LAHIRI, J. - (1.) : This rule has been obtained by the petitioner under Art. 227 of the Constitution of India, for quashing a certificate proceeding pending against him before the Certificate Officer, 24-Par-ganas, for the realisation of unpaid income-tax on the ground that the proceeding is void ab initio.
(2.) THE facts which are not disputed may be briefly stated as follows : THE petitioner was assessed on an income of Rs. 27,162 for the year 1946-1947. Subsequently, this assessment was re-opened under s. 34 of the Indian IT Act, and he was assessed on an income of Rs. 7,46,476, and his tax liability was determined at Rs. 6,53,638, and odd. THE petitioner filed an appeal against this assessment which is said to be still pending. On the 25th May, 1951, the ITO acting under s. 46(2) of the Indian IT Act forwarded a certificate to the Collector of 24-Parganas specifying the amount due from the petitioner and, on the basis of the certificate thus forwarded, a proceeding under the Public Demands Recovery Act was started against the petitioner by the Certificate Officer, 24- Parganas. THE notice under s. 7 of the Public Demands Recovery Act was served on the petitioner on the 11th July, 1951, and on the 14th Aug., 1951, the petitioner filed an objection challenging the validity of the certificate. THE petitioner's objection is that the certificate under s. 46(2) of the Indian IT Act should have been forwarded to the Collector of Calcutta and not to the Collector of 24-Parganas and as in the present case the certificate was forwarded to the Collector of 24- Parganas, the proceedings started by him is without jurisdiction. THE objection of the petitioner has been overruled by the authorities below and against those orders the petitioner has obtained the present rule. Mr. Jyotish Chandra Pal, appearing in support of the rule, has argued that the word "Collector" in s. 46(2) of the Indian IT Act means the Collector of the place where the default is made. As in the present case the default was admittedly made in Calcutta, the certificate should have been forwarded to the Collector of Calcutta. Reference has also been made to s. 3(10) of the Indian General Clauses Act which provides that the Collector of the Presidency Town of Calcutta means the Collector of Calcutta. Sec. 46(2) of the Indian IT Act does not specify to which Collector the ITO is to forward the certificate. It has however been held in the case of Secretary of State for India in Council vs. Syed Sadak Reza (1940) 44 CWN 901, decided by Nasim Ali and Rau, JJ., that the jurisdiction of the Certificate Officer does not depend upon the situation of the property of the certificate debtor but upon the place where the demand is payable. This being a decision of a Division Bench is binding on us. As in the present case the demand was admittedly payable in Calcutta there can be no doubt that it was the Collector of Calcutta who had jurisdiction to receive the certificate under s. 46(2) of the Indian IT Act. The next question is whether the proceeding has become invalid by reason of the fact that the certificate was forwarded to the Collector of 24-Parganas. It appears that by a notification dt. the 31st May, 1875, published in the Calcutta Gazette on the 9th June, 1875, the Collector of 24- Parganas was appointed to be the ex officio Collector of Calcutta. The exact language of the notification is as follows : "The 31st May, 1875. The Collector of 24-Parganas is appointed to be ex officio Collector of Calcutta." The plain meaning of this notification, in our opinion, is that the Collector of 24-Parganas is, by virtue of his office, authorised to function as the Collector of Calcutta. The certificate under s. 46(2) of the Indian IT Act in the present case was forwarded "to the Collector 24-Parganas, Alipore." As under the notification quoted above, the Collector of 24- Parganas was, by virtue of his office, authorised to function as the Collector of Calcutta, we think that the Collector of 24-Parganas had jurisdiction to receive the certificate forwarded to him as Collector of Calcutta. We cannot hold that simply because in the certificate the Collector of 24- Parganas was not also described as the Collector of Calcutta, he had no jurisdiction to receive the certificate. The plain meaning of the expression "ex officio" is "by virtue of his office."
(3.) IN our opinion, therefore, the Collector of 24-Parganas, as such, had jurisdiction to receive the certificate in his capacity as the Collector of Calcutta. The view which we have taken of the effect of this notification receives some support from the decision of this Court in the case of Hari Charan Singh vs. Chandra Kumar Dey (1907) ILR 34 Cal 787. At page 806 Woodroffe, J., makes the following observation : "Secondly it is said that the Certificate Officer of 24-Parganas had no jurisdiction as regards immovable property in Calcutta. This however is not so, as the Collector of 24-Parganas is ex officio Collector of Calcutta." This decision was affirmed on appeal by Maclean, C. J., sitting with Harrington and Fletcher, JJ., in Hari Charan Singh vs. Chandra Kumar Dey (1908) ILR 35 Cal 286. So, both upon a plain reading of the notification, as well as upon authorities, we hold that the Collector of 24-Parganas had jurisdiction to receive the certificate which was forwarded to him in the present case by the ITO under s. 46(2) of the INdian IT Act. Mr. Jyotish Chandra Pal, appearing in support of the rule, has relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of CIT Agrl. IT vs. Keshab Chandra Mandal (1950) 18 ITR 569 which lays down that if a return under the Bengal Agrl. IT Act is not signed by the assessee himself but by somebody acting on his behalf, that is not a proper signature and the return containing such a signature is not a valid return under the Act. In our opinion this decision has no bearing upon the point which arises for our consideration in this case. In the present case, we have to consider the effect of the notification by which the Collector of 24-Parganas was appointed ex officio Collector of Calcutta and the decision relied upon by Mr. Pal affords no guidance on that point. We are, therefore, unable to accept the point urged before us by Mr. Jyotish Chandra Pal in support of the rule.;