Purushottam Chatterjee, J. - (1.) This is a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution against an order passed by the Munsif in exercise of his jurisdiction under Section 19 of the West Bengal Lard Reforms Act. The learned Munsif considered the circumstances in this case and condoned the delay in filing the appeal. He has not found whether he applied Section 5 of the Limitation Act or Section 18 of the Limitation ACT nor has he stated the reasons why he came to the conclusion that he was authorised by law to condone the delay, But the question remains whether he was authorised by law to condone the delay. Mr. Pabitra Kr. Bose on behalf of the appellant says that the Court has no jurisdiction nor power to condone the delay. According to him, no provision of the Limitation Act would apply because relevant Article in the Limitation Act does not refer to any appeal to the Munsif. It refers to an appeal to the District Judge and, therefore, according to him, there is no period of limitation prescribed by the Limitation Act and, according to him, the whole of the Limitation Act is excluded and because that is excluded, there is no question of applying either Section 5 of the Limitation Act or Section 18 of the Limitation Act. The result according to him is that the learned Munsif was not authorised by law to condone the delay. Mr. Chittatosh Mukherjee, on the other hand, replies by saying that when we consider the applicability of the period prescribed under the Limitation Act under the Special Act, we shall consider the same as far as they may be applicable. According to him, the Article of the Limitation Act really refers to the appeal court from the decision of the trial court and the appeal court under the Code of Civil Procedure, is the Court of a District Judge. Therefore, the reference really is to the Court of Appeal. He says that Section 5 or Section 18 of the Limitation Act applies.
(2.) The first question therefore is whether the Limitation Act applies. The preamble to the Limitation Act says, "whereas it is expedient to consolidate and amend the law relating to the limitation of suits, appeals and certain applications to courts ......... it is hereby enacted as follows:"
(3.) Hence it is clear that the Limitation Act applies to all appeals to all Courts. It is indeed true it does not apply to all applications but only to "certain applications". But there Is no doubt it applies to all appeals and we are now concerned with appeals. The first point taken by Mr. Bose Is that the Bhagchas Officer under the Land Reforms Act is no Court. Section 57 of the Bengal Land Reforms Act has come into force and the result of Section 57 Is that an order for restoration of possession Is to be treated as if such order Is a decree of a Civil Court This was a case where the application was for termination of cultivation and the Bhagchas Officer on the 7th January 1961 ordered eviction. Hence, the order for eviction, according to Section 57 of the Land Reforms Act, operates as a decree of a Civil Court. I have been referred to a decision of a Division Bench of Banerjee and Amaresh Roy, JJ. reported in 64 Cal WN 1062, between Brajendra Kumar v. Gosta Dolui, where their Lordships hem that the Munsif was a Civil Court and an appeal to a Munsif means an appeal to a Civil Court and to a persona designata. Hence, according to Section 57, which has now come into force, and also according to the decision of the Division Bench referred to above, the Munsif was a Civil Court within the meaning of the preamble to the Limitation Act. I should make it clear that the Limitation Act refers to all Courts, -- not merely to Civil Court, but if it is a Civil Court, there is no doubt that this is a Court within the meaning of the preamble. The result therefore is that the Indian Limitation Act applies because of its preamble to all appeals to the Munsif. The next question is, if the Limitation Act applies, does it apply entirely or only some of the provisions would apply? There is no doubt that the entirety of the Limitation Act would apply subject to any provision in the Limitation Act itself. Therefore, unless there is some other provision in the Limitation Act Sections 5 and 18 would apply. But there is another provision in the Limitation Act In Section 29 which deals with period of Limitation prescribed for any appeal by any special or local law. Section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act, as it now stands, is the result of some controversy over the interpretation of Section 29 as it stood before the amendment by Act 10 of 1922 and as it stood by the Act of 1871. The history of the development ot this Section is of some importance for an appreciation of the amendment made in the Act in 1922. The relevant Section as it stood i.e. Section 6 of Act of 1871 is as follows: "When by any law not mentioned in the schedule hereto annexed and now or hereafter to be in force in any part of British India, a period of limitation differing from that prescribed by this Act is specially prescribed for any appeal, nothing herein contained shall affect such law." Again, Section 29 as it stood before the amendment is as follows : "Nothing in this Act shall affect or alter any period of limitation specially prescribed for any appeal by any special or local law now or hereafter to be in force in British India." A controversy arose regarding the interpretation of this Section. One view was that none of the provisions of the Limitation Act, namely, Sections 4 to 25 would apply where there is a special or local law. According to that view, the special or local law may be a complete Code and therefore the Limitation Act was excluded and, as the entire Act was excluded, nobody could take advantage of Sections 4 to 25. This was the view which was expressed in 2 Suth WR Act X p. 21, between John. Paulson v. Madnusudan Pal, and a series of other cases. But there was a contrary view where it was said that Section 29 (1) of similar provisions In the earlier Acts provided that the period of limitation prescribed by the special or local law would apply to cases under the special or local law and the period of limitation prescribed under the Limitation Act would not apply and there was no dispute so far as this, but they held that Sections 4 to 25 relates not to the period proscribed but only to the computation of the period prescribed. According to this view, the period prescribed must be as in the special Act but In order to compute that period Sections 4 to 25 might be taken Into account. This view was taken in ILR 5 Cal 314, between Gola Chand v. Kristo Chunder and a series of other cases. The matter thereafter came to a Full Bench of this Court reported in ILR 18 Cal 368, between Nagendra Nath Mullick v. Mathura Mohun. According to their Lordships, the special or local law referred to therein i.e. Act 10 of 1859 was a complete Code in itself and therefore none of the provisions ot the Limitation Act would apply. Hence, Section 14 of the Limitation Act 15 of 1877 would not apply. Though the Act of 1908 came into force, there was no much alteration so far as this matter was concerned. The result therefore was, according to another Full Bench decision in 1920 between Kalimuddin v. Sahibuddin, 24 Cal WN 4 : (AIR 1920 Cal 14 (2)), that none of the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act would apply where there is special and local law which would ba considered to be a complete Code by itself. But the Section itself was amended in 1922 and Section 29 (2) may now be analysed in two parts. Part I: "Where any special or local law prescribed for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed therefor by the first schedule, the provision of Section 3 shall apply as if such period was prescribed therefor in the schedule." This is no substantial alteration to the law. All that was provided is that Section 3 would apply. In the earlier Acts a period was prescribed but it was not stated that where there was an appeal after the period, the appeal must be dismissed but that was always understood even though Section 3 was not specifically extended. It was held that provisions for special law implied that, if the appeal is not filed within that time, the appeal must be dismissed. Hence, there was no substantial alteration with regard to this part, namely, part I as I have referred to above, then comes the next part: "For the purpose of determining any period of limitation in any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in Sections 4, 9 to 18 and Section 22 shall apply only in so far as and to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by sucn special or local law. The remaining provisions of this Act shall not apply." It is clear that the legislature did not accept either ot the two views advocated earlier, one view was that none of the Sections from 4 to 25 would apply; another view was, all of them would apply. So far as our Court, the aforesaid Full Bench cases decided that none of the provisions would apply if the Act was a complete Code In itself. The amended Section 29 stated that some of the provisions would apply in some circumstances. If there was no express exclusion by the special or local law, the provisions of Sections 4, 9 to 18 and Section 22 would apply and the remaining provisions would not apply. Therefore, if the special law made any special provision as to whether any or all of the Sections 4 to 25 would apply or not, that special law would still be binding. But, It, on the other hand, the special law did not expressly exclude Sections 4, 9 to 18 and Section 22, that would apply not because of the force of the special law but because of the force of the Indian Limitation Act. The reason is the Limitation Act applies In Its entirety to all Courts; and [section 29 made a provision for special and local law. It by such law there Is any express exclusion or express inclusion of any of the Sections 4 to 25, such exclusion or such Inclusion will be In force notwithstanding contrary provision In the Limitation Act. But if there was no express exclusion nor any express Inclusion, then because of section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act and because of absence express exclusion in special or local law Sections 4, 3 to 18 would apply and in the absence of special inclusion the other provisions would not apply. Therefore, it is clear that, if the special law has not excluded Sections 4, 9 to 18 and Section 22, those Sections will apply provided the appeal is to a Court. We have held that the appeal is to a Civil Court and there is no provision in the Land Reforms Act which expressly excludes Sections 4, 9-18 and Section 22. Therefore, Section 18 on a plain construction. of the provision of Section 29 (2) would apply and because the Limitation Act says, the remaining provisions of the Act shall not apply, Section 5 of the Limitation Act would not apply. But had Section 5 been expressly included to apply by the special or the local law Section 5 would have applied. Under the Land Reforms Act we find no provision which says that in determining the period of limitation Section 5 of the Limitation Act is to be taKen into account. 1, therefore, hold Section 5 of the Limitation Act would not apply to an appeal filed under the Land Reforms Act but all the same Section 18 of the Limitation Act would apply.;