the indenture of lease, to wit, clause 2, the appellant is not entitled to demand and collect royalty from the respondent. This is nothing but enforcement of a term of a contract of lease. Hence the question whether such contractual obligation can be enforced by the High Court in its writ jurisdiction." The Supreme Court further observed: "In substance, this was a suit for refund of a royalty alleged to be unauthorisedly recovered and that could hardly be entertained in exercise of the writ jurisdiction of the High Court." In my view, the last cited decision of the Supreme Court is also of no assistance to Mr Chowdhury. The subject matter of the writ petition under consideration is not the enforcement of contractual obligations; but whether the insurer is under any obligation to communicate its decision as regards the admissibility of the claim. The writ petition does not involve adjudication of rights on merits of whatsoever nature. In the premises in my view, the writ petition cannot and should not be discarded on the ground of involving enforcement of contractual obligation. Mr Chowdhury further contended that in any event, the application is hopelessly belated. In support of his contention, Mr Chowdhury drew the attention of the Court that the last representation was made in the year 1980. As such, Writ Court ought not to entertain the petition. But while it is true that in the normal course of events, the Writ Court ought not entertain an application of the nature which is hopelessly belated; but in the facts and circumstances of the case, I am of the view that statutory obligations are imposed to act fairly and with diligence, and where the authority had failed to comply with the same, the latter cannot and ought not to be heard to say that the application ought to be dismissed on the ground of being belated. No one ought to take advantage of its own wrong and raise technical objection of the application being belated, far less, a Governmental authority. In my view, there exists a duty to speak in so far as the insurer is concerned. Non fulfilment thereof would lead to breach of an obligation, and the law Courts exist to enforce that obligation of the insurer. The last contention of Mr Chowdhury is that in terms of clause 19 of the contract of insurance, twelve months' limitation period has been imposed. Mr Chowdhury contended, question of enforcement of an obligation in so far as the insurer is concerned, does not and cannot arise after the expiry of the twelve months period from happening of the loss or damage unless claim is subject to pending action or arbitration. Clause 19 prescribes no liability can be attached in regard to the loss or damage, but does not prescribe after the expiry of twelve months period, there exists no obligation to communicate its decision. I am not called upon to decide as to whether any liability can be foisted to the insurer or not. As such, in my view, clause 19 has no manner of application in the facts of this case. In the matter under consideration, question of any financial obligation does not and cannot arise. Fair dealings of public bodies ought to be the keynote of our administrative structure. In this context, reference may be made in the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Shiv Shankar Dal Mills v. State of Haryana AIR 1980 SC 1037 wherein the Supreme Court observed: "Article 226 grants an extraordinary remedy which is essentially discretionary, although founded on legal injury. It is perfectly open for the Court exercising this flexible power to pass order as public interest dictates and equity projects." The Supreme Court in that decision further observed: "Where public bodies under colour of public laws, recover peoples' money, later discovered to be erroneous, leaves the Dharma of the Constitution, admits of no equivocation. There is no law of limitation, especially, for public bodies, on the virtue of returning what was wrongly recovered to whom it belongs. Nor is it palatable to our jurisprudence to turn down the prayer for high prerogative writs on the negative plea of alternative remedy, since the root principle of law married to justice is ubijus ibi remedium." While directing presence of the two executives of the insurer, this Court felt that direction to that effect would bring about a sense of justice in the mind of the officers concerned. But surprisingly, it turned out to be otherwise. Officers present in Court not only instructed the lawyers to raise such technicalities as has been dealt with earlier; but also insisted on strenuous submissions being made to that effect. This, in my view, is rather unfortunate. Public officers ought not to have acted in a manner as they have done. They owe a duty to the public at large not to shirk the responsibilities by taking recourse to sheer technicalities. These administrative officers are placed in charge of dealing with the public in general of our country where there are quite a good percentage of illiteracy, and the fate of the individuals of our country depend upon the whims of these public officials. These officers do not feel shy in regard to their total neglect of the duty as required under the law; but try to wriggle out of the same by indulging in technicalities. The correspondence annexed to the petition goes to show that the petitioner was moving from pillar to post so that further steps can be taken. But the insurer kept a delightful silence in the matter. If this is the order of the day, it is a very sad day for our administrative system. But one redeeming feature that is existing, is that, law Courts are still now functioning in the manner it ought to, and law Courts exist to remedy the wrong and to remind administrative officers of their duty under the law. In that view of the matter, this application succeeds. Let a writ be issued directing the respondent insurer to communicate the decision in regard to the claim lodged by the petitioner as detailed above. Such decision should be communicated to the petitioner in the special facts and circumstances of the case, within a period of seven days from the date hereof. In the normal course of events, this Court ought not to have directed payment of costs; but in the special facts and circumstance of the case, I direct payment of costs by the Oriental Fire and General Insurance Co. Ltd. to the extent of Rs. 510 to the petitioner. Such cost is also to be paid within a period of one week from date. Mr Ghose, learned advocate appearing for the insurer prays for extension of time by one week further. Such prayer is granted. In that view of the matter, the Insurance company is directed to comply with directives as detailed in this order within a period of two weeks, and time for payment of cost is also extended by two weeks from date.;