- (1.) This is an application for a certificate for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court under Article 133(1)(a) and (b) of the Constitution. The facts are shortly as follows: The Petitioner, Union of India filed a suit against the Respondent, Assam Iron and Steel Company, in August, 1953, for recovery of Rs. 74,207-14 with interests and costs. On or about April 4, 1959, the suit was decreed by Law J. for Rs. 70,350 with interests at 6 per cent and costs. Against this decree, the Respondent preferred an appeal and in that appeal, which was heard by a Bench presided over by Bachawat, J., the decree was reduced to Rs. 15,300 and both parties were directed to bear and pay their own costs. Now, it is proposed to prefer an appeal to the Supreme Court and therefore, this application has been made for a certificate. As regards the merits, it is not disputed that this is a judgment or reversal and it is not further disputed that the value of the subject-matter exceeds Rs. 20,000.
(2.) Two objections are taken. The first objection is that it is barred by limitation and the second objection is that the petition has not been properly signed or verified. As regards the first point, it is necessary to set out certain dates. The relevant dates are as follows: 11.6.1963: judgment of the Appeal Court delivered. 13.6.1963: The Respondent paid stamp and gave requisition for drawing up of the decree. 13.6.1963: The Appellant applied for certified copy of the decree for the purpose of appeal and also applied for certified copy of the judgment. 13.5.1964: The Appellant paid stamp for filing the judgment. 13.5.1964: The Appellant paid extra stamp for folio of the judgment. 30.5.1964: A certified copy of the judgment was made ready. As the Respondent did not file the decree as was his duty pursuant to the present practice/procedure of this Court, no certified copy of the decree was prepared by the office. The Appellant states that it was keeping watch and making enquiry at the appropriate department of the High Court diligently. 19.8.1964: Present application filed. 22.8.1964: The Appellant's solicitor Sri S.N. Sen wrote to Respondent's solicitor Sri M.G. Poddar asking him to take steps to file the said decree within three days for obtaining the certified copy of the decree for preferring the appeal. Under the practice and procedure of this Court no certified copy of the decree can be obtained unless the decree is filed by the party who has given requisition for drawing up of the decree. 25.8.1965: The Appellant's solicitor Sri S.N. Sen asked permission of the Registrar to file the decree for obtaining the certified copy, as the Respondent was guilty of laches. 31.8.1964: The Appellant, pursuant to the permission given by the Registrar, filed the decree. 21.11.1964: Certified copy of the decree was made ready by the office.
(3.) It is argued that, although the Respondent did not take the requisite steps to have the decree filed, it was open to the Appellant to take steps and as it did not do so, it cannot come within the exemptions provided for by Section 12 of the Limitation Act. It will appear from the list of dates mentioned, above, that the Respondent made a requisition for drawing up of the decree so that the Appellant was not called upon to file such a requisition, although if the Respondent failed to put in a requisition, the Appellant could have put in its own requisition. This has been made clear in a judgment of Rankin, C.J. in Sambhu Nath Bandopadhyay v. Gopi Lal Seal, 1929 AIR(Cal) 734 It is obvious that the Respondent did not take diligent steps for filing the decree, without which a certified copy of the decree could not be given to the Appellant. What is argued is that it was open to the Appellant to expedite the filing of the decree and therefore, it cannot claim the benefit of the delay. In our opinion, that is strange attitude to take. It is true that if the Respondent did not make a requisition for drawing up of the decree, a duty was cast upon the Appellant to make such a requisition, but as the Respondent did file a requisition and did not proceed diligently, it cannot turn round now and take advantage of its own laches. In my opinion, this view is supported by a Privy Council decision in Jijibhoy N. Surty v. T.S. Chettyar, 1928 AIR(PC) 103 where at p. 106 Lord Phillimore says as follows: The word 'requisite' is a strong word; it may be regarded as meaning something more than the word 'required'. It means 'properly required' and it throws upon the pleader or counsel for the Appellant the necessity of showing that no part of the delay beyond the prescribed period is due to his default. But for that time which is taken up by his opponent in drawing up the decree or by the officials, of the Court in preparing and issuing the two documents, he is not responsible.;