A.K. De, J. - (1.) Complainant, the Chief Enforcement Officer, Emergency Risk Insurance Scheme, Department of Revenue and Insurance, Government of India, in Complaint Case No. 282 of 1970 is the Petitioner in Criminal Revision Case No. 704 of 1973. By the order dated December 29, 1972, the learned Magistrate has acquitted the opposite parties (who are the Directors and the Company) in this case who were being prosecuted under Sec. 5(4) of the Emergency Risks (Factories) Insurance Act, 1962. The complainant has filed an application under Sec. 417(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to be hereafter called the Code, on May 16, 1973 and has simultaneously filed a petition under Sec. 5 of the Indian Limitation Act for condoning the delay of 76 days in filing that. This Rule has been issued on his application under Sec. 5 of the Indian Limitation Act.
(2.) The State and the opposite parties have appeared to oppose.
(3.) No application under Sub -section (3) of Sec. 417 of the Code for the grant of special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal shall be entertained after expiry of 60 days from the date of order of acquittal. To be within time this application under Sec. 417(3) is to have been filed on or before March 31, 1973, adding to that the period that may have been taken in getting the certified copy of the order provided the application for the copy has been filed before March 31, 1973. The application for copy of the judgment of acquittal in this case was filed on April 18, 1973. The said copy was taken delivery of by the complainant on the same date. He is not, therefore, entitled to make any addition to the period of 60 days for the reason that the application for copy was not filed before March 31, 1973. Delay for the period from March 31, 1973, to April 18, 1973 and for the period between April 18, 1973 and May 16, 1973, requires to be explained. The first of the two periods is sought to be explained submitting that the complainant asked his Advocate in the trial Court in February 1973 to apply for the copy, was informed by him that he had made such application and in spite of his repeated enquiries from him between February and April, 1973 did not get the copy before April 18, 1973. The complainant came to know of the order of acquittal on December 29, 1972, when it was pronounced. Sri S.K. Basak, who was looking after the complainant's case in the Magistrate's Court obtained an unauthorised copy of the judgment. The Chief Enforcement Officer of the Department mentioned that fact in his letter dated February 3, 1973, to the Deputy Director. It further appears that the complainant made over a sum of Rs. 20 as expenses for the copy to his Advocate who endorsed receipt of it on February 20, 1973. Sri S.K. Basak certified in the bill of the learned Advocate that he was entitled to his fees at half rates for the date of judgment, that is December 29, 1972, thereby proving that the Advocate was present when the judgment was delivered. It further appears that no application for copy was filed till April 18, 1973. If copy, was not applied for by the complainant's Advocate in spite of the complainant providing him with the fund, it is to be considered whether that delay on the part of the Advocate will be a 'sufficient cause' within the meaning of the expression in Sec. 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963, preventing the Petitioner from coming to Court in time. It was contended that this was a lapse on the part of the Advocate and was a 'sufficient cause'. I am unable to accept this submission. On February 6, 1973, (annex. B) the complainant's Advocate stated that the copy had been applied for. He asked for funds. He received the same on February 20, 1973. In annex. R of March 19, 1973, the Advocate stated that the copies were not ready and that attempts were being made to get the same as early as possible. The complainant was requesting the Advocate from time to time for the copy. In spite of that, the lawyer, it appears, did not apply for the copy till April 18, 1973. Either he was forgetful or was not prompt in looking after the interest of his client. I am unable to say that this lapse on the part of his Advocate can be availed of by the Petitioner to say that he was prevented by 'sufficient cause' from coming to Court in time. The complainant has not been able to explain the period from March 31, 1973, to April 18, 1973, or the period from February 6, 1973, to April 18, 1973.;