- (1.) THE idols of the names of Sri Sri Sridhar Jiew and Sri Sri Radharaman Jiew, represented by their shebait, Pulin Chandra Daw, are the petitioners in this rule. To the said idols were dedicated considerable properties, which are commonly known Shiva Krishna Debuttar. For the assessment year 1952-53, the respondent ITO assessed the income arising from the said debuttar estate in the hands of Pulin Chandra Daw, as shebait. The assessment was challenged by the assessee and ultimately the Tribunal, Calcutta Bench "A", held that the legal owner of the debuttar properties was not Pulin Chandra Daw but the idols themselves and that the status of Pulin Chandra Daw was that of a shebait or manager, having no beneficial interest in the said properties. Pulin Chandra Daw was, therefore, held not liable to taxation as owner of the properties.
(2.) THEREAFTER , a notice, said to be under s. 34 of the Indian IT Act and addressed to the petitioners-idols, represented by their shebait above-named, for the asst. yr. 1952-53, was served upon the said shebait. It was stated in the said notice that the income of the two idols above- named had escaped assessment and the idols were called upon to file a return in accordance with the said notice. The petitioners challenged the said notice on several grounds but only two were selected at the time of hearing of the rule, namely : "1. For that the Indian IT Act does not contemplate nor does it provide for assessment of the income of debuttar properties. 2. For that having regard to the specific rule having the force of law that in the case of individuals the income-tax return has to be signed by the individual himself it should be held that these individuals such as deities who can never sign have been left out of the purview of taxation under the Indian IT Act." Mr. Jyotish Chandra Pal, learned advocate for the petitioners-idols, invited my attention to the language of s. 3 of the Indian IT Act, 1922, which reads as follows : "3. Where any Central Act enacts that income-tax shall be charged for any year at any rate or rates, tax at that rate or those rates shall be charged for that year in accordance with, and subject to the provisions of, this Act in respect of the total income of the previous year of every individual, HUF, company and local authority, and of every firm and other AOP or the partners of the firm or the members of the association individually;" and contended that an idol did not fit in with any of the units of assessment described in s. 3 of the IT Act of 1922, and particularly contended that the expression "individual" was not wide enough to embrace the conception of a deity or an idol, which was only a juridical person. He argued that this lacuna in the IT Act of 1922 had to be removed by substituting a new definition for the word "person" in s. 2(31) of the IT Act of 1961 to the following effect : "2. (31) 'person' includes-- (i) an individual, (ii) an HUF, (iii) a company, (iv) a firm, (v) an AOP or a BOI, whether incorporated or not, (vi) a local authority, and (vii) every artificial juridical person, not falling within any of the proceeding sub-clauses"; and by changing the language of the charging section in the said Act in the following manner : "4. (1) Where any Central Act enacts that income-tax shall be charged for any assessment year at any rate or rates, income-tax at that rate or those rates shall be charged for that year in accordance with, and subject to the provisions of, this Act in respect of the total income of the previous year or previous years, as the case may be, of every person." He contended that the Act of 1961 made express provision for assessment of the income of a juridical person like a deity, but such express provision was absent in the Act of 1922 and this was enough indication that it was not within the contemplation of the IT Act of 1922 to tax the income of a debuttar estate or of a deity. In my opinion this argument is not very well conceived. In the case of CIT vs. Sodra Devi (1957) 32 ITR 615 (SC) --, it was pointed out by the Supreme Court that : "... the word 'individual' has not been defined in the Act and there is authority for the proposition that the word 'individual' does not mean only a human being but is wide enough to include a group of persons forming a unit. It has been held that the word 'individual' includes a corporation created by a statute, e.g., a university or a bar council, or the trustees of a baronetcy trust incorporated by a Baronetcy Act. It would also include a minor or a person of unsound mind." To the list appearing in the quotation above, an idol or a deity may not be an unreasonable addition. "According to Hindu notions when an idol has been consecrated by the appropriate ceremonies performed and mantras pronounced, the deity of which the idol is the visible image resides in it and not in a substituted image and the idol so spiritualised becomes what has been termed a juridical person" (vide P. Doorga Proshad vs. Sheo Proshad (1881) 7 CLR 278. The mere fact that an idol has been established does not by itself create a debuttar. A religious trust by way of debuttar comes into existence only when property is dedicated for worship or service of the idol and it is the spiritual object which is embodied in the image and not the image itself that is regarded as the holder of the property. Now, if a baronetcy trust can be an individual, there is no reason why a religious trust, namely, estate dedicated to an idol and the spiritual object which is the holder of the property, may not be an "individual".
(3.) FACED with this difficulty, Mr. Pal relied on the requirements of the form of the return, which provides that the declaration in the return shall be signed, in cases of an individual, by the individual himself. He contended that even if the idol be treated as an individual an idol cannot himself sign and can never file a return. This he contended was another indication that the income from debuttar property cannot be taxed. In support of his argument he relied upon the following observations by the Supreme Court in Commr. of Agrl. IT vs. Keshab Chandra Mandal (1950) 18 ITR 569 (SC): "On a consideration of the provisions of the Act and of the Rules and the Forms and for reasons stated above there appears to be many clear indications of an intention on the part of the legislature to insist on the personal signature of the assessee, appellant or applicant whenever his signature is required by the Act or the Rules and the common law rule qui facit per alium facit per se is excluded by necessary implication or intendment of the Act and the Rules. ;