Suhas Chandra Sen, J. - (1.) The Tribunal has referred the following two questions of law to this court under Section 256(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 : " 1. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal misdirected itself in law in holding that some of the objects of the Association were not objects of general public utility and the income of the Association from interest was not exempt from tax under Section 11, Income-tax Act, 1961 ? 2. Whether the Tribunal was right in law in holding that the income of the Association was not exempt from tax either under Section 11 or under Section 10(24) or both ? "
(2.) The Indian Sugar Mills Association is a trade union registered under the Trade Unions Act, 1926 ; any individual, firm or company owning or managing a sugar mill or a factory is eligible for membership of the Association. The objects of the Association have been set out in Rule 3 and there are as many as 31 objects. The object Clause of the Association came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of CIT v. Indian Sugar Mills Association. In that case, the Supreme Court held that Clauses (a), (b), (c), (d), (1) and (n) of Rule 3 fell in the category of primary purposes of the Association and it was not possible to treat any one of them as ancillary or incidental to another. The Supreme Court, in that case, held that the income of the Association derived from its business of export of sugar and interest from current and fixed deposits were not exempt from taxation under Section 4(3)(i), Indian I.T. Act, 1922. The Supreme Court, after referring to the various objects of the Association, held (at p. 493 of 97 ITR): " These are all primary purposes of a trade union. Rule 3(b) also may possibly be taken as a trade union object. Assuming Rule 3(a) could be the primary object of a trade union, the other objects named in Clauses (c), (d), (1) and (n) of Rule (3) also fell in the same category, and it is not possible to speak of one of them as ancillary or incidental to another. These other objects cannot also be called charitable purposes within the meaning of Section 4(3)(i) even assuming that in some remote and indirect manner they might be of some public utility. It is not, therefore, possible to agree that the association held the income derived from its business wholly for charitable purposes. "
(3.) In view of this judgment of the Supreme Court, the first question referred by the Tribunal has to be answered in the negative and in favour of the Revenue.;