Sinha, J. - (1.) This is an appeal, against an order made by Mitra, J., on the 19th September, 1960 by which he allowed an appeal under Section 11 of the Indian Trade Unions Act, 1926 against the order of the Registrar of Trade Unions, West Bengal, cancelling the certificate of Registration No. 3487 granted to the Employees' State insurance Corporation Employee's Union. The facts are shortly as follows : The Employees' State Insurance Corporation came into existence under the provisions of a Central Act, namely, the Employees' State Insurance Act (Act No. XXIV of 1948). It is art Act to provide for certain benefits to employees in case of sickness, maternity and 'employment injury' and to make provisions for certain other matters in relation thereto. At a meeting of (the employees of ft the Employees' State Insurance Corporation, held on the 7th June, 1956 it was resolved to form a Trade Union of their own. This Trade Union made an application for registration under the Indian Trade Unions Act, 1926. On or about the 28th August, 1956 the Registrar of Trade Unions, West Bengal, certified that the union had been registered under the said Act, the certificate number being 3847. On or about the 20th November, 1957 the Registrar issued notice to the Secretary of the Union that it was his intention to cancel the registration of the said Trade Union on the following grounds, unless cause was shown to the contrary. (1) That the certificate had been obtained by mistake and it was wrongly mentioned in the application that the Employees' State Insurance Corporation was a 'profession'. (2) That the Employees' Slate insurance Corporation could not be regarded as 'trade' or 'industry' and the Employees therefore could not be regarded as 'workmen' under Section 2(g) of the Indian Trade Unions Act, 1926.
(2.) The Union showed cause. On the 20th March, 1958 the Registrar cancelled the certificate of Registration No. 3847 with effect from the 28th February, 1958. Against the said order of the Registrar, the Union preferred an appeal under Section 11 (1) (a) of the Trade Unions Act. This was how Mitra, J. came to consider the matter. To learned Judge allowed the appeal and set aside the order of the Registrar cancelling the certificate of Registration No. 3847 and directed each party to bear and pay-its own cost. This appeal has been directed against the said order.
(3.) I must mention here a preliminary objection that has been taken in this appeal. It is, that an appeal does not lie. That an appeal does not lie under the Trade Unions Act is quite clear. As I have stated above, an appeal lies from the decision of the Registrar to the High Court under Section 11 (1) (a). But against the decision of the High Court no further appeal has been provided under the Act. It has been argued however, that an appeal lies under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. Two objections have been taken in respect of such appeal. Firstly, it is said that the judgment of Mitra, J. was itself passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction, and therefore, is not appealable, and secondly, there was no declaration by the learned Judge that the case was a fit one for appeal. In my opinion, there is no substance in this argument. A judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction is excluded, where it is in respect of a decree or order passed by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court. That is not the case here, because the Registrar of Trade Unions is not a 'court subject to the superintendence of the High Court'. That an appeal lies under Clause 15 of the Letters. Patent is clear from the Supreme Court decision National Sewing Thread Co. Ltd. Chidambaram v. James Chadwick and Bros, Ltd. That was a case under the Trade Marks Act 1940. The appellants there made an application to the Registrar of Trade Marks at Bombay for the registration of their mark 'Vulture Brand', under the Trade Marks Act, 1940. This was opposed. The Registrar refused registration. The appellants preferred an appeal against the order of the Registrar to the High Court at Bombay, under the provisions of Section 76 of the Trade Marks Act, which is similar to Section 11 of the Trade Unions Act. Shah J. allowed the appeal and set aside the order of the Registrar and directed him to register the mark as a trade mark. From the judgment of Shah, J. an appeal was preferred by the respondents under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent: of the Bombay High Court, and was allowed. There was a further appeal to the Supreme Court. Mahajan J. held, that the Trade Marks Act did not provide or lay down any procedure for the future conduct of an appeal provided for by Section 77 of the Trade Marks Act. Therefore, after it had reached the High Court, it was to be determined according to the rules, practice and procedure of that court, and in accordance with the provisions of the Charter under which that court was constituted, and which confers on it the powers in respect of the method and manner of exercising that jurisdiction. The rule is well settled that when a statute directs that an appeal lies to a court already established, that appeal, must be regulated by the practice and procedure of that court. See National Telephone Co, Ltd. v. Postmaster General, 1913 A. C. 546 and Adaikappa Chettiar v. Chandrasekha Thevar, AIR 1948 PC 12. It was held that the case of India Electric Works v. Registrar of Trade Marks, 51 Cal WN 42 ; (AIR 1947 Cal 49) where it was decided that there was no right of appeal from the decision of a single Judge to a Division Bench, with respect to a Trade Marks Act appeal, was wrongly decided. It was. held that in such a case, an appeal lay under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. Clause 15 of the Letters Patent of this High Court is in identical terms, and the provisions of the Trade Marks Act are similar to the provisions of the Trade Unions Act. I hold therefore, that the appeal is competent under the provisions of Clause 15 of the letters Patent.;