Lahiri, J. - (1.) The petitioner in this case is a thika tenant against whom an order for ejectment has been made by the Thika Tenancy Controller, whose decision has been affirmed on appeal by the Subordinate Judge, Third Court, 24-Pargan as. The facts which are material for the purpose of this Rule may be briefly stated as follows : On the 18th August, 1950, the landlord opposite parties filed an application for ejectment against the petitioner, under section 3 of the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act (West Bengal Act II of 1949). The grounds upon which ejectment was asked for were that the petitioner was a thika tenant under the opposite parties in respect of one cotta and six chhataks of land in a portion of premises No. 63/R, Mahanirvan Road, at a monthly rent of Rs. 8-4 under a registered lease the terms whereof had expired on the 16th November, 1949, and thereafter the opposite parties served a notice upon the petitioner to vacate the land and to deliver up peaceful possession on the expiry of the month of February, 1950. In spite of that the petitioner failed to vacate the land. The second ground upon which ejectment was prayed for was that the land was required by the opposite parties for the purpose of building and/or otherwise for developing by discontinuing the system of letting out to thika tenants. The prayer made by the opposite parties comes under clauses (iv) and (vi) of section 3 of the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act. Clause (iv) of section 3 authorises the landlord to apply for ejectment of a thika tenant on the ground that the land is required by the landlord for his own occupation or for the purpose of building on the land or otherwise developing the land by discontinuing the system of letting out to thika tenants. Under clause (vi) of section 3 the landlord is entitled to apply for ejectment when the land comprised in the holding is held under a registered lease on the ground that the term of the lease has expired. In the present case the landlord opposite parties made their application on both the grounds. But at the trial the landlords did not produce the registered lease under which the petitioner held the land with the result that the case under clause (vi) of section 3 was disallowed and an order for ejectment was made under clause (iv) of section 3 only. Against the order of the appellate Court the thika tenant has obtained the present Rule.
(2.) The only question that requires consideration is whether in the circumstances of this case the landlords can be said to require the land for the purpose of building on the land or otherwise developing the same. Mr. Sinha appearing in support of the Rule has argued before me that the word "required" as used in clause (iv) of section 3 of the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act means something more than a mere desire or a wish on the part of the landlords and that it involves an element of need which has not been proved by the landlords in the present case. He has relied upon the decision of Buck-land, J. in the case of Rekhabchand Doogar v. J. R. D'Cruz, (26 C. W. N. 499), where his Lordship was considering the meaning of the word "required" under the Calcutta Rent Act of 1920. Section 11 proviso of the Calcutta Rent Act of 1920, took away the immunity from ejectment conferred on the tenant by the Act "where the premises are bona fide required by the landlord either for purpose of building or re-building or for his own occupation." In the case before Buckland, J., the landlord made a case that the premises were bona fide required by the landlord for his own occupation. In dealing with the case. Buckland, J., observed as follows : "I do not think it is enough that a plaintiff in order to defeat a plea under the Calcutta Rent Act should merely say that he desires the premises bona fide for his own occupation. The word in the Act is not 'desire' but 'require'. This in my opinion involves something more than a mere wish and it involves an element of need, to some extent at least."
(3.) It is to be noticed that the expression which was being interpreted by his Lordship was "bona fide required", whereas in the case before me, I have to consider the meaning of the word "require" without any qualification or limitation. The word 'require' with, the adjective bona fide or reasonable has been used in various Rent Acts passed by the Legislature of West Bengal, and the meaning of that expression with those qualifications has been considered in some of the cases of this Court. In the case of Sri Naresh alias Narendra Chandra Sarkar v. Kanai Lal Roy Chowdhury, (56 C.W.N. 480), Chunder. J., sitting singly has held that the expression "bona fide required" as occurring in the West Bengal Premises Rent Control Act of 1948, involves an element of "must have" which is not present in the case of "desire". All the decisions on the point were carefully reviewed by Chakravartti, C. J., sitting with P. N. Mookerjee, J., in the case of Girish Chandra Majhi v. Girish Chandra Maity, (56 C.W.N. 320), where their Lordships were dealing with the provisions of section 5(1) of the West Bengal Bargadars Act (Act II of 1950). which runs as follows : "The owner of any land cultivated by a bargadar shall be entitled to terminate the cultivation of such land by the bargadar on one or more of the following grounds, namely (a) that the owner desires to cultivate the land by himself or by members of his family or by servants or by labourers". Chakravartti, C. J., in, delivering the judgment of the Bench was considering the meaning of the word "desire" as used in the section as distinguished from the word "required" or "bona fide required" as used in other statutes and at page 324, his Lordship observed with reference to the passage in the judgment of Buckland, J., as follows : "It is to be noticed that, in the passage quoted above, Buckland, J., chose the word 'desire' in order to contrast it with the word 'require' which he had to construe and he held that under the Rent Act of 1920, where the expression used was 'require' and not 'desire', it was not enough that the landlord should have a mere wish.";