Amit Talukdar, J. - (1.) UNLESS the litmus test as set out in the first proviso of section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (hereinafter referred to as 'the said Act') is passed, there is hardly any scope for entertaining an appeal under the said Act. To put it simply, there must be sub- stantial question of law involved which would persuade the court to interfere with a finding returned by the learned Commis- sioner under the said Act.
(2.) FAR less than being substantial there is hardly even any question of law which would permit us to look into the order of the Commissioner in connection with Claim Case No. 308 of 2001 passed on 24.6.2010 in connection with the award of compensation passed in favour of the respondent. But as a first court of appeal we have to not only give our reasons but set out the facts on the basis of which we would conclude in the aforesaid direction. The respondent was working as a steward in one of the vessels owned by the appellant and in course of his work on 27.12.1999 on account of suffering from chest pain he swooned and fell down on board resulting in injuries on his head, back and chest. This saw him incapacitated due to the accident to the level of 100 per cent as certified by Dr. H.K. Mukherjee, Orthopaedic Surgeon, PW 2. On the basis of the claim petition filed by the respondent, the Commissioner, Workmen's Compensation, First Court, West Bengal in Claim Case No. 308 of 2001 directed that the respondent would be entitled to a compensation of Rs. 12,00.000 along with an interest of 12 per cent after one month from the date of passing of the order. While concluding in the aforesaid direction the learned Commissioner opined that as the appellant suffered loss of earning capacity to the extent of 100 per cent and after taking into account the evidence of PW 1, the claimant himself and also the deposition of the Deputy Manager, Human Resource of appellant's company, OPW 1, found that the criteria in respect of claim made under the said Act having been fulfilled, passing of the award was necessitated. Mr. Ghosh, learned senior counsel appearing in support of the appeal, has placed before us a number of points. He has firstly submitted that the medical reports which have been relied upon by the appellant do not justify that appellant suffered from any cardiac problem. He has also challenged the competency of Dr. H.K. Mukherjee, PW 2, as he, being an Orthopaedic Surgeon, was not authorised to certify with regard to the illness suffered by the appellant. Mr. Ghosh, learned senior counsel, has also drawn our attention to the deposition of the appellant, PW 1, to show that there was no accident and the injuries suffered by him cannot be said to arise out of and in the course of his employment. Furthermore, challenging the order under appeal he has invited our attention to the finding of the learned Commissioner to the effect that the respondent was covered by the National Maritime Board Agreement, whereas the respondent, according to his own showing, was a crew member in the inland vessel which does not cover the National Maritime Board Agreement award. In order to sustain his point he has referred to the decisions in the cases of- (1) Malikarjuna G. Hiremath v. Branch Manager, Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., 2009 ACJ 721 (SC); (2) Rashida Haroon Kupurade v. Divisional Manager, Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., 2010 ACJ 721 (SC); and (3) Shakuntala Chandrakant Shreshti v. Prabhakar Maruti Garvali, 2007 ACJ 1 (SC); and furthermore, he has also shown from the tail end of the order under appeal that the award of interest from four weeks thereafter was improper in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in U.P. State Road Trans. Corpn. now Uttarakhand Trans. Corpn. v. Satnam Singh, 2012 ACJ 691 (SC).
(3.) DEVELOPING his argument further he has cited the decisions in Malikarjuna G. Hiremath, 2009 ACJ 721 (SC), Rashida Haroon Kupurade, 2010 ACJ 721 (SC) and Shakuntala Chandrakant Shreshti, 2007 ACJ 1 (SC), that unless there is any causal relationship with the accident and the incident which led to the respondent's sufferings, no claim can be maintainable under the said Act. He has shown from the said decision that there must be an accident and due to such accident the injuries have been suffered which would result in fructification of a claim by the concerned respondent. Since none of these criteria have been fulfilled, the entire award of compensation on the basis of such erroneous finding, according to the learned senior counsel, was liable to be set aside. Per contra, Mr. Majumdar, for the respondent, has, at the outset, drawn our attention to the first proviso of section 30 of the said Act. In order to build up his case Mr. Majumdar has submitted that unless there is a substantial question of law involved no appeal would be maintainable under the provisions of the said Act. Mr. Majumdar was of the view that when on the own showing of the appellant, OPW 1, who was the Deputy Manager, Human Resource of the appellant's company, that after accepting, the respondent has suffered 100 per cent disability, was discharged from the service upon fulfilment of all the dues in respect of his compensation and provident fund dues, it is not open to the appellant to turn back and raise this question with regard to maintainability of the award. Mr. Majumdar has invited attention of the court to the cross-examination of PW 1, to show that question with regard to the application of the National Maritime Board Agreement award has little relevance as the respondent being a member of the crew is covered by the entire gamut of the award and simply referring the same would not make any difference.;