Bhagabati Prasad Banerjee, J - (1.) This is an appeal against the judgment and order dated July 7, 1989 passed by the learned Trial Judge in Matter No. 4458 of 1988 dismissing the writ application filed by the appellant-petitioner. The only question involved in this appeal is with regard to the interpretation of the provisions of Section 36(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The facts are not in dispute. The Government of India, Ministry of Labour, referred an industrial dispute before the Presiding Officer, Central Government Industrial Tribunal, Calcutta for adjudication of an industrial dispute. After receipt of the said order of reference the workmen represented by Petroleum Employees' Union, Eastern Branch, entered appearance and filed their written statement. The appellant also appeared through its Association, namely, Employers' Association of India of which the appellant was a member and the said Association had authorised two of its Executive Committee members, namely, Dr. Manotosh Mukherjee and Shri M.N. Kar of the said Association to represent the appellant- petitioner before the Tribunal in accordance with the provisions of Section 36 of the Industrial Disputes Act. The said representation of the said two Executive Committee members was objected to by the Union and as a result of which the Tribunal had to decide the question whether the said two members fell within the category of persons who might represent the employers under the provisions of Section 36 (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The provisions of Section 36 (2) of Industrial Disputes Act reads as follows: "36 (2). An employer who is a party to a dispute shall be entitled to be represented in any proceeding under this Act by- (a) an officer of an association of employers of which he is a member; (b) an officer of a federation or association of employers to which the association referred to in clause (a) is affiliated; (c) where the employer is not a member of any association of employers, by an officer of any association of employers connected with, or by any other employer engaged in the industry in which the employer is engaged and authorised in such manner as may be prescribed."
(2.) Before the Tribunal a document was produced by the appellant which is a letter dated August 26, 1988 written by the Secretary, Employers' Association of India, addressed to Dr. Manotosh Mukherjee wherein it appears that- "Pursuant to your telephonic conversation I am to inform you that you have taken as Executive Committee member of Employers' Association of India on and from Sunday the March 8, 1987 in the meeting held on the said date along with others."
(3.) Another letter dated September 1, 1988 from the Employers Association of India addressed to Mr. M.N. Kar shows that Mr. Kar has also been a member of the Executive Committee of the Employers' Association of India from March 8, 1987. On the basis of the communication made by the said letters, it was contended before the Tribunal that the said two members of the Executive Committee of the Employers' Association of India come within the scope of the expression "officer of an Association of Employers". The Tribunal examined the case and this question in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court of India in the case of Paradip Port Trust v. Workmen reported in 1976-II-LLJ-409 and relying on the principles laid down in the said judgment and considering the facts and circumstances of the case the Tribunal by the order dated September 9, 1988 held that Dr. Mukherjee and Mr. Kar as Executive Committee Members of the Employers' Association were not officers of the Employer's Association and the appellant, therefore, could not be permitted to be represented by them. Accordingly, the Tribunal upheld the objection taken by the Employees' Union regarding the representation of Dr.Mukherjee and Mr. Kar.;