A.Lala, J. - (1.) This is an application for contempt. This contempt application is arising out of an order passed by this Court in disposing of the writ petition on 20th May, 2002. In the original order Court held: a long period of suspension till the retirement of the incumbent is as good as major penalty like compulsory retirement, removal or dismissal. Such order was set aside. However, it was observed that this order will not prevent the authority concerned to proceed in accordance with law, if necessary. In drawing inference Court has also held that the petitioner will be entitled to service benefits including arrears deducting the amount, if any, paid during the period of suspension. From such order an appeal was preferred when on 26th August, 2002 an interim order was passed by the Division Bench giving directions for preparation of the Paper Book and fixing a period of hearing. Meanwhile, operation of the order of the learned single Judge impugned in this appeal was stayed. This contempt application was made on 31st January, 2003, taking a plea that the Division Bench was pleased to pass a limited order of stay. No application was made for extension of interim order by the Division Bench. Therefore, the incumbent is entitled to get relief pursuant to the original order in the form of joining in the service and recovery of service benefits. Initially a contempt rule was issued by this Court upon the alleged contemners making the same returnable to get the full fact and/or defence of the contemners.
(2.) Learned counsel appearing for the contemners contended before this Court that the respondents in the original writ petition are protected by the order passed by the Division Bench. The order of the Division Bench is still subsisting. To that, arguments were advanced by both the parties on the strength of a judgment reported in 1993(2) CHN 444 (Calcutta Corporation Teachers' Association & Anr. v. Calcutta Municipal Corporation & Ors.) whereunder it was held by a Division Bench that 'in the mean time' must be given its normal meaning i.e. 'during or within the time which intervenes'. However, from such judgment I find, in effect, Division Bench was made such interim order 'in the mean time' limited for a particular period.
(3.) Mr. Ashok Sarkar, learned counsel appearing for the alleged contemners cited a judgment reported in 2001(3) SCC 739 (Mrityunjoy Das & Anr. v. Sayed Hasibur Rahaman & Ors.) in its paragraph 14 to establish that 'standard of proof' be it noted that a proceeding under the extraordinary jurisdiction of the Court in terms of the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act is quasi-criminal, and as such, the standard of proof required is that of a criminal proceeding and the breach shall have to be established beyond reasonable doubt.;