- (1.) I agree that the order should be as proposed by my lord. Reliance was placed by counsel for the appellant on a recent decision of the Supreme Court in P. B. Desai v. C. H. Patel A. I. R. 1974 S. C. 1059. There the appellant was the owner of two bungalows known as Truth and Hill bungalows. The former, except for one room on the ground floor which was in occupation of the appellant was in possession of one Dr. Bharucha under leave and licence of the appellant on payment of compensation at Rs. 50/-per month. The first floor of the Hill bungalow was let out by the appellant to his mother at a rent of Rs. 50/- per month. The ground floor was let out by him to the predecessors-in-interest of the 1st, 2nd and 5th respondents. The appellant brought a suit against the said respondents for possession of the portion of the premises in their occupation on the ground of reasonable requirement and on the further ground that the respondents had unlawfully sub-let: the demised premises.
(2.) IN so far as the appellant based his case on the ground that he required the premises for his own use and occupation, it was contended on behalf of the respondents that he could occupy the Truth Bungalow by revoking the leave and licence granted to Dr. Bharucha. In rejecting the contention, bhagawati J. speaking for the Court observed : "now, it is true that when premises are green on leave and licence, the licensor continues from a juridical point of view, to be in possession of the premises and the licensee is merely given occupation, and therefore, strictly speaking the High Court was right in observing that the Truth Bungalow which was given on leave and licence to Dr. Bharucha, was in the possession of the appellant. But for the purpose of determining whether the requirement of the appellant for the ground floor premises was reasonable and bona fide, what is necessary to be considered is not whether the appellant was juridically in possession of the Truth Bungalow but whether the Truth Bungalow was available to the appellant, for occupation so that he could not be said to need the ground floor premises. If the Truth Bungalow was in occupation of Dr. Bharucha on leave and licence, it was obviously not available to the appellant for occupation and it could not be taken into account for negativing the need of the appellant for the ground floor premises. The appellant could not obtain for himself the occupation of the Truth Bungalow unless he terminated the leave and licence of Dr. Bharucha and compelled him to vacate the occupation of the Truth Bungalow. That might involve a long litigation with Dr. Bharucha. As against that, a suit for eviction was already pending against the respondents in respect of the ground floor premises and it would certainly be more reasonable to pursue that litigation rather than to start a new one".
(3.) IN the present case, the landlord occupies a reverse role. He is not the licensor but the licensee. The licence is one for which no compensation is paid or consideration given. It is true that even if the leave and licence is revoked, the plaintiff No. 4 may obstruct the licensor from recovering possession of the portion of the premises he is occupying and compel the licensor to file a suit against him which, it is safe to assume, is bound to succeed. No honorable men will like to live in the premises he is occupying under leave and licence granted by a benefactor after he revokes the leave and licence nor will a court of law reasonably expect him to obstruct recovery of possession of the premises when it is crystal clear that he has no legal right to remain in possession. There is no reason why the plaintiff No. 4 should invite such a litigation. In common with his co-sharers he has already filed a suit for recovery of possession of the premises into which he can move in It will be less than fair to dismiss the suit and compel the plaintiffs to file a similar suit again, after a suit, to be instituted by the licensor, is decreed against the plaintiff No. 4. It seems to me that having regard to the evidence in this case, the plaintiff No. 4 has no reasonably suitable alternative accommodation and the plaintiffs are therefore entitled to succeed on the ground that they require the premises for their own use and occupation.;