- (1.) This is an appeal from the judgment and order of Sabyasachi Mukharji, J. dated the 21st of July, 1971. His Lordship considered in connection with the matter, the judgment delivered by K. L. Ray, J. in the Matter No.359 of 1969, (Bird & Company Private Limited v. Kalyan Kumar Sengupta and others). Although His Lordship was of the view that that the facts of this case are not identical with the facts of the aforesaid case, yet in view of the said decision on the main question of law, he was ?not inclined to decide the case in a way contrary to the said decision?. Following the said judgment the Rule was discharged.
(2.) The facts shortly are that in exercise of the powers conferred by S. 25(1) of the Customs Act 1962, the Government of India by a notification dated the 19th June, 1968 inter alia, exempted in public interest ?jute specialities? of certain kind whose F.A.S. value was not less than Rs.3500/- from payment of customs duties. Earlier the Government of India, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, had by a resolution dated 4th of December, 1962 constituted a committee for registration of export contracts in respect of jute goods to facilitate shipments and to remove or obviate considerable inconvenience experienced by shippers of Indian exporters of jute specialities on account of disputes or questions raised by the customs authorities regarding F.O.B. price or the real values of jute goods entered in the shipping bills. Under the scheme, shippers could volunteer to register sale contracts after scrutiny by the committee for registration of export contracts. The Committee for registration was to consist of a representative of the Reserve Bank of India, an Additional Collector of Customs, Calcutta and a representative of the Judge Commissioner, Calcutta as members. Production of registration certificate with other shipping documents before customs authorities was to be accepted by the latter as constituting sufficient proof of the contract price and related financial items. Relying on the said provisions the petitioner company entered into contracts with R.E.B. Wilcox and Company for sale of some jute specialities and duly registered the contracts with the committee for the purpose of exporting the goods to fulfill its contracts with foreign buyers. The petitioner presented the shipping bills in prescribed forms with necessary declarations. Officers of the Calcutta Customs, however, took the view that the goods had been overvalued and so could not be allowed to be exported as jute specialities without payment of export duty. By three notices, one dated the 17th and two dated 23rd December, 1968 the Assistant Collector of Customs for exports alleged that the F.A.S. sale price appearing in the registration contract had been inflated to claim the goods as jute specialities. There was mis-declaration regarding the value of the goods and an attempt to cause loss of government revenue. The customs authorities proceeded on the basis that the duty was payable on the export goods and deducted Rs.500/- per tonne as duty on alleged F.O.B. price without, according to the appellant, taking into account the actual price of the profits included therein. The petitioner, however, paid customs duties and executed a guarantee bond without prejudice to its rights and contentions. Later on, the customs authorities issued three further notices, one dated the 17th and two dated 23rd March, 1969 calling upon the petitioner company to show cause why the said goods should not be confiscated under S. 113(1) of the Customs Act and why penal action should not be taken against the petitioner company under S. 114 of the Customs Act for alleged mis-declaration of the value of the goods exported by ?under-valuation?. The petitioner, thereafter, filed an application under Article 226 to quash the said show cause notice. The same was ultimately rejected by S. Mukharji, J. as noted above.
(3.) On behalf of the customs, learned Advocate General contended that a writ did not lie at the stage of the show cause notices. He contended that the jurisdiction of the customs authorities was unquestioned and unconditional. There was no condition precedent to be fulfilled to confer jurisdiction. Unlike cases in the Indian Income Tax Act or the Foreign Exchange Act where some such expressions as ?if the I.T.O. has reasons to believe? or ?if the officer is of opinion? are used to indicate a condition precedent to be fulfilled to confer jurisdiction, in this case, there was no bar in law to issue notice under S. 124 of the Customs Act. The question whether the goods might be confiscated or penalty might be imposed or whether the goods were dutiable or exports goods could be decided by the department. The Company was only asked to show cause. It might be that after hearing the company the customs authorities would agree with their views. In this connection he referred to the cases of Pilani Investment Corporation Limited v. I.T.O. 69 ITR 847 and Rampyari Debi Saraogi v. Commissioner of Income Tax, West Bengal, 67 ITR 84. The learned Advocate General contended that issue of notice was not a violation of the provisions of a statute. There was no bar to the issuance of the notice and therefore the notice could not be quashed. It was not a case, according to him where the notices were ex facie bad. With regard to question of assessment etc. the customs authorities were the sole judge with exclusive jurisdiction under the statue. The Court will not interfere in its writ jurisdiction in such a case. He referred to the case of Colonial Bank of Australia v. Willam reported in (1873) 5 Privy Council appeal cases 417 and N. Chetty v. I.T.O. Nelore 1959 Supreme Court Journal 250. He further contended that the legality of the notices could not be decided without ascertaining facts regarding under-valuation. Facts were not, according to him, finally investigated. He referred in this connection to a decision (Dadabhay & Co. v. S. P. Jain and anr.) reported in 31 ITR 872. Referring to the decision of Raman and Raman Limited v. The State of Madras reported in AIR 1956 SC 463 he urged that in a case of certiorari the Court could enquire into correctness of decisions only as to collateral facts which constitute jurisdiction. The present was not such a case.;