Harish Tandon, J. - (1.) THIS revisional application is directed against the judgement and order dated 17th April, 2015 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, First Court, Burdwan in Miscellaneous Appeal No. 1 of 2015 affirming the judgment and order dated 3rd May, 2013 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), First Court, Burdwan in Preemption Case No. 16 of 2008.
(2.) SECTION 8 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 contemplates three categories of person to apply for preemption if the plot of land is sold, transferred and conveyed to stranger. At the time of promulgation of the said Act, such right was conferred upon the co -sharer of a raiyat and the adjoining owner but subsequently by amending the Act, the right of a bargadar under the aforesaid provision was further recognized. As of this date, it is a settled law that a proceeding under Section 8 of the said Act is in the nature of the original proceeding though originated on the basis of an application. The Co -ordinate Bench in case of Minor Subir Ranjan Mondal -v - Sitanath Mukherjee reported in : 1994 (1) CLJ 106 held: "82. In view of the discussions made hereinabove, I am of the view that an application for pre -emption under Section 8 of the Act must be deemed to be a plaint filed in a suit. Therefore, Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be applied in a proceeding or to an "application" under Section 8 of the Act as Section 5 of the Limitation Act itself omits its application in suits. Accordingly, it is decided that Section 5 of the Limitation Act has no manner of application to Section 8 of the Act."
(3.) THE identical point cropped up before the Division Bench in case of Serish Maji -v - Nishit Kumar Dolui reported in : (1999) 1 CHN 365 because of two conflicting decisions of the equal strength operating in the field. Though in case of Serish Maji (supra), it was held that even if, a proceeding under Section 8 of the said Act originates on an application but because of the procedure for determination under the said provision, it is in effect a plaint and, therefore, the said proceeding is the original proceeding and Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply. On the other hand, the judgement rendered in case of Chandra Sekhar Sarkar -v - Baidyanath Ghosh & Others; reported in : AIR 1982 Cal 6 held that Section 29 Sub -section 2 of the Limitation Acts, 1963 makes the provision of the said Act applicable to a proceeding under Section 8 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 in absence of any express exclusion provision. The Division Bench noticed the definition of an application and suit given under Section 2(b) & Section 2(1) of the Limitation Act and held that those are judicial proceeding not only for a complete remedy but also a part of larger action or original proceeding. Ultimately the Division Bench held that the law declared in case of Minor Subir Ranjan (supra) is a correct proposition of law. Finally the Supreme Court in case of Gopal Sardar -v - Karuna Sardar reported in : (2004) 4 SCC 252 held the proposition as laid down in case of Subir Ranjan & Serish Maji (supra) to be a correct proposition of law in the following: "12. A Bench of three learned Judges of this Court in CST v. Parson Tools and Plants dealing with the question of limitation in relation to revision filed beyond the time prescribed by Section 10 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948, in AIR p. 1045, para 17, has observed thus: (SCC p. 29, para 22) "22[17]. Thus the principle that emerges is that if the legislature in a special statute prescribes a certain period of limitation for filing a particular application thereunder and provides in clear terms that such period on sufficient cause being shown, may be extended, in the maximum, only up to a specified time -limit and no further, then the tribunal concerned has no jurisdiction to treat within limitation, an application filed before it beyond such maximum time -limit specified in the statute, by excluding the time spent in prosecuting in good faith and due diligence any prior proceeding on the analogy of Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act." In the same judgment it is expressed that (at SCC p. 29, para 23) "where the legislature clearly declares its intent in the scheme and language of a statute, it is the duty of the court to give full effect to the same without scanning its wisdom or policy, and without engrafting, adding or implying anything which is not congenial to or consistent with such expressed intent of the lawgiver". The conclusion reached by the Division Bench of the High Court in Serish Maji case that Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not applicable to proceedings under Section 8 of the Act is correct and acceptable. 13. Section 8 of the Act prescribes definite period of limitation of three months or four months, as the case may be, for initiating proceedings for enforcement of right of pre -emption by different categories of people with no provision made for extension or application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. When in the same statute in respect of various other provisions relating to filing of appeals and revisions, specific provisions are made so as to give benefit of Section 5 of the Limitation Act and such provision is not made to an application to be made under Section 8 of the Act, it obviously and necessarily follows that the legislature consciously excluded the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Considering the scheme of the Act being a self -contained code in dealing with the matters arising under Section 8 of the Act and in the light of the aforementioned decisions of this Court in the case of Hukumdev Narain Yadav, Anwari Basavaraj Patil and Parson Tools it should be construed that there has been exclusion of application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to an application under Section 8 of the Act. In view of what is stated above, the non -applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to the proceedings under Section 8 of the Act is certain and sufficiently clear. Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act as to the express exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act and the specific period of limitation prescribed under Section 8 of the Act without providing for either extension of time or application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act or its principles can be read together harmoniously. Such reading does not lead to any absurdity or unworkability or frustrating the object of the Act. At any rate, in the light of the three -Judge Bench decision of this Court in Hukumdev Narain Yadav case and subsequently followed in Anwari Basavaraj Patil case even though special or local law does not state in so many words expressly that Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not applicable to the proceedings under those Acts, from the scheme of the Act and having regard to various provisions such express exclusion could be gathered. Thus, a conscious and intentional omission by the legislature to apply Section 5 of the Limitation Act to the proceedings under Section 8 of the Act, looking to the scheme of the Act, nature of right of pre -emption and express application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to the other provisions under the Act, itself means and amounts to "express exclusion" of it satisfying the requirement of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act.;