- (1.) THE question for decision before us is whether the S. C. C. Suit No. 209 of 1957, which was brought by Opp. Party No. 1 against the petitioners, the commissioners for the Port of Calcutta, for recovery of damages, for short delivery of a consignment of cocoanut oil, was barred by section 142 of the Calcutta Port Act of 1890, which is as follows: "no suit shall be brought against any person for anything done, or purporting or professing to be done, in pursuance of this Act, after the expiration of three months from the day on which the cause of action in such suit shall have arisen. " The contention of the petitioners that the suit is barred by the above provision has been rejected by the trial court as well as by a Bench of two Judges of the Court of Small Causes, Calcutta. Chatterjee, J. before whom the matter came in revision from the order of the Bench of Judges, dated 29. 6-60. has referred the matter to a Division Bench because his Lordship was unable to agree with two single Judge decisions of this court, namely, that of R. P. Mookerjee, J. in (1) Basanta Lal v. Commissioners for the Port of Calcutta, A. I. R. 1951 Cal. 460 and that of J. P. Mitter, J. in (2) C. R. No. 274/51, which were cited before him. It may be mentioned in this context that a view similar to that taken in the two decisions just cited, was taken by another single Judge of this Court, Sarkar, J, (as he then was) in (3) Prabhudas v. Governor-General of India-in-Council, I. L. R. (1951) 1 Cal, 443.
(2.) UNDER section 112 (1) of the Calcutta Port Act, the Commissioners are liable for the loss, destruction or deterioration of goods which are landed and remain in possession or under the control of the Commissioners, and the standard of liability is the same as that of a bailee under sections 151, 152 and 161 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. The question is whether section 142 of the Act would be attracted to a suit brought against the Commissioners, to enforce the liability laid down tin section 112 (1 ). According to the view taken in the decisions referred to earlier, section 142 would be attracted to such a suit. Chatterjee, J. however, has been unable to agree with that view for three reasons given by his Lordship in his order of reference. It would be convenient to refer to these three grounds separately.
(3.) FIRSTLY, it has been said that the Commissioners would not come within the meaning of the words "any person" in section 142 because separate provision in bar of action against the Commissioners had been made in section 135. His Lordship also thinks that because the word "the Commissioners" has been defined in sec. 3 (1) of the Act and the Act has referred to the Commissioners as such in other provisions of the Act they should not be included within the generic words "any person" used in sec. 142. With respect, we are unable to agree with this view inasmuch as the Commissioners are a body corporate, having a legal entity, by virtue of the express provisions in sec. 4 and there is little doubt that such a body of persons must be taken to be included within the ambit of the word "person", used in a Bengal Act by reason of the definition of that word in sec. 3 (32) of the Bengal General Causes Act, 1899. Of course, a contrary context in a particular statute may exclude that general interpretation. In the Act before us, the provision in sec, 135 is supposed to furnish such contrary indication. It is to be noted, however, that sec. 142 is not inconsistent with sec. 135 which deals with only a particular class of suits or proceedings for which the Commissioners might have been otherwise answerable. It gives complete immunity to the Commissioners for the acts or defaults of certain specified officers except where such action has taken place under the express order or sanction of the said Commissioners. Of course, where sec. 135 applies there is no scope for invoking sec. 142 because the Commissioners are not liable at all in such cases. But sec. 135 is not exhaustive of all cases of the liability of the Commissioners. The instant suit does not seek to make the Commissioners liable for any specific act or default of the officers specified in sec. 135 and is therefore outside the purview of sec. 135. The suit would, therefore, lie against the Commissioners in view of sec. 112 ; but though such suit would be maintainable under the substantive law, sec. 142 raises a bar against such action after the expiration of three months as specified in that section. We are, accordingly, unable to agree that the words "any person" in sec. 142 should be so interpreted as to exclude the Commissioners.;