Seth, J. - (1.) These two appeals of the Calcutta Metropolitan Development Authority (CMDA) have been preferred against the Order dated 7th February, 2001 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.R NO. 11615 of 1998 and W.P. No. 11616 (W) of 1998 arising out of L.R.A. Case No. 541 of 1993 (V) and 487 of 1993 (V) both dated 26th June, 1996. Since the grounds of challenge were identical, the two writ petitions were heard together and were disposed of by a common judgment. The two appeals, therefore, were also heard together. We propose to dispose of the same by a common judgment. The Facts :
(2.) The facts in brief are summarized thus. For the benefit of the CMDA, the lands were acquired by the State Government under the provisions of West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act, 1948 (1948 Act). On a reference under Section 8 of the 1948 Act against the award passed under Section 7 thereof, no notice of the reference, admittedly, was served upon the appellant (CMDA), the requiring body and person interested within the meaning of Section 2(b)(2). The determination of the amount is alleged to be too high affecting the interest of the requiring body. Therefore, the award passed on reference is to be set aside and the reference be re-heard afresh after giving opportunity to the CMDA. Submission on behalf of the appellant :
(3.) Mr. Das, appearing on behalf of the appellant submitted that on a reference under Section 8 of the 1948 Act, it is incumbent on the Court to issue notice upon the person interested and as such non-service of notice, which is an admitted proposition, would render the award by the Court invalid and a nullity. According to him, by reason of Section 8(2), the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (LA Act) contained in Sections 18(2), 19-22, 25-28 have been made applicable. He relied on the decision in Neelagangabai & Anr. v. State of Karnataka & Ors., AIR 1990 SC 1321 to support his contention that non-service of notice on the requiring body deprived it of an opportunity to place its case before the Court rendering the judgment of the reference Court illegal and not binding on the Corporation and that such a question can be raised through a proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Mr. Das then relied upon a decision in U. P.Awas Evam Vikas Parishad v. Gyan Devi & Anr., AIR 1995 SC 724. Relying on this decision, he contended that the right under Section 50(2) of the LA Act confers a right on the requiring body to appear in the acquisition proceedings before the Collector and the reference and adduce evidence for the purpose of determining the amount of compensation. The said right carries with it the right to be given adequate notice by the Collector as well as the reference Court. It only precludes the requiring body from seeking a reference but it does not deprive the local authority, if it feels aggrieved by the determination of the compensation by the reference Court, of invoking the remedy available under the LA Act. Even, if notices have been served on the requiring body, the remedy under Article 226 would still be open to the requiring body to challenge the award on grounds permitting judicial review under Article 226. The requiring body is a proper party in a proceedings before the reference Court and is entitled to be impleaded as a party wherein it can defend the determination and oppose the enhancement and adduce evidence in that regard. In case of enhancement by the reference Court if no appeal is filed by the Government, the local authority can file the appeal after obtaining leave of the Court. Mr. Das then relied on the decision in M/s. Neyvely Lignite Corporation Ltd. v. Special Tahsildar (Land Acquisition), Neyvely & Ors., AIR 1995 SC 1004 in order to support his contention that the requiring body is also a person interested. Relying on a decision in 12,1.C. Bose Road Tenants' Association v. Collector of Howrah & Ors., AIR 1977 Cal 437, he submitted that the CMDA is a local authority. Referring to the decision in Kanak (Smt) & Anr. v. U. P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad & Ors., (2003)7 SCC 693 : (2003)2 WBLR (SC) 683, Mr. Das contended that non-service of notice causes serious prejudice to the requiring body and in such a situation the remedy under Article 226 can be invoked for setting aside the Award and referring the matter to the reference Court for determining the compensation afresh. Mr. Das drew support from Abdul Rasak & Ors. v. Kerala Water Authority & Ors., (2002)3 SCC 228 to substantiate his contention that a notice to the requiring body on a reference is mandatory and simply because the local authority was aware of the proceedings and had participated in the meetings where matter as to compensation were discussed were not sufficient compliance with Section 50 of the LA Act. For the same proposition, he relied on Agra Development Authority v. Special Land Acquisition Officer & Ors., (2001)2 SCC 646 : AIR 2001 SC 992. He further relied on the decision in Project Officer, Singareni Collieries Company Ltd. v. B. Komaraiah & Ors., (2001)10 SCC 33 to support his contention that the compensation enhanced by the Civil Court are not binding on the requiring body since it was not a party to the proceedings in the reference Court and such a question can be challenged in a writ proceedings. Relying on the decision in P. C. Goswamiv. Collector of Darrang, AIR 1982 SC 1214, Mr. Das contended that there is no justification for discriminating between an acquisition under one Act and acquisition under another Act. Mr. Das also rehed on Himalaya Tiles and Marble (P) Ltd. v. Francis Victor Coutinho, AIR 1980 SC 1118 in order to contend that the definition of the person interested is an inclusive definition and must be liberally construed so as to embrace all persons who may be directly or indirectly interested. He pointed out that the expression used in the LA Act to define 'person interested' is identical with those in the definition of 'person interested' in the 1948 Act. He then relied upon the decision in Yadu Nandan Gargv. State of Rajasthan & Ors., (1996)1 SCC 334 to support his contention that if there is something wrong, in that event, Article 14 will not come in aid on the ground of invidious discrimination. Submission on behalf of the Respondents :;