P.C.Mallick, J. - (1.)THE petitioner asks for a Writ in the nature of mandamus on the Registrar of this Court directing him "to recall, cancel and withdraw the filing of the pretended award dated April 1, 1963 as a judgment in suit No. 1045 of 1947 as part of the record of this Court. THE petitioner is the plaintiff in the said suit and the respondents Nos. 3, 4 and 5 are the defendants. THE dispute between the brothers and sister relate to the estate left by their father Srish Chandra Paul who died intestate in 1946 leaving considerable properties. Apart from the plaintiff who is the youngest daughter and is still unmarried, Sris had other daughters who are married and one of whom has died since. THE widow of Srish, Pramila Sundari Dasi died on January 13, 1958 after having instituted the above suit and after executing a Will whereby she left her entire estate to the plaintiff her youngest daughter and the respondent No. 3 her youngest son, to the total exclusion of her two other sons and the other daughters. THE suit instituted by Pramila Sundari was a suit for cancellation of a deed of gift executed by her in favour of her three sons in respect of one item of immoveable property situate in Calcutta of which she was the exclusive owner, and for partition of the estate left by her deceased husband. THE agreement between Pramila Sundari and her three sons which purports to record the partition of the bulk of the estate left by Srish has also been chal-lenged in the said suit. During the pendency of the suit Pramila Sundari died leaving a Will as indicated before and by an order of this Court her youngest daughter Arati was transferred from the category of defendant to be the sole plaintiff in place and stead of the deceased mother. She also propounded her mother's Will which was contested by her two brothers Balai and Kanai. THEreupon the testamentary proceedings became a contested cause and was marked and numbered Testamentary Suit No. 12 of 1962. Both the Testamentary Suit and the other suit came up before me for trial. What happened thereafter will appear from the judgment delivered by me on April 1, 1963 hereunder set out.
"THE suit and the testamentary proceedings initiated by the substituted plaintiff to prove the Will of Promila came up for trial, the testamentary proceeding having been placed first. THE Testamentary proceedings was called on first and a number of witnesses were examined on behalf of the propounder. On January 4, 1963, the parties represented by their counsel asked me to dispose of the disputes in these two proceedings as I considered proper. No further evidence was tendered in the above two proceedings. What I was asked to do will appear from the minutes recorded and set out hereunder:

"It is recorded that all the parties consent to this testamentary suit as well as the partition suit being suit No. 1045 of 1957 and all the disputes involyed in these two matters be settled and referred to the sole arbitration of the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Mullick and the parties agreed to abide by any decision that will be given and no evidence need be taken except as to what His Lordship might desire and the evidence need not be recorded in any formal manner. Parties agree that His Lordship would have all the summary power including the power to divide and partition the properties and to make such decrees as his Lordship thinks fit and proper and for the purpose of partition, if necessary, to engage or appoint surveyors and commissioners as His Lordship thinks best. It is recorded that all the parties have referred this matter to the Learned Judge in what is known as Extra Cursum Curiae jurisdiction of this Court. It is further recorded that all parties agree that they will not prefer any appeal from or against the decree or order that may be passed by his Lordship the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Mullick."
I have accepted it in terms of the prayer of the parties protracted litigation amongst suck near relations is extremely undesirable. It is not merely ruinous to the estate but also leaves in its trail such bitterness and bad blood between brothers and sisters that snaps all that is good and beautiful in their relationship. THE method suggested by the parties, I hope, will leave behind the least evil and I will try to do justice to the parties and effect an equitable partition of the estate. THE parties should remember that I cannot give decisions which would be to the tikiag of all the parties. Indeed it is more probable that none of the parties would be fully satisfied. Nevertheless the parties and their legal advisers have appreciated that however unsatisfactory it may appear to each individually, it is in their best interest to accept it without any mental reservation and give full stop to the family disputes."
(2.)BY my said judgment, both the suits were disposed of. I pronounced in favour of the Will, upheld the agreement recording the partition of the bulk of the estate and passed a partition decree declaring the shares of the respective parties in the different properties as under:
"In the result, for the present I will pass a preliminary decree as under: I. I declare that the deed of gift executed by the original plaintiff on September 27, 1946, in favour of the three defendants is a valid document and the premises Nos. 60/11 and 60/12, Gouribere Lane covered by the said document ceased to belong to the original plaintiff from the said date, the donees having acquired full ownership therein. Neither the original nor the substituted plaintiff has any interest in the said premises and it is directed to be kept out of the partition proceedings.

II. I declare that there has been an amicable partition as recorded in the agreement dated March 30, 1952 being Annexure "C" to the plaint. The properties set out in Schedules A, B and C of the said agreement have become ever since the exclusive properties oi the three defendants, respectively. The said properties set out in Schedules A, B and C are also directed to be kept out of the partition proceedings.
III. I declare that the properties set out in Schedule "D" of the said Annexure "C" allotted in the said partition to the original plaintiff, became the pro-perties of the original plaintiff initially possessed under Hindu Women's right, subsequently in absolute title since the coming in force of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. On her death, the substituted plaintiff and the defendants have acquired rights therein in the following shares: Plaintiff ..... 1/2 Defendant No. 1. Balai ..... 1/60th Defendant No. 2 Kanai ..... 1/6th Defendant No. 3 Gour ..... 1/6th These properties would be partitioned according to the above shares declared in this proceedings. IV. I declare that the properties set out in Schedule "E" to Annexure "C" have not been partitioned and continued to be joint and have to be partitioned in this proceedings. I declare that at the date of her death the mother had 1/4th share in the said properties in absolute title. I declare that under the Will of the original, plaintiff, the substituted plaintiff has acquired a half share in the said properties belonging to the mother, the remaining half to be divisible amongst the three defendants equally. I declare the shares of the partners in the said properties as under: Plaintiff ..... 1/8th Defendant No. 1 Balai ..... 7/24th Defendant No. 2 Kanai .... 7/24th Defendant No. 3 Gour ..... 7/24th V. Any other immovable properties jointly belonging to the parties and not referred to in the said agreement dated March 30, 1952, still continue to be joint, and I make a declaration accordingly. These properties are liable to be divided and partitioned amongst the plaintiff and the defendants in the shares indicated below: Plaintiff ..... 1/8th defendant No. 1 ..... 7/24th Defendant No. 2 ..... 7/24th Defendant No. 3 ..... 7/24th VI. I declare that the dwelling house at Dingel-hati, as also the Belgachia Garden, are the joint properties to be partitioned in this proceeding amongst the plaintiff and the defendants Nos. 1, 2 and 3 in the shares as indicated in paragraph V above. VII. There, will be following enquiries in the proceedings:
"(i) As to what other immoveable properties were left out in the amicable partition and which continued to be joint even now. The enquiry will cover (i) lands in the Zamindary not acquired (ii) lands leased out to tenants at Calcutta and (iii) any other immoveable property. (ii) The enquiry will also be made as to what joint properties, in particular zamindary lands, were conveyed to the companies named in Schedule "F" to the plaint. (iii) There will also be a similar enquiry in respect of the moveables and the insurance money referred to in Schedule "E" to the plaint. The parties will have shares as indicated in paragraph V in respect of any immoveable property including money, that might be found to be jointly belonging to the parties."

It is difficult to understand, far less to appreciate the grievance of the petitioner. She was given half the mother's estate on the basis of the mother's Will. Whatever she is entitled to in law has been given to her by the judgment. The amicable partition effected by the mother and the sons, I have not disturbed. The execution of the agreement is admitted but the amicable partition has been challenged on the technical ground that not being registered, the agreement does not effect a partition. I held on looking to the document that it does not purport to effect a partition but it only records that a partition has been effected in the past and the terms on which such partition was effected. I held that in law and in equity such a partition between the members of the family should not be disturbed. 1 very much regret that the petitioner, a young girl, should be so litigation-minded as to carry on litigation for its own sake and not for getting any benefit out of it. Not having sufficient experience, she is unable to appreciate how much injury she is doing to herself and her near relations. I leave it at that.

(3.)THE instant application is an application under Article 226 of the Constitution for an order in the nature of mandamus on the Registrar of this Court. THE object is to prevent the filing of the preliminary decree passed by me on April 1, 1963. THE preliminary decree has been described as a "pretended award" not even an award. THE application was made before Binayak Baner-jee, J. on September 5, 1963, who refused to issue a rule and dismissed the application in limine with the following observation:
"In my opinion, the remedy chosen by the petitioner is not the correct remedy. If Mallick, J. was really acting as an arbitrator, he should have produced an award, but instead of doing so, passed a decree. . THE decree may be a nullity. THE petitioner may have the liberty of having the production of Mallick, J. declared as nullity. On the other hand, if the production of Mallick, J. is really a decree as ex-facie it is, then the Registrar has no other option but to proceed in accordance with the Rules of this Court and to permit the said decree to be filed and to pre-pare a decree in accordance therewith. In these circumstances, I cannot order the respondent to interpret the production of Mallick J. as an award even though ex facie it shows that it is a decree and to treat it as an award and then to proceed according to law."
Against this order of dismissal an appeal was taken which was heard by a Bench consisting of Sinha and Arun Kumar Mukherjea, JJ. who by their order dated April 28, 1964 allowed the appeal and directed the issue of a rule. THEir LORD-ships felt that having regard to the questions raised in the application, a rule should have been issued and the application should not have been dismissed in limine. THEir Lordships expressly stated that they were not to be taken to express their views on the points raised which would have to be considered at the hearing of the rate.