Amitava Lala, J. - (1.) This second appeal arises out of a reversal decree. The appellants/plaintiffs instituted a suit being Title Suit No. 88 of 1982 for the purpose of eviction of respondents/defendants therein. Another suit which was instituted by the tenant being Title Suit No. 9 of 1985 was analogously heard. According to the Court of first instance plaintiff/tenant's case in Title Suit No. 9 of 1985 is almost her defence in Title Suit No. 88 of 1982. The Court of first instance ultimately held that the Title Suit No. 88 of 1982 was decreed on contest with costs. The defendants were directed to deliver vacant possession of the suit premises to the plaintiffs in Title Suit No. 88 of 1982 within three months from the order, failing which the plaintiffs had liberty to file execution proceeding against the defendant. The defendants were directed to continue to pay the rents as determined by the Court on 27th August, 1987 till the delivery of the vacant possession failing which defendants should pay interest at the rate of 6% per annum till the realisation of the said amount in execution proceeding. Title Suit No. 9 of 1985 was dismissed on contest with costs. Such decree as aforesaid was passed on account of provisions of Clauses (m), (o) and (p) of Section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act. But the question of reasonable requirement of the plaintiffs failed before the Court of first instance.
(2.) Being aggrieved by and/or dissatisfied with the judgment and order passed by the Court of first instance the respondent No. 1/tenant herein preferred an appeal in the First Appellate Court. The cross appeal was also filed by the appellant/landlord herein against the findings of the Court of first instance in respect of reasonable requirement but subsequently such cross appeal was not pressed for and was withdrawn, Therefore, First Appellate Court was confined hearing only in respect of violation of Clause (m), (o) and (p) of Section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act by the appellants/tenants. Ultimately, the decree passed by the Court of first instance was set aside and thereby the appeal was allowed. The appeal relating to the Title Suit No.9 of 1985 was treated to be disposed of. However, it is recorded in the judgment and order of the First Appellate Court that practically no effective adjudication was made by the parties in hearing the Title Suit No. 9 of 1985. Accordingly, title appeal arising therefrom being Title Appeal No. 212 of 1996 stood disposed of as not pressed and as such the judgment and decree of the Court of first instance in this regard stood unaltered.
(3.) The second appeal was admitted by a Division Bench of this Court on the ground No. 1, 2, 3, 6, 8, 9 and 11 of the memorandum of appeal. Out of such grounds, ground Nos. 1 and 2 and 6 are related to Clauses (m), (o) and (p) of Section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act. The ground Nos. 8 and 9 are related to reasonable requirement. The ground Nos. 3 and 11 are general in nature.;