P.B. Chakravartti, J. - (1.) We do not consider it necessary to call upon the respondents in this appeal. The learned Counsel for the appellant has said all that he wished to say and the way in which he said it makes it possible for us to dispose of the appeal straightaway. It appears that the appellant, Subhasini Nandi, is the owner of three premises on the southern part of the city, numbered respectively 56, 57 and 42. It is the common case of all the parties that she carried out certain additions and alterations in respect of those premises without even submitting any plan to the Corporation of Calcutta, far less obtaining any sanction. When the constructions were detected, the Corporation decided to take appropriate legal proceedings and such proceedings were, in fact, commenced on the 23rd of September, 1949, by means of an application before a Magistrate under section 363 of the Calcutta Municipal Act of 1923, which was the statute then in force. The proceedings thus commenced terminated on the 26th of June, 1952, when what is called a demolition order was made. The appellant thereupon moved this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and obtained a Rule. At the final hearing of the Rule, it was discharged.
(2.) The first point taken by the learned Counsel on behalf of the appellant was that although no plan had been submitted to the Corporation, nor any sanction obtained before the impugned constructions had been commenced, there had subsequently been an amalgamation of the three premises into one which had rendered the constructions inoffensive. What was meant was that if the three premises were taken as one, no building rule would be found to have been infringed by the constructions which formed the subject-matter of the proceedings before the Magistrate. It appears to me that the contention is wholly fallacious. The fact which attracted to the appellant a liability to have the additions and alterations demolished was not that they infringed any building rules, although they might have done so, but that they had been commenced, undertaken and completed without obtaining a prior sanction from the Corporation. If the constructions were unauthorised and bad at the time they were commenced on account of the want of a prior sanction, no subsequent amalgamation of the three premises could remove the initial illegality. The constructions still remained constructions which had been commenced and completed without obtaining any sanction from the Corporation which was sufficient to condemn them as unauthorised. As I pointed out in the course of the argument, if a person were to purchase a plot of land within the municipal limits of Calcutta and erect thereon a structure in strict compliance with every building rule but he did so without obtaining any sanction from the Corporation, the want of such sanction would itself be sufficient for action to be taken against the construction even though it might not offend against any of the building rules. This appears to have been the view taken by the learned trial Judge and, in my opinion, it was the only possible view that could be taken.
(3.) The learned Counsel for the appellant urged before us a second point which was a pure point of law, unconnected in any way with the merits of the case. He contended that during the pendency of the proceedings before the Magistrate, the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951, came into force on the 1st of May, 1952, the Act of 1923, being repealed, and he contended that the effect of the new Act replacing section 363 of the old Act by section 414, was that the Magistrate could no longer continue the proceedings before us, but that the only authority which could thereafter deal with the alleged unauthorised constructions was the Commissioner appointed under the new Act. It was contended broadly that section 414 of the new Act was a procedural provision and if it was so, it had to be construed as retrospective in operation. In aid of that contention reference was made to an unreported decision of G.K. Mitter, J., in Suit No. 4847 of 1952-Noorjahan v. Jadoddlal Bysack, (decided on the 31st August, 1954).;