Kalyan Jyoti Sengupta, J. - (1.) The petitioner above named being the teacher in a school called Elias Meyer Free School and Talmude Torah (hereinafter referred to the said school in this writ petition) has challenged the show- cause notice dated 19th December, 1990, disciplinary proceedings pursuant thereto and order of dismissal dated 28th June, 2001. In this case short narration of fact is required to be stated as it has got little history before the order of dismissal was passed which is sought to be impugned. In 1978 the petitioner was appointed as Assistant Teacher in the said school. On 13th December, 1990 it was alleged that the petitioner, while taking her class of the pupils in Class III of the said school, pulled the ears of one of the students of the said class and it resulted in bleeding. Immediately thereafter an investigation was carried out by the Principal of the school and the petitioner was supplied a copy of the recording of the investigation and she was asked to give a written explanation. Petitioner submitted written explanation alleging that she had never pulled nor twisted the ears of the said student and she denied the charges levelled against her. The school authority not being satisfied with the explanation issued the impugned show cause notice and she was called upon to show cause as to why further proceedings should not be taken against her. Simultaneously, she was put under suspension. On 24th December, 1990 the petitioner submitted a written reply against the show cause. The petitioner challenged the said show cause notice by filing a suit and prayed for consequential reliefs. Ultimately, the said suit was allowed to be withdrawn by the Learned Judge of the City Civil Court on 21st November, 1997. On 17th December, 1998 the petitioner thereafter filed an application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in this Court (W.P. No. 2336 of 1997) (hereinafter referred to as the first writ) challenging the said show cause notice and the disciplinary proceedings initiated against her pursuant thereto. The said first writ was disposed of by this Hon'ble Court directing the respondents to complete the disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner in accordance with law within a period of two months from the date without going into the merit. On 10th February, 1999 after completion of the disciplinary proceedings a second show cause notice was served upon the petitioner and on receipt thereof the petitioner challenged the same by filing another writ petition (hereinafter referred to as the second writ) questioning legality and validity of the second show cause notice dated 10th February, 1999. The second writ was disposed of by the judgment dated 24th August, 2000, by setting aside the second show cause notice and directing the school to start de novo proceedings pursuant to the said first show cause notice dated 19th December, 1990. The school authority preferred appeal against the said judgment and order dated 24th August, 2000 passed on the second writ. The Appeal Court, however, declined to interfere with the said judgment and order and granted extension of the time for completing the enquiry within certain time.
(2.) Pursuant to the said judgment and order of the Learned Trial Judge read with the order of the Appeal Court enquiry was initiated on 2nd May, 2001 by appointing Learned Advocate for this Court as Enquiry Officer. The Enquiry Officer duly gave notice to both the parties and heard them. He examined witnesses produced by the parties. On 19th June, 2001 Enquiry Officer furnished a report holding the petitioner's guilty of misconduct. On 19th June, 2001 itself the petitioner received the said copy of the report and on 28th June, 2001 the impugned order of termination was served.
(3.) On the aforesaid narration of facts it is clear that there is no scope to scrutinise and examine the legality and validity of the show cause notice as by the three orders this Court allowed the school authority to proceed with the said show case notice. Unless there were grounds to proceed with the same this Court would not have time and again asked the disciplinary authority to proceed with the same. As such the petitioner now cannot challenge the same.;