Umesh Chandra Banerjee. J. - (1.) The doctrine of natural justice has a deep rooted foundation in the concept of fair-play and justice. This concept of fairness or fair-play, however, cannot by any stretch be said to be inflexible in nature and its flexibility is its real virtue, be it noted here that it is not possible to lay down rigid rules as to when the principles of natural justice ought to be made applicable but the same depends upon the facts and circumstances of the matter in issue. The observation of Lord Denning M.R. in R. v. Gaming Board of Great Britain ex. p. Benaim and Khaida 1970(2) Q.B.417 lends support to the view expressed above.
(2.) This concept of natural justice and fair play has come for increasing judicial scrutiny in recent years and the Law Courts have been in the past and still are expanding its frontiers depending upon the situations. This expansion of doctrine of fairplay, equity and justice culminating in the concept of natural justice is effected by reason of changes in the society and it is a primary duty of the Law Courts to keep on changing the structure of law as otherwise law will lag behind rendering the concept of justice totally nugatory. In a democratic set up the prosperity of the society depends upon the judiciary and in the event the function of judiciary falls below the expectation of the society the society shall perish. The doctrine propounded by Ro-scopound that laws stress upon the social purpose and the legal order must be flexible as well as stable still hold good as a guiding principle in order to do effective justice between the parties. It is the primary duty of the Law Courts to review the existing laws and with its adaptability broaden the scope so as to meet the demand of the society. As Bhagwati-J, observed in M.P.Sugar Mill's case that law is not antique to be taken down, dusted and put back on the shelf again, but it is essentially a social process and it must keep on growing and developing with the changing social concepts and values. The concept cannot be restricted in a straight-jacket formula and be applied only in certain specified cases. Law Courts have been working with the idea of fair administration of justice and have been expanding the horizon of the administrative law-whether in America or in England or in this country the judiciary has been quite active in the matter of expansion of the frontier of administrative law.
(3.) The above narration cannot but be adverted to by reason of the special facts of the matter under consideration but before turning attention on to the factual aspect a reminder is necessary to the basic principle once again. The House of Lords in Ridge v. Baldwin 1964 AC 40 reinstated the right to a fair hearing as 'a rule of universal application' in the case of administrative actions or decisions affecting the rights - and it would be useful to record the oft-cited observation of Lord Loreburn that the duty to afford such an opportunity of hearing is 'a duty lying upon every one who decides anything'. If we trace the English decisions little bit further one inevitable conclusion is that this decision of the House of Lords in Ridge v. Baldwin has opened up a new vista in regard to the concept of natural justice and since then there exists a steady refinement of administrative law by the English Courts. The decisions of the Indian Courts are also not lagging, however, on this count and it is now a well settled principle of law that the concept of natural justice has its application in administrative actions as well. The trend of judicial decisions in our country unmistakably depict the obliteration of dividing line between the administrative power and quasi-judicial power and the law is well settled to that effect and as such one need not dilate much on this score excepting, however, recording the observations of the Supreme Court in the decision of C.B. Boarding and Lodging v. State of Mysore and Anr., (1970-II-LLJ-403) wherein the Supreme Court observed; (p. 411): "14. It was urged on behalf of the hotel owners that the power conferred to fix the minimum wages on the appropriate Government under Section 5(1) is a quasi-judicial power and in exercising that power, it was incumbent on the appropriate Government to observe the principles of natural justice. The Government having failed to observe those principles, the fixation of wages made is liable to be struck down. It is unnecessary for our present purpose to go into the question whether the power given under the Act to fix minimum wages is a quasi-judicial power or an administrative power as observed by this Court in A.K. Kamipak v. Union of India, the dividing line between an administrative power and quasi judicial power is quite thin and is being gradually obliterated. It is further observed therein that principles of natural justice apply to the exercise of the administrative powers as well. But those principles are not embodied rules. What particular rule of natural justice, if any, should apply to a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that case, the framework of the law under which the inquiry is held and the constitution of the tribunal or body of persons appointed for the purpose." ;