P.B.Mukharji, J. - (1.) THIS is an application to set aside the two awards of the Bengal Chamber at Commerce, each dated 21-12-1951. The dispute is between the seller who is the applicant and the buyer who is the respondent in the matter of a contract of sale of B twills.
(2.) IT is the seller's application to set aside the awards on various grounds. Fourteen different grounds have been urged in para. 23 of the petition. IT is unnecessary for me to refer to all these grounds because Mr. D.C. Sethia, learned counsel appearing for the applicant, has abandoned the other grounds except grounds 4, 5, 7 and 11 in para. 23 of the petition. In other words, Mr. Sethia has argued that these two awards should be set aside on the ground first that the arbitrators had no power to make two awards in this case and secondly, on the ground that their award gave damages on the basis of rates exceeding the official ceiling price at the relevant time. The third ground of attack is that the extension of due date had been pleaded by the respondent beyond 16-2-1951, and the award must have been on the basis of a later date and therefore illegal and void because no evidence had been taken on the question. Taking the first ground of objection that the arbitrators in this case could not make two awards, 1 find that the whole basis of the argument of Mr. Sethia is based on a misconception of fact. The point of his argument was that there was only one letter, dated 20-6-1951, which his clients have annexed to the petition and that is only with regard to 250 bales of B twill bags. Prom the file of the records of the arbitrators which has been sent to this Court, it appears that on the same date, i.e., 20-G-1951, the buyers wrote two letters of submission, one in respect of 250 bales, a copy of which has been annexed to the petition claiming 3037-10s. and the other in respect of 100 bales of B twills claiming 1005. That being so, although the disputes arose under the same contract, there being two separate submissions before the Tribunal of Arbitration, the arbitrators in my view were quite within the bounds of law to make two separate awards, each on the different submission, and not to combine them in one award simply because the contract was one. There is in the law nothing which makes this illegal on the part of the arbitrators. I, therefore, hold that this ground of objection that the arbitrators could not make two award, on two separate letters of submission under the same contract in respect of different bales of twill bags has no substance whatever and I overrule such objection.
(3.) IT is on the second ground on which the main argument has been concentrated by Mr. Sethia. He has relied on the Jute Goods Export Control Order, 1849, and the provisions contained therein. Briefly his argument may be formulated in this way. According to him under this Order there is a ceiling price fixed in relation to any quantity of manufactured jute goods and which means the price determined in accordance with the provisions of the Schedule annexed to that Order. No person under this Export Control Order can export manufactured jute goods of any quality specified in the Schedule except under and in accordance with the conditions of a licence issued by the Licensing Officer. IT is provided further in that Export Control Order that no licence shall be granted by the Licensing Officer unless he is satisfied in respect of any manufactured jute goods to be exported, that the price at which they have been or are being sold by the applicant for the licence is not more than the ceiling price and the additional sum, if any, received or receivable by the licencee on account of brokerage or commission paid or to be paid to the shipping agent, or to the selling agent abroad, or howsoever otherwise, is not more than 5 per cent. of the ceiling price. The Schedule referred to in that Export Control Order fixes the sch. price of this particular type of twills which are the subject-matter of the contract in these proceedings at Rs. 155-12 as per hundred bags. IT is the contention of the applicant that the award of damages by the Tribunal of Arbitration, Bengal Chamber of Commerce has violated the ceiling price. In fact Mr. Sethia has relied on the decision in -- 'Bijoy Singh v. Bilas Rai and Co.', for this purpose as well as on the question of the extension of time, and there being no evidence about such extension, the main point of his submission is that if the law prohibits a certain rate, it is not for the arbitrators to award that rate.;