D.K. Seth, J. - (1.) Two orders passed by the learned Industrial Tribunal have since been challenged in this writ petition. The first order that has been challenged is order No. 29 dated 30th April, 2001 and the second order is order No. 30 dated 16th May, 2001. By the first order a prayer for leave to rely on certain other documents has since been refused and by the second order certain amendment, which was asked for, his since been declined. Mr. Debal Banerjee, learned Counsel for the petitioner, contends that the learned Tribunal had allowed similar application filed by the workmen, to adduce certain documents by an earlier order, while refusing that of the petitioner/employer. According to him, these documents were related to the paying capacity of the petitioner, which were relevant for the purpose of determining the real question at issue and, therefore, it ought to have been allowed in view of the provision contained in section 11 sub-section (3) of the Industrial Disputes Act. He relied on several decisions in order to sustain the paying capacity as one of the factors, on which the fixation of wage structure is dependent. He had also contended that the application for leave, to file certain documents, was refused on the ground of that the order passed by this Court, by which the matter was remitted for a decision on issue No. 2, did not permit it. He further contends that the said order of this Court is to be read according to its context. He has specifically pointed out the scope cannot be confined to a particular factor when the remand is open. It is presumed to be open unless it is specifically confined to a particular question. He further contends that the workmen had been permitted to rely on the revised charter of demand, which can be met without additional evidence, which the petitioner/employer wants to produce; otherwise it would be denying justice to the petitioner. He had pointed out from the revised charter of demand that Dearness Allowance (D.A.) has since been incorporated in the wages, although the question of D.A. is a subject matter of a separate reference pending before the Tribunal. He had also contended that the amendment was formal in nature and it was necessary in view of the change of nomenclature or name of the company and these are also necessary for determining the real question at issue. He had also relied on various decisions to which reference should be made at appropriate stage.
(2.) Mr. M. Dutta, learned Counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, contends that the order of the learned Tribunal is quite justified and need no interference by this Court. So far as the documents that are sought to be relied are not relevant since the contention of paying capacity is no more a good law. He has also cited certain decisions in support of his contention. He further contended that the question is to be decided on the basis of the order of remand, which, confined the scope of the adjudication, trusted upon the learned Tribunal. In fact, the reference was made in 1983 pursuant to a charter of demand served in 1981. The application has since been made only to delay the process. It has to be dismissed on the ground of belatedness of mala fide. That apart the application does not disclose any merit on its own. It is absolutely vague and as such the applications are rightly rejected. He, however, contends that section 11(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act does not contemplate conferring of any power of amendment to the Tribunal and as such no amendment can be allowed. He relied on Arun Kumar Ghosh and Ors. v. State of West Bengal and Ors., 2001 (1) CHN 589 , in support of his contention and contended that the Court cannot direct to do something, which is, otherwise, impermissible in law and for which statute does not provide. He relied on a decision in Workmen of Reptakos Brett and Company Limited v. Management, 1992(1) LLJ 340 , in support of his contention with regard to paying capacity, which is not at all necessary. Therefore, this petition should be dismissed.
(3.) I have heard the respective Counsel at length.;