Aniruddha Bose, J. - (1.) The appeal of the petitioner against the final order of assessment of the assessing authority, which appeal was filed on 24th June, 2010 has been dismissed as the appeal was not filed within thirty days from the date of issue of the order of final assessment.
(2.) In this matter order of the assessing authority was passed on 18th May, 2010. The petitioner claims to have received that order on 3rd June, 2010, as it appears from paragraph 32 of the writ petition. The appeal was filed on 23rd June, 2010. In this proceeding, the petitioner has questioned the constitutional validity of Section 127 of the Electricity Act, 2003 which specifies that an appeal has to be filed within a period of thirty days from the date of final order of assessment In a proceeding before an administrative or a quasi-judicial authority, where no prior intimation is given as regards the date on which an order would be passed after conclusion of hearing, and there is no regular list, as in the cases before a Court of Law, bringing to the notice of the disputing parties in advance the date on which the order would be passed, the recipient of the order can have knowledge of the order only on the date such order is received by him. So far as final order of assessment under the provisions of the Electricity Act, 2003 is concerned, there is no mechanism for informing the parties about the date on which an order would be passed. In this proceeding also, no case has been made out that the petitioner was informed after conclusion of hearing in relation to final assessment that the order would be passed on 18th May, 2010. In such circumstances, in my opinion, the expression "within thirty days of the said order", as employed in Section 127 of the Act would mean the date on which the order is received by a party. Section 127(1) of the Act stipulates:- 127. Appeal to appellate authority. -(1) Any person aggrieved by the final order made under Section 126 may, within thirty days of the said order, prefer an appeal in such form, verified in such manner and be accompanied by such fee as may be specified by the State Commission, to an appellate authority as may be prescribed. "
(3.) The object of permitting thirty days is to let the recipient of the order ascertainthe scope of the order and decide as to whether such order ought to be appealed against or not. The legislature has considered it necessary to give thirty days time to enable a person aggrieved by an order to prefer the appeal. Unless a person aggrieved has knowledge of the order in normal course, or has means of knowing that the order would be passed on a particular date through any information channel in public domain, the thirty-day period cannot run from any date prior to the date on which he receives the order.;