- (1.) THE facts of the case will appear from the petition for revision and the order of the Additional Commissioner of Commercial Taxes dated 7th January, 1954.
(2.) THE only point for decision is if the petitioner's claim for deduction in respect of charges on account of repairing, oiling and cleaning of watches etc. should be allowed in fixing the amount of their taxable turnover. This question has already been answered in full in two previous cases decided by the Board, viz., Case No. 69 of 1948 (Messrs. Nalanda Press) and Case No. 120 of 1950 (Messrs. Metal Press Works Ltd.). In the first case the Board stated that the only goods in respect of which any transfer of property might be said to have taken place was the printing ink. But it would be twisting commonsense and logic to suggest that there was any contract, explicit or implied, for the sale of the printing ink. The essence of the thing was the goods that was being sold. As there was only a contract for printing the papers supplied by the customers, there could be no sale of goods at all. The Board also held that the definition of contract as given in section 2(b) of the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941, could not be extended beyond what had been stated in the law itself. In the case of Messrs. Metal Press Works Ltd., the Board observed that there was a slight difference between this and the case of Nalanda Press, viz., that some items of assessable value, viz., "handles" etc. were provided by the dealer in course of preparing the manufactured articles. It was therefore held in the latter case that the dealer purchased those articles in the market and sold them as part of the finished product.
(3.) FROM the argument on which the above decisions are based it is quite clear that the learned Additional Commissioner of Commercial Taxes was entirely wrong in his reading of the law and that he failed to appreciate the import of the Board's decisions in the above two cases which should be binding on the directorate of Commercial Taxes. No sales tax can be levied on account of repairing, oiling or cleaning of watches, clocks or timepieces. The Board reiterates its previous decision that the definition of contract for the purpose of the Act cannot be extended beyond the three items mentioned in section 2(b)(i), (ii) and (iii). And that is exactly what the Additional Commissioner had attempted to do in the present case, which even the learned Senior Government Pleader could not support.;