GUHA RAY, J. - (1.) THIS petition by the Corporation of Calcutta is for revision of an order of acquittal of the Opposite Party, the Director of Rationing and Distribution, representing the Food Department of the Government of West Bengal in a case under Section 488 read with Section 386(l)(a), Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923, The allegations on which the prosecution is based are briefly that during the financial year 1951 -52. the Opposite Party was carrying on trade at premises No. 259, Upper Chitpur Road, Calcutta, and was using, or permitting the use of, the said premises for the purpose of storing rice, flour, etc., under the provisions of the Bengal Rationing Order, 1943. No licence, however, was taken for this purpose by the Opposite Party as. required by . Section 386, Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923, for the year in question. It is further alleged that from 1943 -44 to 1948 -49 the Opposite Party had paid license fees for different shops under Sections 175 and 386 for storing rice, etc., but since then he has been refusing to do so on the ground that he or rather the Government of West Bengal which he represents is not liable for such licence fees. The learned Magistrate without going into the merits of the case acquitted the Opposite Party on the short preliminary ground that he was not liable for licence fees and for this view, he relied on the decision of this Court in the case of - - 'the Corporation of Calcutta v. Sub -Postmaster, Dharamtola Post Office', : AIR1950Cal417 . The short point for decision in this case is thus whether the Opposite Party or rather the Government of West Bengal which he represents is liable for licence fees.
(2.) SECTION 386(l)(a) is as follows: No person shall use or permit to be used any premises for any of the following purposes without or otherwise than in conformity with the terms of a license granted by the Corporation in this behalf, namely, any of the purposes specified in Schedule 19. Item No. 8 of Schedule 19 is 'storing, packing, pressing, cleansing, preparing or manufacturing, by any process whatever, any of the following articles' and then follows a list, which includes rice, flour, etc., the articles said to be stored by the Opposite Party in this case. Section 488 provides for the punishment of any contravention of the provisions of this as well as other sections and the maximum punishment provided is a fine of Rs. 250. Sub -section (2) further provides for the imposition of a daily maximum fine of Rs. 50 in the event of a continuation of the offence after conviction. The first point for consideration now is whether Section 386 is of general application requiring persons who store even for domestic consumption the articles in question to take out licenses or they apply only to those who store these things for purposes of trade, etc. If they apply to those who store them for purposes of trade, a further question arises, namely, whether the word 'trade' necessarily carries with it the idea of an exchange of goods for goods or money for the purpose of making a profit, so as to exclude the Opposite Party from the purview of the section because there was no idea of profit behind his storing of these articles, the whole object of the Government in this matter being to secure a proper distribution of these essential articles of food. The case which the learned Magistrate relied on furnishes a complete answer to all these questions and with that answer we are in respectful agreement. That answer is first, that on a plain reading of Section 386 it cannot be held to be of general application but must be held to be limited to premises falling within the description of the sub -heading 'Factories, trades and places of public resort'; secondly, that 'trade' in this section means an exchange of goods for goods or money without the additional idea of such an exchange being for the purpose of making a profit.
(3.) THE next and the most important point for consideration is whether the Opposite Party on the State of West Bengal which he stands for is a person falling within the scope of Section 386. That the Opposite Party even in his official capacity is a person within the meaning of the word in Section 3(32), Bengal General Clauses Act, goes without saying and even the State, composed as it is of a large number of parts, each of which is represented by one or more individuals satisfies that definition. The legal personality of the Union and the State is placed beyond doubt by Art. 300 of the Constitution of India. It is, therefore, clear that the Opposite Party is a person even though he might represent the State and in the absence of anything to the contrary, would be normally within the scope of the prohibition embodied in Section 386, Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923.;