Sinha, J. - (1.) This is an application which is very similar in facts to Civil Revision No. 3254 of 1952 (Sisir Kiu mar Das v. State of West Bengal and others - since reported in 58 C.W.N. 952-Ed.). The petitioner was employed in the Police Force, in course of which he came to be in charge of the Malkhana at the Shalimar Police Station. The allegation is that while he was posted at Shalimar he disposed of goods from the Malkhana irregularly and contrary to the rules. He was also charged with carrying out certain directions of his superior officers in a perfunctory way. These charge were drawn up on or about the 21st August, 1951, by the respondent No. 5, Aswini Kumar Gope. Prior to the framing of the charges, Mr. Gope had also made a preliminary enquiry and had drawn up a report upon -which the charges came to be framed. Upon the charges being framed, the petitioner showed cause and the enquiry was entrusted to Mr. Gope. The enquiry was a somewhat long one, being very similar to the enquiry which had been made in Sisir Kumar Das's case. On the 30th December, 1951, Mr. Gope made his report and recommended that the petitioner may be reverted to the rank of a constable for a period of one year. Thereupon, the petitioner was called upon by the Superintendent, Government Railway Police, Howrah, to show cause why he should not be reverted to the rank of a constable for a period of one year, and ultimately on the 14th February, 1952, an order was made reducing the petitioner's rank to that of a constable for a period of one year. The petitioner thereupon preferred an appeal to the Deputy Inspector-General of Police, Western Range, but this appeal was dismissed on or about the 7th April, 1952. The petitioner thereupon preferred a further appeal to the Inspector-General of Police, who asked the petitioner to show cause why the petitioner should not be dismissed from the Force. The petitioner showed cause, but ultimately by an order of the Inspector-General, dated the 18th August, 1952, the petitioner has been dismissed from the Police Force.
(2.) A number of objections have been taken against the various orders mentioned above. In order to decide this application it will be necessary only to deal with one single point which, in my opinion, entitles the petitioner to have all the orders set aside. It appears that while the respondent No. 5 was proceeding with the enquiry, ho followed the extraordinary procedure of giving evidence himself before himself and the report was made after consideration of the evidence, inter alia, of himself. This, to my mind, is so fundamentally repugnant to all. established principles of natural justice, that the entire proceedings have been, vitiated. Mr. Basu appearing on behalf of the respondents admits that this course is repugnant to all established principles, but argues that this rather extraordinary procedure was adopted as a result of the request of he petitioner himself. He further argues that if one looks at the record, one will find that the answers given by Mr. Gope were really inconsequential and therefore has resulted in no prejudice to the petitioner. I do not think that such considerations are at all relevant. Whether the delinquent had asked for it himself or not, there is no excuse for allowing the enquiring officer to give evidence before himself and then solemnly considering it and coming to a decision. It is not so much the actual prejudice that has to be considered, as the violation of the fundamental principles according to which proceedings, including departmental enquiries, should be conducted. I have already pointed out in a previous decision that although a departmental enquiry need not be carried out strictly according to the rules applicable to judicial proceedings, still, the principles of natural justice should be followed. It is one of the fundamental principles of natural justice that a Judge cannot give evidence before himself and weigh the same while coming to a decision. When a request was made by the petitioner that Mr. Gope should be called as a witness, the authorities should have considered as to whether there was any foundation for alleging that Mr. Gope was a relevant witness, and if it was found that the request of the petitioner for examining Mr. Gope was frivolous, it should have been promptly turned down. On the other hand, if it was found that Mr. Gope was in fact a material witness, he should have been equally promptly removed from the office of an enquiring tribunal. To my mind, there was no possible third course to be taken. It is not possible for Mr. Gope to have figured as a witness before himself and then to give a report, inter alia, weighing his own evidence.
(3.) The result is that the entire proceedings have been vitiated and must be set aside. The Rule is therefore made absolute and the orders, dated the 30th December, 1951, 14th February, 1952, and 8th August, 1952, must be quashed by a Writ of Certiorari and a Writ of Mandamus must issue directing the opposite parties to forbear from giving effect to them. If it is found necessary to have a departmental enquiry it must proceed with de novo. I make no order as to costs.;