- (1.) THE facts in this case are briefly as follows : the petitioner is a lower division assistant under the District Magistrate and Collector, 24-Parganas. Under the West Bengal Panchayat Act, a post has been created called the Supervisor of Panchayats by a notification dated the 28th December, 1960 published in an Extraordinary Issue of the Calcutta Gazette dated the 2nd January, 1961. Rules have been made for the recruitment of Supervisors of Panchayats. It has been provided that 25 per cent, of the posts to be created or falling vacant every year, shall be filled by promotion from Government staff working in the Collectorate and other offices in the district, with experience in Panchayat or community development work or social service. The selection will be made by the District Officer according to the number of vacancies allotted by the Director of Panchayats to be filled by promotion in a particular district. The remaining 75 per cent, of the pasts to be created or falling vacant every year are to be filled by direct recruitment. It has also been provided that the appointment of a Supervisor of Panchayats is to be made by the Director of Panchayats. Sometime in January, 1961 the respondent No. 1, the Director of Panchayats, Government of West Bengal, advised that three vacancies of Supervisor of Panchayats were to be filled up by promotion. It was further stated that formal appointment orders would be issued by the Director of Panchayats on receipt of the names selected by respondent No. 2, the District Magistrate of 24-Parganas, who is the District Officer within the meaning of the expression as used in the Notification dated 28. 12. 60. On the 13th February, 1961 the Additional District Magistrate of 24-Parganas invited applications for filling up the three vacancies from L. D. and U. D. Assistants in the Collectorate of 24-Parganas. The petitioner applied and was asked to take a short examination in which he appeared on the 9th March, 1961. On the 10th April, 1961 the petitioner appeared at an interview. On the 21st April, 1961 the petitioner's name was forwarded by the District Magistrate to the Director of Panchayats as one of the three candidates selected for the post of Supervisor of Panchayats. on the 30th May, 1961 the Director of Panchayats appointed the petitioner as a Supervisor of Panchayats and the letter of appointment forwarded to the District Magistrate for being communicated to the petitioner. In the meantime, Government formulated a policy for retention of the existing Supervisors of Panchayats, that is to say, who were already working as Supervisors of Panchayats, on a temporary basis. Before the appointment order made by the Director of Panchayats could be communicated to the petitioner, the Director of panchayats recalled and cancelled the said order sometime in June, 1961. The letter of appointment was not handed over to the petitioner. On the 15th April, 1962 advertisements have been issued in the Jugantar and Amrita Bazar Patrika inviting applications for seven posts of supervisors of Panchayats. The petitioner's grievance is that he had already been appointed as a supervisor of Panchayats and therefore this action of putting in advertisements for candidates is contrary to law.
(2.) THE short point therefore is as to whether the fact that the Director of Panchayats had issued a letter of appointment means that the petitioner had been validly appointed as a Supervisor of Panchayats, although the order had not been communicated to him. According to the petitioner, since the letter of appointment was sent to the District Magistrate, to be handed over to the petitioner, it was a completed order and the petitioner had been validly appointed. In my opinion this argument cannot be accepted. An order to be effective must not only be made by a competent authority but must be communicated to the person in whose favour or against whom it has been made. Until that is done, it is not a completed order. This point is now covered by a decision of the supreme Court in (1) Bachhittar Singh v. State of Punjab and another, A. I. R. (1963) S. C. 395. In that case, the short facts were as follows : The appellant was appointed Quanungo in the former State of Pepsu in the year 1950. On December 1, 1953 he was appointed Assistant Consolidation Officer. Complaints were received against him regarding tampering with official records. He was thereupon suspended and an enquiry was held against him. As a result of that enquiry, he was dismissed by an order of the Revenue Secretary. This order was duly communicated to the appellant. From this order the appellant preferred an appeal before the Revenue Minister of Pepsu who considered the appeal and made an endorsement to the effect that although the charges against the appellant were serious, he thought that as the appellant was a refugee and had a large family to support, his dismissal would be too hard and instead of dismissing him, he should be reverted to his original post of Quanungo and warned that if he did not behave properly in future he should be dealt with severely. On the very next day, the State of Pepsu merged in the State of Punjab. Before this order could be communicated to the appellant, the file was put up before the Revenue Minister of Punjab with which Pepsu had merged, and he was of the opinion that dismissal from service was the correct punishment and no leniency should be shown on the ground that the appellant was a displaced person or had a large family to support. The order was therefore varied to the effect that the original order of dismissal should stand. The appellant moved against this order before the Punjab High Court and thereafter before the supreme Court. Mudholkar, J. relied on an earlier decision of the Supreme Court in (2) State of Punjab v. Sodhi Sukhdev Singh, A. I. R. (1961) S. C. 493 at page 512. It was held that it was of the essence that an order has to be communicated to the person who would be affected thereby. It was only when that order was communicated, that it would be said that the person concerned would be bound by that order and until the order was communicated to the person affected by it, it would be open to the State represented by the Council of Ministers to consider and reconsider the matter over and over again and therefore until it was communicated, it was not a completed order but one of a provisional character only. In my opinion, this succinctly lays down the law on the subject. An order to be effective must be completed and it can only be completed when it is communicated to the person against whom or in whose favour it has been made, that is to say, the person who would be affected by that order. Until such communication is made, it could be varied as many times as is necessary.
(3.) IN the present case, the order of appointment had been made by the Director of panchayats who was the competent authority under the Notification. But before it was communicated to the petitioner, it was recalled and cancelled. The mere fact that one official handed it over to another does not mean that there was communication of the order. The order is effective only when it is communicated to him, so that he receives it or must be presumed to have received it. It is not disputed that this was not done at any point of time. In my opinion, therefore, the order was never completed and therefore never became effective. Consequently the petitioner has no legal right to maintain an application for a Writ.;